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CHAPTER 1
1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to test different theories cf 
unemployment and to shed light on factors that may have 
contributed to the rise in the unemployment over the pass 
three decades in 22 OECD countries. The thesis also 
attempts to explain why unemployment experiences have been 
so different across OECD countries. Although the chapters 
are interrelated they are written so they can be read 
independently.
Chapter 2 surveys the literature of unemployment. In 
contrast to other surveys, this chapter evaluates theories 
of unemployment in relation to the paths of key 
macroeconomic aggregates over time and across countries. 
The chapter also discusses the empirical multicountry 
models of unemployment.
The survey concludes; 1) that the most popular theories cf 
unemployment cannot adequately explain the paths cf 
unemployment in OECD countries and; 2) the empirical models 
of unemployment shed only limited light on factors that may 
have been responsible for the rise in unemployment and why 
of unemployment differs across nations. The greatest
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problem for most empirical models seems to be a passionate 
focus on wage push factors and the neglect of labour supply 
factors. Moreover, to the extent to which output growth has 
been subject to a factor using bias has not been addressed 
adequately. All these elements, to a varying degree, are 
addressed in this study.
Chapter 3 tests the real wage gap theory, which suggests 
that the rise in unemployment in OECD countries has been 
caused by cyclical demand factors and excessive wages. The 
excess wage component, in these studies is measured by the 
real wage gap which is defined as the proportion of the 
real wage in excess of the marginal productivity of labour 
at full employment. I Use data for 22 countries for 
manufacturing and private services and a measure the real 
wage gap under the Cobb-Douglas technology assumption and 
find that the real wage gap has contributed modestly to the 
unemployment path in most countries. Moreover, the real 
wage gap is not able to contribute to the explanation of 
cross-country differences in unemployment or to the 
increase in the unemployment in the 1980s.
Most studies have estimated the wage gap under the 
assumption that the aggregate production function is Cobb- 
Douglas and occasionally under the assumption that the 
aggregate production function is of the more general CES 
type. Since the wage gap is likely to be sensitive to the 
underlying technology assumption it is important to test
12
which technology is the best one. Chapter 4 derives and 
estimates the real wage gap under the Cobb-Douglas, CES and 
translog technology assumptions for 22 OECD countries. The 
models are compared in terms of nested and diagnostic 
tests. From the point of view of measuring the real wage 
gap the translog production function is found to give the 
best results and the real wage gap path in the 1980s, in 
particular, is sensitive to the underlying technology 
assumption.
It is a common finding in empirical studies that the 
estimate of the best technology depends to a large extent 
in the way to which the technology parameters are 
identified. In chapter 4 the technology parameters are 
identified from direct estimates of the production function 
in conjunction with an income share function. In chapter 5, 
however, I identify the technology parameters in a 
different way and test for the best underlying technology 
assumptions from the viewpoint of the labour demand 
functions. Since the data requirement in the estimations of 
the labour demand are quite different from the data 
requirements when the real wage gap is from a production 
and share equation it follows that the best technology is 
not necessarily the same for the two different approaches.
Chapter 5 derives neoclassical labour demand models under 
different identifying and technology assumptions and 
estimates the labour demand models for manufacturing and
13
private services for 15 OECD countries, a smaller subset of 
my 22 countries because capital stock estimates or 
investment data are not available on a sectoral basis for 
all countries. Cobb-Douglas, CES, translog and constant 
relative elasticity of substitution (CRES) technologies are 
considered. The chapter demonstrates which technology and 
identifying assumptions are likely to give the best 
results, in terms of statistical information criteria and 
diagnostic tests. Unlike the results of chapter 4 which 
suggest that the translog technology assumption is best 
when a production and share function are estimated chapter 
5 finds, from the viewpoint of estimating a labour demand 
function, that the CES profit maximization gives better 
results.
Chapter 6 discusses the model used by Layard and Nickell to 
account for the unemployment path in the UK. I suggest that 
the model is incomplete as a result of unrealistic 
underlying assumptions and cross-equation constraints. It 
is also suggested that the estimation method they employ is 
inadequate. An alternative approach that circumvents some 
of the problems encountered by the Layard-Nickell model is 
suggested. Dynamic simulations with the model suggest that 
wage stickiness, decline in manufacturing employment and 
low GDP growth have all contributed to the rise in the UK 
unemployment from 1967 to 1983.
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New Keynesian theories of unemployment have become popular 
explanations of unemployment and have now entered mosi 
modern economic textbooks. According to these theories OECD 
unemployment has increased as a result of reduced real wage 
flexibility, where wage flexibility refers to the degree of 
real wage response to unemployment or cyclical movements in 
macroeconomic activity.
Chapter 7 tests New Keynesian theories of unemployment. A 
wage equation is employed to test whether unemployment has 
exerted a decreasing downward pressure on real wages over 
the past three decades and especially after 1974, when the 
rate of unemployment started to increase in all OECD 
countries. The chapter also examines whether real wages are 
most sticky in those countries with the highest 
unemployment. A high proportion of the tests reject the Ne« 
Keynesian theories of unemployment.
In chapter 8 a small model to shed light on factors thar 
may have contributed to the unemployment path and cross­
country differences in unemployment is established, 
estimated and simulated. The novel feature of this model, 
compared to most other time series models of unemployment, 
is that 1) labour supply is explicitly considered; 2- 
income changes are decomposed into changes in factor usage 
and changes in productivity and 3) factors that may have 
contributed to the different unemployment paths across 
countries are analysed. The simulations of the model
15
indicates that the slow-down in the rate of growth of real 
GDP since 1973 has contributed much to the rise in the 
unemployment. The decline in manufacturing employment has 
also been an important contributing factor. In contrast to 
most other findings, wage push factors have only modestly 
contributed to the rise in the unemployment.
To conclude it is hoped that this thesis has made the 
following contributions. First, that the rise in 
unemployment is a vary complex phenomenon and cannot be 
explained exhaustively by few factors. Second, excessive 
wages cannot contribute much to the explanation of 
unemployment over time and across countries. Third, I have 
shown how the real wage gap under different technologies 
can be derived and that the wage gap is sensitive to the 
underlying technology assumption. Fourth, labour demand 
under different identifying and technology assumptions are 
derived and estimated. Fifth, the popular model suggested 
by Layard and Nickell is demonstrated analytically and 
empirically to give results one cannot have confidence in. 
Sixth, that New Keynesian theories of unemployment do ncc 
contribute much to our understanding of unemployment.
Overall the thesis suggests that much research is needed to 
give us a better understanding of the factors that may have 
contributed to the rise in unemployment. In my opinion 
contemporary research focus too much on factors that affecc
16
labour demand whereas macroeconomic factors that affect 
labour supply are much neglected.
17
CHAPTER 2
UNEMPLOYMENT: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
LITERATURE
Abstract. Theories of unemployment are evaluated in 
relation to key macroeconomic variables they assume 
unemployment to be related to. The theories cannot 
adequately explain the path of unemployment in OECD 
countries. Most empirical models suggest that a too low GDP 
growth and a too high real wages have been responsible for 
the rise in the unemployment rates in the OECD countries 
since the mid 1970s. Although this may be true these 
empirical models have not yet solved the paradox that the 
warranted real wages have declined mostly, and GDP in the 
private sector increased mostly, in the countries with the 
largest rise in the rate of unemployment since the mid 
1970s.
18
1 Introduction
The two past decades have witnessed a strong rise in the 
unemployment rate in most OECD countries. This has provoked 
a growing bulk of theories on unemployment based on 
microeconomic foundations; most of which follow either the 
"New Keynesian" or the "New Classical" paradigm. In the 
"Old Keynesian" approach, sticky money wages and/or lew 
demand may prevent full employment and the New Keynesian 
theories of unemployment try to explain the sticky nature 
of wages. In the New Classical approach, unemployment is 
assumed to be voluntary and caused by information 
misperception or expectational errors.
Both the New keynesian and New Classical theories cf 
unemployment make the implicit assumption that unemployment 
exists as a result of wages that are too high. The 
existence of a close link between real wages and 
unemployment is, as a rule, taken for granted. Although 
there is empirical evidence in favour of a negative 
correlation between employment and real wages, in my view 
it has never been demonstrated convincingly that the rise 
in the unemployment rate in the OECD countries over the 
past decade and a half has been caused by excessive wages. 
Nor has it been demonstrated that the differences in 
unemployment across OECD countries can be explained by the 
excess wage hypothesis.
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The purpose of this survey is fourfold. First, to relate 
unemployment in most OECD countries to the path of 
important macroeconomic aggregates. Second, briefly to 
present the most popular theories of unemployment in the 
New Keynesian and the New Classical frameworks. Third, to 
discuss the link between real wage and employment in a 
theoretical and an empirical context. Fourth, to analyse 
the empirical multi-country models of unemployment. The 
emphasis of the survey will be on the empirical related 
unemployment literature, as theories of unemployment are 
covered in other surveys.^
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the 
macroeconomic aggregates relating to unemployment for four 
OECD country groups which have followed the same 
unemployment path. Theories of unemployment are discussed 
in section 3 and the disequilibrium wage hypothesis is 
theoretically and empirically reviewed in section 4. 
Section 5 deals with empirical models of unemployment. 
Section 6 briefly discusses the implications of the 
findings.
1. See Lindbeck and Snower (1986a), Nickell (1990), Katz 
(1988), Gordon (1976, 1990), Mankiw (1990) and Stiglitz
(1986) for rigourous surveys of unemployment theories.
20
2 Labour Force, Employment and Unemployment and Their 
Relationship to Macroeconomic Variables
To get a clear picture of the different unemployment 
experiences, 19 OECD countries are divided into four groups 
according to the average unemployment rate over the period
O1980 to 1988. The low unemployment (L) group consists cf 
Japan, Austria, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
The low/medium (LM) unemployment group is the US, 
Australia, Finland, Germany and Portugal. The medium/hich 
(MH) unemployment group composes of Canada, Belgium, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. The high (E) 
unemployment group encompasses Ireland and Spain. The 
arithmetic average is taken of all numbers that appear in 
the figures.
Figure 1 displays the unemployment rate from 1960 to 1968 
with data from the OECD Labour Force Statistics. For the L 
group, the unemployment rate has increased slightly over 
the period. For the other three groups, unemployment 
increased to much the same extent over the 1973 to 19~4 
period but from 1978 to the mid 1980s the unemployment 
rates across these country groups moved apart from each 
other. In particular the H group experienced a strong rise 
in the unemployment rate over the period 1978-85. By 1968
2. My database consists of 22 OECD countries but the number 
of countries considered in the chapters vary according to 
the data requirement. This chapter consider 19 of the 
countries where the data is available from 1960 onwards.
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the L and the LM groups have managed almost to reach the 
unemployment rates existing before the 1980-82 recession. 
The MH and H groups have much higher unemployment rates in 
1988 compared to their pre 1980-82 recession rates.
Figures 2 to 5 display the employment and labour force 
participation as a percentage of the population of working 
age (15 to 64 years of age). The figures suggest that both 
demand and supply of labour have been responsible for 
increased unemployment. In the low and the high 
unemployment countries, for instance, labour supply tends 
to mimic labour demand, whereas the supply and demand for 
labour in the LM and MH groups appear to move more 
independently. It is in this context that it appears 
striking that theories of unemployment usually consider 
either the demand side or the supply side of the labour 
market and not both.
Most New Keynesian theories of unemployment do not consider 
the factors that may affected the labour force 
participation rate. Supply of labour, however, plays a 
central role in most New Classical theories of 
unemployment, following the neoclassical paradigm. Assuming 
that the substitution effect outweighs the income effect ir. 
the labour supply decision neoclassical theories of labour 
supply predict labour supply to be a positive function of
23
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oreal after tax disposable income. Figure 6 displays the 
after tax real wage.^  From the onset of the first oil price 
shock, the participation rate has increased most in the LM 
countries that have experienced the slowest increase in the 
after tax real wage and declined in the H countries that 
have seen the strongest rise in the after tax real wage! 
These simple facts do not seem to support a simple model of 
labour supply that assumes that the substitution effecc 
dominates the income effect.
New Keynesian theories of unemployment assume unemployment 
exists as a result of excessive real wages. Comparison of 
the growth of real product wages across country groups is 
not without pitfalls since advances in labour productivity, 
factor ratios and factor augmenting technical progress 
dictate the warranted growth in the real product wage. 
Advances in labour productivity, for instance, have allowed 
a stronger warranted growth in real wages in Japan than in 
the US during past decades.
To allow for the contribution of differences in the rate oz 
technical change and growth in capital stock across
3. Most cross-section studies find labour supply to be a 
positive function of (real) income or wages. See Keelev 
(1981), chapter 4, for a review on labour supply.
4. After tax real wage is calculated as (1 - t)W/CPI, where
w is direct wages in services and manufacturing, CPI 
consumer prices and t the tax rate, t is calculated as
General Government direct tax and other contributions 
receipts divided by GDP, from OECD's National Accounts, « 
is from ILO's Year Book and consumer prices IMF's 
International Financial Statistics.
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countries the real wage gap, suggested by Sachs (1983) and 
Bruno and Sachs (1985), is used for comparative purposes. 
The real wage gap is defined as that part of the real wage 
in excess of the marginal productivity of labour at full 
employment. It provides a measure of the magnitude of the 
disequilibrium wage. Figure 7 and 8 display the real wage 
gap under the Cobb-Douglas and the translog technology 
assumption respectively.^ The average real wage gap is set 
to zero over the (full employment) period 1965-1969, and is 
measured as the excess wage as a per cent of the full 
employment wage.
All country groups experienced an explosion in the wage gap 
from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s which may have been the 
triggering factor behind the unemployment rise in the wake 
of the first oil price shock. It is noteworthy that the 
wage gap rose strongest in the L and the LM groups up to 
1976 even though they were subsequently to experience the 
least rise in the unemployment rate. Moreover, the real 
wage gap declined mostly in the H country group after 1976 
although this group subsequently experienced the strongesz 
rise in the unemployment rate. Finally, the unemployment 
rate increased after 1977 in all groups notwithstanding a 
decline in the real wage gap. This preliminary glance at 
the data suggests the real wage gap alone is not able to
5. The real wage gap under the Cobb-Douglas, the CES and 
translog technology assumptions are derived, estimated and 
compared in chapter 4.
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explain the different unemployment rates of the countries, 
or the different changes in unemployment through time.
According to the Old Keynesian theories of unemployment, 
the slow-down of GDP growth may have contributed to the 
increase in unemployment. Figure 9, however, shows that 
there is not a simple relationship between GDP growth and 
unemployment. Countries that have experienced the strongest 
GDP growth in private service and manufacturing also have 
faced the strongest rise in the unemployment rate over the 
period 1960-1988. The opposite holds true for the countries 
with the lowest increases in GDP. Additionally, the L group 
saw the greatest slow-down of GDP growth in the period 
1973-1980 without experiencing higher unemployment, whereas 
the other country groups, over the same period, saw an 
approximate 4 per cent rise in the rate of unemployment. 
Note, however, that the impact GDP has on labour demand 
depends on the source of GDP change. Factor using increases 
in GDP and capital augmenting technological progress 
increase employment, whereas labour augmenting 
technological progress decreases employment via direco 
displacement of labour.
Finally, Glyn and Rowthorn (1988) have found that countries 
with the largest rise in the rate of unemployment have 
experienced the largest fall in manufacturing employment. 
The argument, discussed in more details later, is that blue 
collar workers displaced in manufacturing are not easily
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reemployed in the service sector. Figure 10 gives some 
support for this finding, especially after 1980. Comparing 
figures 1 and 10 suggests the relationship between 
decreases in manufacturing employment and increases in the 
rate of unemployment in the two country groups with the 
highest unemployment rate could be quite strong.
To summarize, the different unemployment rates for the OECD 
countries appear to be the result of a complex interaction 
between demand and supply of labour which makes it 
difficult to pin-point the causes of the unemployment 
differences across country groups. It is clear that an 
approach must be adapted that allows for a range of factors 
that have an impact on unemployment and that no single 
factor will be able to explain the unemployment data.
Concerning the supply of labour, the participation rate has 
increased most in countries that have experienced the 
slowest growth in the after tax real wage. This suggests 
that the link from increased real wages to increased labour 
supply to increased unemployment is incorrect. Concerning 
the demand for labour real wage gaps have declined lease 
since the mid 1970s in countries that have experienced the 
largest increase in employment and smallest increase in 
unemployment. Furthermore, GDP in private services and 
manufacturing has not mostly increased in countries that 
have experienced the highest increase in employment. These 
findings suggest that the real wage gap and GDP growth are
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not entirely able to explain cross country differences in 
unemployment rates. Finally, the decline in manufacturing 
employment since the mid 1970s may have contributed to the 
rise in unemployment, especially in countries with the 
highest rate of unemployment.
3 Theories of Unemployment
Before the late 1960s, theories of unemployment were 
dominated by Keynesian and Classical theories (Mamkiw 
(1990)) . According to Keynes, sticky money wages prevent 
real wage falls and hence the labour market from clearing 
when demand for labour is low. For the classical economists 
unemployment only occurs temporarily in unregulated and 
undistorted markets as a result of exogenous shocks in 
technology, tastes, trade and crop failures.
In regulated markets unemployment can exist because laws cr 
tradeunions prevent wages from falling. The New Classical 
theories of unemployment assume labour to be on its 
notional labour supply scheme during unemployment periods, 
the New Keynesian theories assume that fluctuations in 
unemployment are associated with unemployed who want to 
work at the prevailing wage and therefore employment is ncc 
on the notional supply curve.
The role of money is another feature that distinguish the 
two frameworks. Money has no role in determine employment
34
and unemployment in the New Classical theories following 
the classical dichotomy. Real variables such as employment 
and output, are determined in the Walrasian system, whereas 
nominal variables, such as price level and wages, are 
determined in the money market (Mankiw (1989)). In the 
Keynesian model money demand and supply may affect 
employment and hence unemployment via changes in aggregate 
demand in the IS/LM framework and changes in the price 
level. If wages are not fully adjusted, or are slow to 
adjust, to a change in the price level changes in money 
demand or supply will affects employment via changes ir­
real wages.
3.1 New Classical Theories of Unemployment
In the New Classical approach unemployment is a Pareto- 
efficient response of the labour market to changes in 
tastes and technology, and hence unemployment may be 
regarded as voluntary. Unemployment in these theories 
reduces to a rational reaction to changes in relative 
prices. An activist government which seeks to chance 
unemployment distorts an otherwise equilibrating private 
sector and hence makes things worse. The most well know:. 
New Classical theories of unemployment are the following.
Imperfect Information. These models depart slightly fror, 
the Walrasian paradigm by assuming that the agent's 
expected consumer prices may deviate from realized consumer
35
prices (Friedman (1968) ) . An unexpected increase in prices, 
say due to an expansive monetary policy that is assumed to 
feed faster into price changes than wage changes, will lead 
firms to recruit more labour as the real product wage 
decreases. This will cause a temporary fall in the
unemployment rate from its natural rate. In a slightly 
different version, suggested by Lucas (1972, 1973),
producers are assumed to know the prices of their own
products, but not the general price level. An unexpected
increase in the price level hence leads to an outpur
expansion since producers erroneously infer the relative 
price of the product they produce to be high. The higher 
output temporarily lowers the unemployment rate. Increases 
in the unemployment rate above the natural rate can resulr 
from the opposite effect.
These theories have been criticized on the ground than 
misperception of relative prices/real wages may not lasn 
over a prolonged period as in the 1930s and the past twn 
decades (Gordon (1976); Mankiw (1990)). Moreover, monetary 
innovations in these models are assumed to have a temporary 
effect on employment. Nelson and Plosser (1982) have 
observed that most economic time-series appear to be non­
stationary and do not follow a deterministic Irene, 
implying that some fraction of innovations in output is 
permanent and alters the long-run trend in output.
36
Search theories. In the theories unemployment increases 
when workers refuse to take job offers. Unemployment will 
rise therefore when firms reduce wage offers relative to 
the acceptance wage, in periods of falling product demand 
(Alchian (1970) ; Mortensen (1970); Phelps (1970); Parsons 
(1973); Siven (1974)). Workers are by assumption able to 
search for new jobs only while being unemployed. 
Unemployment increases as a result of the misperception of 
workers of the wage distribution relative to the expected 
price level. Workers belive that the distribution of wage 
offers are more advantageous to them than is actually the 
case. Unemployment thus depends entirely on misinformation. 
In these models anything that influences the cost of job 
search affects unemployment. Government unemployment 
benefits, for instance, tend to stretch the length of 
unemployment spells and create unemployment because they 
subsidise the search process.
It is, of course, doubtful that the high and persistent 
unemployment in the 1930s and the past two decades are 
entirely due to the persistence of misinformation. The 
theory also cannot explain the fact that lay-offs increase 
and quits decrease during recessions.
Sectoral shifts. This theory is formally advanced in the 
paper by Lucas and Prescott (1974), but first became 
popular in the US in the 1980s due to papers by Lilien 
(1982) and Black (1987) . According to this theory,
37
unemployment is initiated by stochastic shocks, which imply 
increased wage differentials between sectors via the labour 
demand schedule. The increased wage differentials lead 
workers to move from low-wage to high-wage sectors. Since, 
by assumption, active employment search is only possible 
while unemployed, the shock will lead to a rise in the 
unemployment.
The empirical evidence does not seem to support this 
theory. First, the movement of workers from one job to 
another is procyclical in contrast to the theory 
predictions (Murphy and Topel (1987)). Second, the theory 
implies a positive correlation between unemployment and 
vacancies which is not observed, that is, labour demand
increases in some sectors and decreases in others at the
same time. In the medium-term, however, a significant shifr 
outward has been observed in the unemployment-vacancy (UV 
schedule since 1975 which suggests that a larger fraction 
of unemployment may be due to structural factors but the 
outward shift is not a general phenomenon.
Real business cycles. According to this theory exogenous 
stochastic fluctuations in the rate of technological change 
lead to fluctuations in relative prices (Kydland and
Prescott (1982); Long and Plosser (1983) ; Barro and King 
(1984); Prescott (1986)). Fluctuations in relative prices, 
in turn, lead rational individuals to alter their
consumption and labour supply. If the price of leisure
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increases (wage) relative to the price of goods, workers 
rationally reduce their labour supply and this affects 
unemployment.
Business cycle theories of unemployment have been subject 
to a large body of criticism. Since the rate of 
unemployment fluctuates markedly the theory implies large 
changes in technology. Summers (1986) and Mankiw (1989) 
argue that large changes in technology, and especially 
technological regress, are unlikely to occur. Stadler 
(1990) argues that most technological innovations are 
dependent on economic factors and therefore endogenous, 
rather than exogenous as suggested by business cycle 
theories. Empirical support of business cycle theories is 
also lacking. Stockman (1988) finds that most macroeconomic 
fluctuations cannot be ascribed to technological shocks 
alone. If the business cycle is primarily due to supply 
shocks, business cycle theories predict the marginal costs 
will move counter-cyclically. Bils (1987) finds evidence 
for the opposite.
3.2 New Keynesian Theories of Unemployment
Up to the 1970s conventional Keynesian macroeconomic 
analysis was mainly interpretated in the Hicksian IS/LM 
framework, without any attempt to construct the theory 
within an explicit disequilibrium context (Mankiw (1990)). 
In the seminal paper by Barro and Grossman (1971), which
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built on the foundations laid down by Clower (1965) and 
Patinkin (1965), the Keynesian paradigm is interpretated in 
a general disequilibrium context where unemployment can 
arise either as a result of excessive wages and/or 
insufficient demand. The Barro-Grossman paper has initiated 
a growing bulk of New Keynesian theories of unemployment 
with the ambition of establishing microeconomic foundations 
to Keynesian macroeconomics. The mainstream New Keynesian 
theories of unemployment try to answer the following 
question; why are wages sticky when unemployment exists? 
The most popular New Keynesian theories of unemployment are 
the following.
Implicit contract theories. The early contributions by 
Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974) and D. F. Gordon (1974), 
share two common assumptions. First, workers are more risk 
averse than employers due to occupational selection and 
less opportunities of the workers to diversify their human 
capital; and second, the contractual arrangement between 
workers and employers is implicit and unwritten. Since 
workers are assumed to be more risk averse than employers, 
it becomes optimal for firms to minimize the income 
variability of their workers. The outcome is sticky money 
wages. Sticky money wages may translates into real wage 
rigidities which prevent the labour market from clearing. 
An adverse demand shock therefore results in worker lay­
offs and unemployment.
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Implicit contract theories have been questioned on two 
grounds. First, why do reductions in demand result in lay­
offs rather than reduced hours (Gordon (1976)) . Second, 
implicit contract theory is a theory of wage stickiness and 
not of employment (Stiglitz (1986)). Implicit contracts do 
not result in unemployment fluctuations, and insurance 
contracts in fact improve the functioning of a competitive 
market. Stiglitz (1986) has demonstrated that implicit 
contracts imply either full employment or overemployment 
and therefore it is difficult to justify them as theories 
of unemployment.
Efficiency wages. These theories hypothesize that worker 
productivity is a positive function of the wage paid 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984); Weiss (1980); Phelps (1970); 
Salop (1979); Akerlof (1984)) . Unemployment is an 
equilibrium response to information asymmetries and is 
triggered by wages in excess of market clearing levels. 
Keeping wages above the market clearing level is, from the 
firms' point of view, optimal as it encourage workers ncr 
to shirk, lowers labour turnover, attracts a high quaiiry 
labour force and increases the workers morale.
Yellen (1984) has questioned efficiency wage models on the 
following grounds: Why do other types of labour contracts, 
which are Pareto-superior to unemployment, not arise in 
efficiency wage models? Why do workers, in the training 
costs-reduction of labour turnover model, not pay the firm
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for training or post a bond for leaving prematurely? Why do 
firms, in the shirking model, not impose a penalty payable 
to the firm for shirking? Workers should be willing to 
purchase jobs if they provide rents. This act would allow 
wages to adjust to eliminate the disequilibrium wage.
The efficiency-wage theories have had some empirical 
success. The efficiency-wage premium may vary across firms 
due to different monitoring and turnover costs. Studies by 
Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988) and 
Murphy and Topel (1987) observe that wage differentials are 
positively related to monopoly power, profitability, and 
capital intensity and these are likely to be positively 
related to monitoring and turnover costs.
Insider-outsider theories. Wages are set by insiders 
(employed) whose interests are represented by the unions 
and the unemployed (outsiders) have become disenfranchised 
(Gregory (1982); Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987); 
Lindbeck and Snower (1986b, 1987, 1988)). An unexpected 
negative shock raises unemployment, and the vicious circle 
which disenfranchises the unemployed is initiated. There 
are different mechanisms that cause a negative shock to 
have long-term unemployment effects: First, unemployed 
workers lose the opportunity to maintain and update their 
skills by working and over time they lose contact with the 
labour market (Blanchard and Summers (1986)). Second, the 
insiders have bargaining power over outsiders due to
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turnover costs, hiring costs, training costs and firing 
costs, all of which make inside labour effectively cheaper 
then the outsiders (Lindbeck and Snower (1986)) . On behalf 
of the insiders the unions role is to amplify the costs of 
hiring, training and firing and thereby ensure the labour 
market advantages of their members. The implication of the 
insider-outsider story is that once unemployment increases 
in response to a negative shock an even stronger positive 
shock is needed to reverse the process due to the human 
capital deterioration among the long-term unemployed.
The insider-outsider theories (and the labour turnover 
efficiency wage model) predict that firms with the highest 
turnover costs will have the least flexible wages. Using 
sectoral data for Canada and France, Campbell (1989) finds 
evidence for this. Moreover, in concurrence with 
efficiency-wage theories, the insider-outsider theory is 
consistent with the fact that the most profitable ani 
capital intensive firms pay the highest wage premiums ana 
have the lowest quit rates. Finally, Gregory (1986) finds 
wage growth to be influenced significantly by labour 
utilisation within the firm, measured as overtime hours 
worked, but not by the unemployment rate for Australia 
after 1977. This suggests that insiders possess a stronger 
power in the wage negotiation process than outsiders.
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3.3 Can the Above Theories Explain the Macroeconomic 
Aggregates?
Common to all theories of unemployment discussed above is 
the implicit assumption that unemployment persists and is 
often caused by excessive wages. Moreover, unemployment is 
caused either by shifts in demand for labour or supply of 
labour, not both. The discussion in section 2 underscores 
the fact that factors that affect both supply and demand 
for labour have been responsible for the unemployment rise. 
Hence, none of the theories above can claim to be an 
exhaustive theory of unemployment. Moreover, New Keynesian 
theories fail to explain why labour demand, in proportion 
to the population of working age, has not increased 
strongest in the countries with the smallest increase in 
the wage gap. New Classical theories fail to explain why 
the labour participation rate has not increased most in 
countries with the strongest increase in the after tax real 
wage. It appears therefore that the search for an adequate 
theory of the OECD unemployment needs to continue.
4 Wages and Unemployment: The Disequilibrium Wage 
Hypothesis
The link between real wages and unemployment plays a 
pivotal role in unemployment theories. The theoretical and 
empirical links are discussed below and the real wage gap 
theory associated with Bruno and Sachs (1985) is evaluated.
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4.1.1 The Theory of Real Wages and Employment
The negative relationship between real wages and employment 
is derived from the neoclassical system of perfect 
competition, where employment is set at the point where the 
real wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labour. 
A decrease in the real wage increases employment via the 
assumption of a diminishing marginal product of labour.
The assumption of imperfect competition does not change the 
principal hypothesis of a negative relationship between 
real product wages and employment. Assuming that the 
capital stock, the marginal user costs, and the marginal 
wage rate, are fixed, labour demand can be derived as 
follows. Given profit maximization as the firms objective
max P ° Y - W N - R K
where R is cost of capital, P° output prices, Y GDP, W 
wages and N employment the first order condition for profio 
maximization is P° = 8 (W N + R K) /5y under perfecn 
competition. Under imperfect competition on the gooes 
market and constant factor prices we get
p° = (i 8(w n + r K) /5y = \i w 5n/5y + (i R 5k/5y,
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where (I = 1 + 1/rj and rj is the price elasticity of demand. 
Assuming that 8k /8y is zero and a homogeneous Cobb-Douglas 
production function, Y = (AN)aK1-a, then
P° = |i W/ (AaaNa-1K1_a) .
Isolating N on the left hand side, with lowercase letters 
in logs, gives
n = - 1/(a - l)log a + 1/(a - l)log}i + a/(a - l)log A
+ k + 1/(a - 1) (w - p°) . (1)
Since a < 1 a negative relationship exists between real
product wages and employment.
Since firms are never demand constrained in the 
neoclassical world, secondary demand effects of changes in 
wages are unimportant. If firms are demand constrained as a 
possibility allowed for in the Barro and Grossman (1971) 
model, in the sense that firms wish to produce more than 
they are able to sell at prevailing prices, an increase in 
wages in excess of value-added prices and productivity may 
affect employment via following channels: 1) A higher
propensity to consume out of wages than profit, at least in 
the short-run, increases demand. 2) A capital loss on 
financial assets, when wages increase is announced and 
realized, curbs consumption via the wealth effect in the 
consumption function. 3) Malinvaud (1982) argues that real
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product wages have an impact on employment via investments 
in the long-run. Lower profitability affects investments 
through the profitability constraint and the financing 
constraint. In the former, due to Tobin (1969), investment 
is undertaken if the stock capitalization is in excess cf 
the replacement value of capital. The latter is due to 
Catinat et al. (1988) where internal financing cf 
investments may be constrained by low profitability. This 
in turn, affects the external financing since a lack cf 
internal funds is likely to hamper the access to external 
credit.
4.1.2 Empirical Evidence on the Relationship Between Real 
Wages and Employment
The real wage-employment relationship has been studied 
extensively. Most studies find a statistically negative 
relationship between employment and real wages (Hammermesh 
(1986)) but the evidence is mixed. Some studies, notably 
the study by Geary and Kennan (1982), however, fail to find 
a negative relationship between employment and real wages. 
Nickell and Symons (1990) show that this outcome is likely 
to be due to the use of an inaccurate price-deflator. 
Summers (1987) has pointed out that empirical studies with 
lagged real wages in the labour demand function may find a 
spurious negative relationship for the following reason: If 
firms increase prices, due to a surge in demand in the 
first period, but then increase the supply of goods and
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demand for labour in the next period, a negative
relationship is established since real wages have been 
falling in the first period. Anyadike-Danes and Godley 
(1989) demonstrating a similar point by finding a 
significant negative relationship between employment and 
real wages with generated data from a model without any 
causal link from real wages to employment. In order to 
avoid the possibility of a spurious employment-real wage 
relationship due to the possibility of a price rise ahead 
of a wage rise, chapter 3 of the thesis estimates the 
employment-real wage relationship using five and seven 
years differences in the variables to measure changes in 
employment and real wages for 22 OECD countries. Employment 
is found significantly to be negative correlated with real 
wages.
The secondary demand effects of an increase in the 
disequilibrium wage that I discussed in the previous 
section are hard to quantify and much influenced by the 
often intangible reactions of credit and financial markets. 
If firm profitability is "high" the impact of a wage rise 
on employment via credit and financial markets is likely tc 
be low. Concerning investments, the impact of profitability 
has not been studied much empirically. Catinat et al. 
(1988) find profitability to be a statistically significant 
determinant of investment, but its quantitative impact or.
investments is low.
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4.2 The Real Wage Gap Theory
As mentioned in section 2, the real wage gap is a summary 
measure of the excess component of the real wage. The real 
wage gap is set to zero in a full employment period. A 
positively wages gap then measures the per cent points the 
real wage has to fall to ensure full employment, adjusted 
for the influence on productivity of the business cycle. 
The real wage gap, together with cyclical shift parameters, 
is used by Sachs (1983) , Bruno and Sachs (1985) and Brunc
(1986) to explain the unemployment path in Europe and the 
US. They argue that demand factors lead to the unemployment 
rise in the periods 1973-75 and 1979-82, and an excessive 
wage increase that generated a real wage gap is responsible 
for the increase in unemployment between these two periods. 
Empirically, they find the real wage elasticity in labour 
demand to be negative and that the real wage gap- 
unemployment elasticity to be positive. These findings, 
however, are not sufficient to validate their assertions. 
For instance, comparing the Cobb-Douglas real wage gap for 
the whole economy in the US, the EEC and Japan Gordon
(1987) demonstrates that the real wage gap in the 1970s and 
the 1980s was highest in Japan although it faces the loves: 
unemployment rate. Chapter 3 of the thesis shows that the 
results by Bruno and Sachs are due partly to a country 
selection bias and the real wage gap cannot explain the 
different levels of unemployment rates across countries.
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5 Empirical Modelling of the Unemployment Path
The reduced form and structural form approaches have 
frequently been used to account for the unemployment path 
in the OECD countries. The former regresses unemployment on 
explanatory variables. In the latter, estimated structural 
parameters of wage, labour demand and, occasionally, price 
equations are employed to simulate unemployment due to 
shifts in "exogenous" variables.^
5.1 Reduced Form Approach
Bruno and Sachs (1985), McCallum (1986) and Bruno (1986) 
explain unemployment in a reduced form equation but the 
variables in the equation are derived from a structural 
model. Rowthorn and Glyn (1987), Glyn and Rowthorn (1988), 
Barro (1988) and Benjamin and Köchin (1979) go directly to 
the reduced form without being explicit about the 
structural equations. All these models are discussed below.
In the estimates of Bruno (1986) and McCallum (1986) the 
unemployment rate is regressed on the real wage gap and
6. Empirical estimates of macroeconomic rationing models by 
Sneessens (1983, 1987), Sneessens and Dreze (1986), Lambero 
(1990) and Coen and Hickman (1987, 1988) amongst others are 
not considered. Due to the complex estimation procedure of 
these models, their empirical validity is difficult to 
assess. More importantly, macroeconomic rationing models 
have, to my knowledge, not been applied in a multicountrv 
context.
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cyclical shift parameters, where lower-case letters refer 
to logs
Au = ß0 + ß^Awx + p2Adm + p3Adw + ß^Ad^ + ß^Ad^ + ßgAd^
+ ß7AUw + Elf (2)
where U is the unemployment rate, wx the real wage gap, d~ 
real monetary stock, dw deviation of world trade from its 
trend, df the cyclical and inflation corrected fiscal 
balance in percentage of potential GDP, dc the price 
competitiveness on export markets, d11 a terms-of-trade 
effect and Uw the weighted average of the unemployment 
rates in the country sample minus own country unemployment. 
To account for the rise in the unemployment rate, the 
estimated equation. (2) is used to simulate the
contribution of each factor to the path of unemployment.
In Bruno's (1986) approach equation. (2) is estimated over 
the period 1962 to 1982 for eight countries with wx, dm and 
dw as explanatory variables lagged one and two periods. He 
finds that the increase in the real wage gap explains much 
of the unemployment increase during the mid 1970s. The
unemployment growth in the end of the 197 0s and the
beginning of the 1980s can primarily be attributed tz 
aggregate demand factors but the continuous rise in the 
wage gap also played a role in some countries. Since single 
country estimates are not reported the credibility of the 
analysis is difficult to judge. Some information can be
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extracted from a reported pooled cross-section and time- 
series estimate. These results show that the statistical 
significance of the parameter estimates in general are low 
and the model explains about the half of the variance in 
AU. Since the t-statistics in a pooled estimate are in 
general much higher than in single country estimates the 
significance of the parameters in the single country 
equations is likely to be quite low.
McCallum (1986) estimates equation. (2) with dw excluded. 
He employs a pooled cross-section and time-series analysis 
over the annual period 1979 to 1984 for 14 OECD countries, 
with all explanatory variables lagged one period. The 
pooled cross-section and time-series estimate is then used 
to simulate the change in the unemployment rate for 
individual countries over the period 1979 to 1984. McCallum 
finds that cross-country differences in the change in the 
unemployment rate have been due largely to fiscal and 
monetary policy and that the real wage has played a minor
7role.
7. McCallum implicitly assumes that the real monetary stock 
reflects the stance of the monetary policy. Due tz 
increased capital mobility across borders and the abolition 
of quantitative ceilings on bank lending, monetary 
aggregates may not give much information on the stance cf 
the monetary policy. The stance of monetary policy is also 
reflected in the exchange rate and interest rate movements, 
and they often give conflicting indications. See Stiglitz 
(1988) and Chouraqui et al. (1988) for further discussion 
of this aspect.
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McCallum's study is particularly difficult to assess 
because he uses a wide range of variables constructed from 
combinations of data and parameters estimated from other 
studies.® Moreover, the estimation period used by McCallum 
is too short to test the reliability of his model and 
whether the coefficients across countries can be assumed tc 
be homogeneous. ^ Finally, there are some measurement: 
problems. The real wage is measured as the hourly wage ir. 
manufacturing deflated by manufacturing output prices. 
Since the unemployment rate refers to the whole economy, 
the real wage should do that too. He also make the 
classical error of deflating wages with output prices 
instead of the value-added price-deflator. Finally, the 
hourly wage does not encompass indirect labour costs which 
count for up to 50 per cent of total labour costs in OECP 
countries (Swedish Employers’ Confederation (1989)) .
Bruno and McCallum both fail to develop a thorough model of 
labour supply and as a result it is to judge the role 
labour supply as a contributing factor to the rise ir.
8. McCallum adjusts the demand variables as follows: The 
wage gap for each country is multiplied by the labour 
demand elasticity with respect to the real wage, estimates 
by Newell and Symons (1985), divided by the mean elasticity 
across countries. The demand shifts variables are 
multiplied by Okuns coefficient for individual countries 
divided by the means of the shift variables across 
countries, which again is multiplied by a constant and the 
relative openness of the economy (import-GDP ratio). Okuns 
coefficient is calculated as the sum of the estimates of 
05^  and tÖ2 from the equation Ut = töq + tö-^ GDPi- + G^GDP^.^ * 
033t + v^t^ + tö^ t® + et, estimated over the period I960 tc 
1984 .
9. McCallum tests for structural stability, which, of 
course, does not make sense over a five year sample period.
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unemployment. Equation (2) is the reduced form of the 
labour demand and supply, where labour supply is assumed to 
be a function of employment.
Glyn and Rowthorn (1988) and Rowthorn and Glyn (1987) 
explicitly take labour supply factors into account. These 
studies examine the diversity of the rise in unemployment 
across 19 OECD countries from 1973 to 1985. To serve this 
purpose they regress U-^ggg - U^ggg over the same period, cn 
changes in variables, hypothesized to have an impact on the 
unemployment rate. The statistically most significant 
variables that explain the diversity of unemployment are 
the growth rate of working age population and industrial 
employment. The authors suggest that changes in industrial 
employment influences unemployment because workers skills 
tend to be industry specific and concentrated in particular 
geographical areas. GDP and the real wage change are found 
to be only weakly correlated with the change in the rate cf 
unemployment.
The studies by Glyn and Rowthorn are important because they 
emphasise the need to incorporate labour supply explicitly 
into the analysis. Moreover, they highlight the merits cf 
utilizing cross-country unemployment diversity in the 
estimations. Since only 19 observations are available, the 
authors run a double digit number of regressions with one 
explanatory variable in each equation in their 1987 paper. 
This estimation strategy renders their conclusions fragile.
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Monte Carlo studies have shown that randomly generated 
variables after a sufficient number of replications always 
will be able to explain another variable significantly 
(Granger and Newbold (1974)) . Finally, it is erroneous to 
use the change in the real wage across countries without 
adjusting it for advances in productivity as discussed in 
section 2. The real wage gap should have been used instead.
In the studies by Barro (1988) and Benjamin and Köchin 
(1979) they implicitly accept the hypothesis that an 
excessive real wage is the only factor responsible for the 
unemployment path. Since the empirical estimates referred 
to above have demonstrated that the real wage or the real 
wage gap alone cannot explain the unemployment path and 
diversity across OECD countries, these studies are of 
limited value.
5.2 Structural Approach
The structural approach suggested in the seminal 
papers by Layard and Nickell (1985a; 1985b; 1986) has 
gained wide popularity as a framework to account for the 
unemployment change in a single country (Bean et al. 
(1986); Pissarides (1991); Dolado et al. (1986); Pehkonen
(1989); Huay and Groenewold (1989)). In the Layard and 
Nickell approach a labour demand equation, a price equation 
and a wage equation are estimated by three stage least 
squares. Although the real wage may have triggered the rise
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in the unemployment it is not the causal factor since it is 
not truly exogenous. Therefore the wage equation is 
estimated to link wage changes to "exogenous" wage push 
factors. To account for the unemployment path the estimated 
system is simulated with the shifts in "exogenous" 
variables over periods where the unemployment rate has been 
rising. The change in the unemployment rate from the 
initial full employment period can then be traced back to 
the changes in the "exogenous" variables.
Bean et al. (1986) use a simplified version of the Layard 
and Nickell (1986) model to account for the rise in 
unemployment in 18 OECD countries. They find demand to be 
an important contributing factor behind the rise in the 
unemployment rate over the period from 1956-66 to 1980-83, 
especially in the EEC. Wage push factors, such as search 
intensity and higher taxes, also contributed significantly.
There are two major difficulties of the Layard and Nickel! 
model which are associated with the role of the capital 
stock and the cyclical changes in the price mark-ups over 
marginal costs. The model is constructed in such a way 
that, on balance, changes in the capital stock and 
technological advances do not affect employment. This 
occurs because an increase in the capital stock and the 
technology are assumed to increase productivity and real 
wages proportionately so that unemployment does not change. 
These are strange restrictions since we have seen a secular
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increase in demand for labour in response to changes in the 
technology and the capital stock. The point is analysed in 
details in chapter 6 of the thesis.
Another difficulty is related to the role of the price 
mark-ups over marginal costs which provides the only 
mechanism for the economic cycle to affect unemployment in 
the model. As a result the estimated effect of changes in 
the mark-up on labour demand and hence unemployment is 
often unreasonable large. An even more serious difficulty 
is that Layard and Nickell do not measure the mark-up 
directly but approximate it by cyclical variables. These 
cyclical variables are supposed to capture the economic 
cycle which in turn is assumed to capture the cyclical 
nature of mark-ups. The model assumes that increases in 
unemployment are associated with reductions in the mark-up. 
Other researchers, however, who have directly focused their 
studies on variations of the mark-up over the cycle, 
conclude that the mark-up behaves in the opposite way to 
that hypothesized by Layard and Nickell. Bils (1987), 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Price (1991) find that the 
mark-up typically falls during booms. These results suggest 
that the crucial variables included by Layard and Nickell 
are not measuring mark-up effects but are perhaps measuring 
Keynesian demand shifts. In other words, many of the 
cyclical variables should be included in the model in their 
own right.
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The empirical results of Bean et al. (1986) do not seem to 
be plausible. For instance they find that a 9.68 percentage 
point increase in the Dutch unemployment rate in the period 
1956-66 to 1980-83 is a result of a cyclical change in the 
price mark-up over marginal costs. They also estimate that 
changes in the mark-ups lead to an increase in unemployment 
of 5.33, 5.40 and 4.59 for the UK, Denmark and Canada 
respectively. These estimates seem to high. Another 
difficulty is that search intensity is estimated as the 
contribution of a time and a squared time trend to the 
outward shift in the UV relationship. It is far too simple 
to explain the outward shift in the UV relationship to a 
decrease in search activity as is shown by Blanchard and 
Diamond (1989) amongst others. In the Blanchard-Diamond 
model the following elements affect the position of the UV- 
curve: sectoral and cyclical shocks; autonomous changes in 
labour force participation; changes in the rate of capital 
accumulation; changes in the autonomous quit rate; and 
shifts in the matching function.
6 Concluding Remarks
Although the mounting number of theories of unemployment 
have given some insights into factors that may have caused 
the rise in unemployment in OECD countries they have not 
yet given an satisfactory account of the rise. The basic 
problem with the New Keynesian theories of unemployment is 
that they are theories of real wages. It is implicitly
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taken for granted that unemployment exists as a result of 
excessive wages. This, however, is not what we observe. 
First, despite a falling real wage gap since the mid 1970s 
the unemployment rate has continued to increase in most 
OECD countries. Second, excess wages have decreased most in 
countries with the strongest increase in unemployment since 
the mid 1970s.
The New Classical theories of unemployment also face a 
number of difficulties. They for example are unable to 
account for the persistence of unemployment, unless one is 
willing to accept that information misperceptions and 
expectational errors can persist for decades.
Most empirical studies of unemployment also leave us with 
many unanswered questions. They have not been able to 
explain the paradox that the rate of unemployment has 
increased strongest in countries with the largest fall in 
the real wage gap since the mid 1970s. Nor have they been 
able to explain why the unemployment rate has increased 
mostly in countries with the largest rise in GDP. Although 
econometric and methodological problems are present in the 
studies by Rowthorn and Glyn (1987) and Glyn and Rowthorn 
(1988) it is interesting to note that they find that 
factors, other than those traditionally focused on, may 
have been responsible for the rise in unemployment in the 
OECD countries in the past few decades.
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CHAPTER 3
CAN THE REAL WAGE GAP EXPLAIN THE UNEMPLOYMENT PATH IN 22
OECD COUNTRIES?
Abstract. This chapter tests whether the real wage gap is 
able to explain parts of the unemployment path in 22 OECD 
countries by employing different time series models. Using 
pooled cross-section and time-series data it is furthermore 
tested whether the real wage gap has contributed to the 
explanation of cross-country differences in unemployment. 
Whereas the evidence suggest the wage gap has contributed 
to the increased unemployment since the first oil price 
shock for individual countries it has not contributed to 
the different paths of unemployment rates across countries.
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1 Introduction
The persistently high rate of unemployment in many OECD 
countries over the past two decades has been a major puzzle 
in the economic literature. In some influential 
contributions, Sachs (1983), Bruno and Sachs (1985) (B&S) 
and Bruno (1986) suggest that wages above market-clearing 
levels and demand factors since 1973 have been responsible. 
This suggestion is supported by an analysis which involves 
regressing the unemployment rate on the real wage gap and 
cyclical shifts variables. The real wage gap is defined as 
the proportion of the real wage in excess of the marginal 
productivity of labour at full employment.
This chapter goes a step further than B&S in an 
investigation of the general ability of the real wage gap 
and cyclical demand variables to explain the unemployment 
rate over time and across countries. The 6 country sample 
considered by B&S and the 8 country sample considered by 
Bruno (1986), is expanded to 22 and the estimates are 
performed with the real wage gap in the private service 
sector in addition to the manufacturing sector. In the B&S 
estimates the real wage gap, estimated for manufacturing, 
is applied to the whole economy.-*- The effect of the real 
wage gap on unemployment is estimated using different 
models among which are models employed by B&S.
1. Gordon (1987) demonstrates the real wage gap in 
manufacturing show quite different time series behaviour 
compared to the path of the wage gap for the whole economy.
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The empirical findings suggest the real wage gap has been a 
contributing factor to the unemployment path in the OECD 
countries. However, the real wage gap is not able to 
explain the strong rise in the OECD unemployment since the 
first oil price shock even though cyclical demand variables 
are included in the equations to allow for demand 
constrained situations. Finally, although changes in the 
real wage gap do not seem to be important contributors to 
changes in the unemployment rates they are more successful 
at explaining employment changes across countries.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly 
presents the derivation of the real wage gap under the 
Cobb-Douglas technology assumption. Section 3 describes the 
data and displays the path of the real wage gap in the 
manufacturing and the private service sector in the seven 
most important OECD countries. Section 4 outlines and 
estimates the models and further examines whether the wage 
gap models, estimated by B&S, are able to predict the 
turning points in the unemployment rates that occurred in 
the mid 1980s in most OECD countries. Section 5 calculates 
the zero wage gap unemployment rate in 1988. Section 6 sums 
up the main conclusions.
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2 The Real Wage Gap
B&S (1985) and Sachs (1983) define the wage gap as the 
excess real wage over the full employment marginal product 
of labour. Under the Cobb-Douglas technology, the wage gap 
can be calculated as follows: Given the production function 
Q = ALaK^ -_cc, with L as working hours and K capital 
services, the marginal productivity of labour is dQ/dL = 
a(Q/L), and the full-employment marginal product of labour
-p -pis o l ( Q l / L-1-) . With small letters denoting logs the real 
wage gap is then defined as
wx = (w - pq) - (qf - lf + log(a)), (1)
where w is direct and indirect labour costs per working 
hour and pq the value-added price-deflator. Analytically, 
B&S show labour demand to be a negative linear function of 
wx under the assumption that firms are on their output: 
supply schedules. In the empirical estimates, however, B&5 
relate unemployment rather than employment to the real wage 
gap. To support this approach B&S (1985) demonstrate a 
positive relationship between labour supply and employment: 
via discouraged worker effects. Hence, the unemployment: 
rate can be used as dependent variable in the reduced form 
of a demand and supply model. This requires, however, thac 
the component of labour supply which is not explained by 
employment is fixed in the estimation period. This
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assumption is not likely to hold and estimates below 
suggest that this is indeed the case.
3 Calculation of the Wage Gap
The real wage gap is calculated for manufacturing and 
private services excluding the agricultural sector and 
mining for the countries in which it accounts for more then 
3 per cent of GDP (that is for Canada, Australia, the 
Netherlands and Norway). The government sector is excluded 
since labour productivity and the value added deflator are 
not easily measured in this sector. The agricultural and 
mining sector are excluded as their value-added price- 
deflators tend to fluctuate strongly in line with output 
prices as a result of the double deflating principle in 
national accounts. Compensation per working hour is the 
total labour compensation divided by working hours on a 
sectoral basis. Before 1970, employee compensation on a 
sectoral basis is not readily available. Hence compensation 
to employees for the whole economy is divided between the 
manufacturing and service sector according to the 
development in the hourly wage in the two sectors, weighted 
by sectoral person hours worked. Data availability dictated 
the use of annual data.
The trend-through-peak method used by B&S is employed to 
estimate the full employment labour productivity, (qf-l~). 
We assume (q - 1) to be equal to (q^  - 1^ ) at the cyclical
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peaks years of 1960, 1973, 1979 and 1988, and to grow at a 
constant exponential rate between the periods. Since 1979 
and 1988 are not full employment years, the estimated trend 
productivity growth rates may be biased. B&S (1985) and 
Burda and Sachs (1988), however, find the full employment 
productivity growth rates to be insensitive to alternative 
estimations of full employment labour productivity under 
the Cobb-Douglas technology assumption. The real wage gap 
on average is normalized to zero in the (full employment) 
period from 1965 to 1969 for all but two countries (1966-69 
for Denmark and 1971 for New Zealand).
In the figures 1 to 7, the real wage gap in services and 
manufacturing are exhibited for the G7 countries (Canada, 
the US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy and the UK) over the 
period 1960 to 1988. For most of the countries, including 
those not displayed, the real wage gap rose sharply from 
the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s, and subsequently showed a 
declining trend.
Over the considered period the real wage gap has grown more 
in private services than manufacturing due to a weaker 
productivity growth and a firmer growth in compensation to 
employees per working hour. A stronger growth in the value- 
added price-deflator in private services, however, has 
worked in the opposite direction.
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The different magnitude and path of the real wage gap in 
the two sectors show that an assessment of the magnitude of 
the disequilibrium wage on the basis of the manufacturing 
sector solely, may be misleading. For Canada, Germany, 
France and Italy, for instance, the real wage gap is 
positive for one sector and negative for the other in most 
of the 1980s. For the UK in the first half of the 1970s, 
the real wage gap picked-up by 20 per cent in 
manufacturing, but at the same time decreased by 20 per 
cent in services. Furthermore, the figures illustrate the 
real wage gap is not obviously highest in the countries 
with the highest unemployment rate, notable France, Italy 
and the UK.
4 The Models
Five models are established and estimated in this section. 
The first two models are employed by B&S. Since these 
models do not give satisfactory results, and include 
variables that may blur the genuine effect of the real wage 
gap an alternative timeseries model is employed. Finally, 
two models, which employ pooled cross-section and time- 
series data over countries, are estimated to reinforce the 
conclusions obtained by estimating the previous models. 
Moreover, these models enable us to test the ability of the 
real wage gap to contribute to the explanation of cress 
country differences in unemployment rates.
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Model 1 . The following partial adjustment model is one of 
the models estimated by B&S (1985)
ut = ßo + ßlut-l + p2tirae + p3”xt-l + elt'
0<ß1<l, ß2>0, p3>0, (2)
where u is the log of the percentage of the unemployed 
labour force and et a zero-mean finite-variance disturbance 
term. It is not entirely clear why a time trend has been 
added in the equation. In his 1983 paper Sachs suggest it 
accounts for productivity. Productivity, however, is
included in the estimations of the real wage gap. One may, 
however, argue that the time trend may capture the effects 
of the changes in (the log of) labour, capital and labour 
augmenting technical progress; effects that not are
captured under the Cobb-Douglas technology assumption. 
These variables, together with labour productivity,
influence the real wage gap under the translog technology 
assumption that is explicitly derived in the next chapter.
In line with the B&S estimates the model is estimated over 
the period 1961-81 employing the manufacturing real wage 
gap. In addition, the model is estimated with the real wage 
gap for manufacturing and private services plus 
manufacturing over the period 1961-88. The estimates of the 
model are presented in table 1 and summarized in the first 
three columns of table 3. The fourth column of table 3 
shows the estimates obtained by B&S (1985, pl85) . The
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Table 1. Estimations of model 1:
Ut = ßo + ßlut-l + ß2time + ß3wX + et
Country Sec ßg ßi ß-> P3 Est ima. Durbin's R2 Pred. Long-
period h-stat. fail. run
Canada Man -36.74
(2.50)
0.73
(7.00)
0.07
(2.96)
8.19
(2.55)
Man -30.18 
(1.26)
0.76
(6.12)
0.06 
(1.87)
6.75
(1.30)
Tot -37.30
(2.50)
0.87
(7.06)
-0.02
(0.44)
8.24
(2.56)
USA Man 14.49
(0.28)
0.67
(3.29)
0.06 -2.89
(1.55) (0.25)
Man -25.08
(0.52)
0.68
(4.14)
0.02
(0.71)
5.78
(0.54)
Tot 6.88
(0.17)
0.69
(3.58)
0.03 -1.20
(0.66) (0.14)
Japan Man -5.26
(2.96)
0.50
(4.41)
0.01
(2.28)
1.25
(3.07)
Man -4.29
(2.68)
0.62
(6.80)
0.02
(2.71)
1.00
(2.82)
Tot -4.06
(1.97)
0.73
(7.51)
0.01
(0.66)
0.93
(2.08)
Austral. Man -34.47 
(3.10)
0.66
(5.73)
-0.04
(1.31)
7.58
(3.09)
Man -25.64
(2.24)
0.73
(5.73)
0.07
(1.61)
5.57
(2.24)
Tot -25.79
(2.23)
0.77
(5.89)
0.04
(0.74)
5.59
(2.22)
New Zl. Man 6.14
(0.31)
0.89
(2.49)
0.16 -1.44
(1.46) (0.33)
Man -11.86
(0.91)
0.63
(2.53)
0.19
(2.17)
2.41
(0.87)
Tot -11.33
(0.69)
0.60
(2.40)
0.18
(2.06)
2.33 
(0.65)
Austria Man -6.57
(1.61)
0.50
(2.06)
-0.01
(0.53)
1 . 63 
(1.70)
Man -3.60
(0.77)
0.77
(5.87)
0.02
(0.92)
0.83
(0.80)
Tot 6.89
(0.80)
0.63
(2.99)
0.07 -1.44
(1.49) (0.78)
Belgium Man -18.06
(3.00)
0.73
(6.45)
0.14 
(4.19)
3.83 
(2.90)
Man -25.85 
(4.60)
0.69 
(9.87)
0.13
(3.93)
5.56
(4.56)
Tot -31.69
(4.51)
0.93
(13.76)
-0.05
(1.04)
6.92
(4.49)
1961-81 -0.87 0.85 7.02 25.24
1961-88 2.44 0.84 28 . 12
1961-88 1 .53 0.87 63.38
1961-81 1.09 0.53 1.44 -3.75
1961-88 2.58 0.61 15.06
1961-88 _ 0 . 60 -3.87
1961-81 -1.03 0.92 1.98 2.50
1961-88 -0.13 0.95 2.63
1961-88 0.25 0.95 3.44
1961-81 -0.82 0.94 5.94 22.29
1961-88 0.20 0.93 20.62
1961-88 -0.04 0.93 24.30
1972-81 * 0.82 3.54 13.09
1972-88 * 0.86 5.51
1972-88 * 0.86 6.82
1965-81 -20.42 0.43 3.40 3.26
1965-88 0.05 0.83 3.61
1965-88 2.75 0.83 -3.8 9
1961-81 1 . 12 0.96 2.27 14.19
1961-88 3.12 0.98 1" . 94
1961-88 2.16 0.98 93.86
Table 1 continued. 78
Country Sec Po Pi 1*2 “P3~ Estima. Durbin's period h-stat.
Pred. 
fail.
Long- 
run wx
Denmark Man -77.80 
(1.15)
0.71
(2.78)
0 . 15 
(0.68)
16.80
(1.13)
1967-81 -3.80 0.87 1.11 57.93
Man -91.22 
(3.04)
0.63 
(4.47)
0.16 
(2.08)
19.72
(3.07)
1967-88 0.85 0 .88 53.30
Tot- 142.70
(4.49)
0 . 61 
(5.24)
-0.05 
(0.75)
31.01
(4.51)
1967-88 0.53 0 . 92 7 9.91
Finland Man -48.10
(2.95)
0.77 
(4.96)
0.00
(0.03)
10.61
(2.97)
1961-81 2 .14 0.83 0.44 4 6.13
Man -37.34 
(3.55)
0.71
(5.59)
0.04
(1.45)
8.21
(3.60)
1961-88 2.56 0.86 28.31
Tot -22.52
(2.11)
0.70 
(4.89)
0.02
(0.43)
5.05
(2.14)
1961-88 3.31 0.83 16.83
F ranee Man -53.06
(2.53)
0.72 
(5.27)
0.02
(0.51)
11.62
(2.51)
1961-81 -1.79 0.97 1 . 60 41.90
Man -22.78
(2.98)
0.91 
(11.56)
0.03
(0.88)
4.95 
(2.95)
1961-88 -1.80 0.99 55.00
Tot -22.27
(2.69)
0.86
(11.39)
0.02
(0.56)
4 .84 
(2.66)
1961-88 -1.47 0.99 34.5'
Germany Man -64.26
(2.63)
0.65
(4.60)
-0.03
(0.54)
14.08 
(2.61)
1961-81 -0.03 0.88 2 . 89 26.71
Man -42.99 
(2.17)
0.89
(8.25)
-0.00
(0.01)
9.35
(2.16)
1961-88 2.15 0.95 85.00
Tot -0.77
(0.04)
0.79
(4.74)
0.08 
(1.34)
0.08
(0.02)
1961-88 5.32 0.94 0.3 =
Greece Man -7.06
(1.45)
1.05 
(4.80)
0.09
(1.42)
1.32 
(1.08)
1966-81 4.48 0.86 2.86 -
Man -10.67 
(1.82)
0.81 
(8.76)
0.04
(1.83)
2.44
(1.77)
1966-88 3.27 0.91 12.84
Tot -14.10
(0.97)
0.90 
(11.61)
0.00 
(0.01)
3.08
(0.94)
1966-88 3.23 0.90 3C. 8C
I reland Man 3.72
(0.21)
0.49
(2.29)
0.14 
(2.60)
-0.46
(0.12)
1961-81 6.62 0.74 2.46 -C . 9C
Man -0.23
(0.01)
0.86
(7.29)
0.10 
(1.86)
0.03 
(0.01)
1961-88 2.68 0 . 95 -0.21
Tot 7.80 
(0.34)
0.82 
(5.52)
0.13
(1.63)
-1.68 
(0.35)
1961-88 3.37 0.95 -5.33
Italy Man 3.53 
(0.34)
0.44 
(2.29)
0 . 10 
(3.21)
-0.29 
(0.14)
1961-81 1.43 0.84 1.46 -G . 52
Man 8.24 
(0.80)
0.77 
(6.46)
0.07 
(2.80)
-1.67
(0.77)
1961-88 1.05 0.96 -7.26
Tot 17.24
(1.49)
0.64 
(4.03)
0.12
(2.77)
-3.56
(1.46)
1961-88 2.02 0.96 9.69
Luxemb. Man 0.56 
(0.36)
0.88 
(5.74)
0.02 
(1.19)
-O'. 14 
(0.41)
1961-81 -1.14 0.85 2.90 -1.17
Man -0.10 
(0.24)
0.80 
(5.28)
0.02 
(1.25)
-0 . 10 
(0.30)
1961-88 0.37 0.94 -0.50
Tot -0.06
(0.04)
0.83
(6.69)
0.01
(1.09)
-0.00
(0.01)
1961-88 0.36 0.94 0 . 00
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Country Sec " " W ~PT~ u2 ^3 E s t i m a . 
period
Durbin's 
h - s t a t .
R 2 P r e d . 
fail .
w Ky * . —■
rut W*
N e t h l . Man 36.29
(1.46)
0.67 
(3.15)
0.19
(2.27)
-8 . 10 
(1.48)
1961-81 2.07 0.91 2 . 80 -24.55
Man -21.27 
(1.64)
0.94 
(7.25)
0.05
(0.86)
4 . 60 
(1.62)
1961-88 2.45 0.95 ”6.67
Tot -9.55
(0.73)
0.90 
(5.73)
0.03
(0.29)
2.09 
(0.71)
1961-88 4.13 0.95 20.90
Norway Man 15.69
(2.19)
0.25
(1.29)
0.08
(3.63)
-3.38
(2.13)
1961-81 0.96 0.67 4.27 -4 .51
Man 10.40
(1.39)
0.40
(2.23)
0.07
(3.29)
-2.24
(1.37)
1961-88 3.94 0.76 -3.73
Tot 5.36
(0.85)
0.43
(2.38)
0.06
(2.84)
-1.12
(0.81)
1961-88 3.04 0.74 -1.96
P o r t u g . Man -21.75 
(2.55)
0.97
(7.65)
0.00
(0.08)
4.75
(2.55)
1961-81 -0.11 0.92 1.81 153.33
Man -14.81
(2.48)
1.00
(8.20)
0.00
(0.01)
3.24
(2.54)
1961-88 1 .61 0.92 -
Tot -24.98
(4.19)
0.89
(9.20)
-0.01
(0.34)
5.47
(4.25)
1961-81 1.22 0.94 4 9.73
Spain Man 1.11
(0.11)
1.25
(15.95)
0.03
(0.80)
-0.35
(0.16)
1961-81 -1.07 0.98 3.87 -
Man -35.81
(5.37)
1.08
(20.74)
0.01
(0.31)
7 . 82 
(5.29)
1961-88 0.51 0.99
Tot -98.66
(5.97)
1.22
(18.85)
-0.22
(3.36)
21.75
(5.94)
1961-88 -0.12 0.99 ~
Sweden Man -6.32
(1.12)
0.63
(2.44)
0.02 
(1.10)
1 . 50 
(1.27)
1961-81 * 0.34 1.98 4.05
Man -9.26
(1.60)
0.87
(4.51)
0.00
(0.37)
2.07
(1.70)
1961-88 * 0.59 15.92
Tot 2.22
(0.43)
0.68
(3.46)
0.01
(0.44)
-0.35 
(0.33)
1961-88 * 0 . 54 -1.09
S w i t z l . Man 0.10
(0.03)
0.57
(2.59)
0.01
(0.60)
-0.03
(0.10)
1961-81 * 0.53 2.75 -0.09
Man 1.02
(0.75)
0.58
(3.29)
0.02 
(1.59)
-0.25
(0.81)
1961-88 5.23 0.79 -0.7 5
Tot 3.34
(0.77)
0.63
(4.07)
0.02
(1.73)
-0.75
(0.78)
1961-88 3.34 0.79 -2.03
UK Man 27.71
(1.17)
0.60 
(1.60)
0.24 
(1.62)
-6.22
(1.19)
1961-81 * 0.81 2.17 -15.55
Man -9.49
(0.46)
0.89
(4.72)
0.03
(0.26)
2 .08 
(0.46)
1961-88 21.23 0.93 T 13.91
Tot -67.06
(2.58)
0.89
(8.24)
0.11
(2.23)
14.47
(2.57)
1961-88 2.37 0 . 95 131.52
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. = squared multiple correlation coefficient 
adjusted for degrees of freedom. Pred. .fail. = F-test for parameter constancy in the 
post sample period, 1982-88, F(17, 7)-distributed. Long-run Wx is calculated as ßi/d 
- ßl)- * = Durbin's h-statistics cannot be computed. Man = real wage gap for the 
manufacturing sector, Tot * real wage gap for the service sector plus the 
manufacturing sector.
80
estimated coefficients on the real wage gap, comparable 
with the B&S estimates, are quite similar except for the 
UK. In the B&S estimates the real wage gap is significant, 
with the expected sign, at the 5 per cent level, in 4 of 
their 6 cases compared to 10 of the 22 countries in the 
expanded country sample, indicating a country selection 
bias. The countries chosen for analysis by B&S appear to 
conform to the theory to a greater extent than on a sample 
of 22 countries.
This conclusion remains almost unchanged with the 
estimation period lengthened to 1988 employing the real 
wage gap for manufacturing or private services plus 
manufacturing. The 's tend to be higher, though, when the 
real wage gap for manufacturing and private services is 
employed. The diagnostic tests suggest the model is likely 
to be misspecif ied. In nearly half of the cases, the 
Durbin's h-statistics are significant at the 5 per cent 
level, pointing towards first order serial correlation. For 
10 countries, the predictive failure test is significant at 
the 5 per cent level, indicating parameter instability.
Model 2. Since the results of estimating model 1 suggest: 
specification problems, and cyclical shift variables are 
left out, we now analyse the model employed by Bruno (1986) 
and fits the equation
81
ut = ßo + ßlwXt-l + ß2wXt-2 + P3mt-1 + ß4mt-2 + P5Tt 
+ P6Tt-l (+ P7Ft-l + P8Ft-2 ) + P9°6274 + PlOD7588 + e2t'
Pi' ?2>0' Ps-s^/ (3)
where m is the monetary stock Ml (M2 for the US) deflated 
by consumer prices, T the deviation of the volume of world 
trade from its trend, F the change in cyclical and 
inflation corrected fiscal balance as a per cent of 
potential GDP, Dg2 7 4 a time trend for the period 1962-74 
and D7 5 gg a time trend for the period 1975-82 and 1975-88 
for a longer period. The reason why Bruno includes the 
split time trend is not clear but may have been included to 
capture the effects of capital, labour and labour 
augmenting technological progress as discussed above. 
Inclusion of the split-time trend, however, is potential 
dangerous. Since unemployment increased after 1974 in all 
OECD countries, inclusion of it is likely to overshadow the 
contributions of the other variables in the equation.
Like model 1, this model is estimated with the real wage 
gap in manufacturing over the period 1961-82 (as in Bruno 
(1986) ) , and 1961 to 1988 with the real wage gap in 
manufacturing and private services plus manufacturing. 
Equivalent to the estimates calculated by Bruno, the 
structural budget balance as a per cent of potential GD? 
replaces world trade for the US, otherwise it is not 
included as an explanatory variable. The deviation of the 
world trade from its trend is calculated as the exponent of
82
the residual from a regression where the world trade is 
regressed on a constant and a log time trend. Correction 
for first order autocorrelation in the residuals is done 
with a maximum likelihood procedure in the few cases where 
the Durbin h-statistics are below the lower bound.
The columns 5 to 7 in table 3 summarize the results; the 
detailed results are provided in table 2. At least one of 
the lags of the real wage gap is significant, at the 5 per 
cent level, and has the expected sign in most of the cases, 
no matter how wx is measured and which data period is 
employed. Note, the significance level indicated in table 3 
corresponds to the overall significance of the real wage 
gap lagged one and two years. It is remarkable that the sum 
of the coefficients on the wage gap is about a third of the 
long-run estimates in model 1. This may due to omission of 
cyclical shift variables in model 1 and/or misspecification 
of one or both of the models.
The results obtained by Bruno are listed in the final 
column of table 3. Unlike the fairly close relationship 
between B&S and my results for the B&S countries in model 1 
the correspondence between Bruno and my estimation results 
is remarkable poor. Firstly, Bruno's coefficients on the 
real wage gap have much lower standard errors than mine. 
Secondly, the coefficient estimates differ widely. The 
different results may reflect that some of the data sources
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Table 3. Long-run coefficients on the real wage gap.
Table 1 B&S Table 2 Bruno
Mang-^ Mangs Tot88 Man g Man82 Man 8 8 T°t 88 Man g 2
Canada 28.2* 28.1 63.4* 42.5 6.2 8.1* 23.4* 28.8*
USA -8.8 10.0 -3.87 11.1 -94.21 -2.8 24.0 18.7*
Japan 2.5* 2.6* 3.4* 5.2* 1.3 1.7 1.9 3.9
Australia 22.3* 20.6* 24.3* - 1.2 19.4* 25.8* -
N. Zeal. 13.1 6.51 6.8 - - 8.3 10.0 -
Austria 3.2* 3.6 -4.0 - 1.5 2.4 3.0 -
Belgium 14.2* 17.9* 98.9 - 0.3* 19.4* 21.4* 11.0*
Denmark 57.9 53.3* 79.5* - 22.7 44.25 36.6 46.7*
Finland 46.1* 28.3* 16.8* - 16.4* 21.0* 20.1* -
France 41.5* 55.0* 34.6* 63.6 8.3* 9.0 9.2* -4.2*
Germany 26.7* 85.0* 0.4 17.7* 31.2* 28.4 38.3 11.4*
Greece - 12.8* 30.8 - 7.5 3.6 4.0 -
Ireland -0.9 -0.2 -9.3 - 16.2* 12.7 19.8* -
Italy -0.5 -7.3 9.9 - 1.5 2.2 0.6 -
Luxemb. - 1 . 2 -0.5 0.0 - 0.6 1.4* 1.6 -
Netherl. -24.6 76.7 20.9 - 5.2 17.6* 20.7 -
Norway A IT *-4.5 -3.7 -2.0 - -1.9 4.9 4.6 -
Portugal 158.3* - 49.7* - -1.0 7.8 10.6 -
Spain1 -0.4 7.8* 21.8* - -1.7* 8.2 27.6* -
Sweden 4.1 15.9* -1.1 - -1.0 -0.7 1.5 -
Switzerl. -0.1 -0.8 -2.0 - 0.5 0.4* 0.8 -
UK -15.6 18.9 131.5* 20.5* 7.7 7.2 3.5 22.3*
*: Significant at the 5 per cent level.
1. Short-run coefficients for the estimates of model 1 since the estimate 
dynamic unstable.
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differ and the cyclical shift variables are differently 
estimated.
The diagnostic tests of model 2 suggest specification 
problems. The RESET test, of the power two, is significant 
at the 5 per cent level in more than a third of the cases 
pointing toward misspecification and/or functional form 
problems. The predictive failure test rejects the 
hypothesis of parameter constancy in the forecast period, 
1983-88, for more than half of the countries, at the 5 per 
cent level.
Model 3. The discussion of the previous two models 
indicated specification problems and the inclusion of time 
trends are likely to invalidate or blur some of the 
results. Furthermore, the different parameter estimates of 
estimating model 2 indicate that the cyclical variables may 
interfere with the parameter estimates on the real wage 
gap. Finally, the cyclical variables may not be good 
proxies for the business cycle. This suggests it may be 
fruitful to consider another model specification to reveal 
the more genuine influence of the real wage gap on 
unemployment. The following model is estimated
ut = ßo + ßlut-l + ß2cyct + b3«X + e3t'
p3<0 and ß2>0 , (4)
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where eye is the deviation of the log of GDP in 
manufacturing and private services from its log time 
trend.^ Although the model may look similar to the previous 
models is gives remarkably different results.
The results of estimating model 3, with data for 
manufacturing and private services, are shown in table 4. A 
maximum likelihood procedure is applied to account for the 
presence of first order serial correlation in those cases 
indicated in the table. The diagnostic tests, apart from 
the heteroscedasticity tests discussed below, suggest the 
model specification is acceptable. The coefficient 
estimates are quite tidy compared to the previous results. 
All coefficients have their expected signs. The real wage 
gap is significant, at the 5 per cent level, in 13 
instances, which is an improvement from the previous 
estimates. Do these results imply that the unemployment 
path can be explained by the real wage gap and cyclical 
variables? No, certainly not. The coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is very close to, and even above, unity 
for most countries. Disregarding the cases where the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent is above unity the 
result may suggest a the very long adjustment period to 
innovations in the explanatory variables. This, however, is 
highly unlikely to be the case. Firstly, adjustment of the
2. A more general model, with both wx and eye lagged two 
periods, was estimated with sequential deletion of 
insignificant variables. Almost the same results were 
obtained of estimating this model.
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labour inputs, to the desired level, is not likely to take 
much more than a couple of years. Secondly, the results 
indicate it takes longer to adjust labour inputs in Canada 
and the US than in most of the North European countries; 
which is very much at variance with the accepted view on 
this issue (see for instance Krugman (1985)).
The high magnitude of the coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable is more likely to reflect the upward 
drift in the unemployment rate that has occurred over the 
period caused by other factors than the business cycle and 
the real wage gap. From this we can conclude the real wage 
gap has contributed to the unemployment path, for most 
countries, but is not able to account for the persistent 
rise in the unemployment rate in the OECD countries. This 
interpretation is supported by the time profile of the
unemployment rates and the real wage gaps . For all
countries, by and large , the real wage gap increased
strongly from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s and
continually declined thereafter. Hence, the almost secular 
increase in the unemployment rate in the OECD countries 
since the mid 1970s is unlikely to be a result of the real 
wage gap, even if the model is modified for the influence 
of the business cycle.
The time profiles of the unemployment rate and wage gaps
are likely to be the reasons for the presence of
heteroscedasticity and it is possible that the
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heteroscedasticity is an indication of the measurement of 
the real wage gap in the sense that the decline of the real 
wage gap after the mid 1970s is likely to be exaggerated in 
the estimates. This may have occurred for two reasons. 
First, the estimates of the real wage gap under a translog 
technology in the next chapter demonstrate that the real 
wage gap has declined at a slower rate under this 
technology assumption than under the Cobb-Douglas real wage 
gap. Second, Krugman (1985) has pointed out that the real 
wage gap over the long-run, and even in the medium term, 
may be underestimated. An increase in the real wage gap, 
for instance, triggers a capital deepening process, which 
in turn increases the marginal productivity of labour and 
hence lowers the real wage gap. This effect may have been 
important since the growth of the capital stock, in most 
OECD countries, was much higher before the mid 1970s than 
after. The slow-down in demand after 1973 has of course 
influenced the growth of capital stock.
Model 4. To investigate further the extent to which the 
real wage gap has contributed to the unemployment path over 
time, changes in the unemployment rate are regressed on 
changes in the real wage gap and income employing pooled 
cross-section and time-series data
(ut ~ ut-i) = ßo + ßi(wxt - wxt_i) + ß2 (yt " yt-i> + e4t' 
ßi>0, ß2<0, i = 4, 7, (6)
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where country subscripts are suppressed. Estimation of this 
equation may additionally shed light on whether changes in 
the real wage gap across countries can explain, or 
contribute to, changes in the unemployment rates across 
countries. The model is estimated with "long differences"; 
that is changes in variables over a four and a seven years 
time span corresponding to the duration of an average 
business cycle.^
The model is estimated with "long differences" to count for 
the fact that the actual timing of the relationship between 
unemployment/employment and the real wage gap in the 
previous models may be blurred for the following reasons: 
First, the time period it takes the markets to clear after 
a change in the real wage gap is likely to vary depending 
on the activity level and whether there is a cyclical 
upturn or downturn. In Europe, at least, labour is a quasi- 
fixed factor; that is firms are not free to fire workers 
and have to give notice long in advance. Therefore, it may 
take some years before an equilibrium is reached. The time 
it takes for the markets to clear after an increase in the 
real wage gap, amongst other factors, depends on the 
cyclical demand for labour and the outflow of the labour 
from the labour market due to retirement etc. Second, a
3. If one uses long differences with yearly data, a moving 
average in the residuals appear. In order to circumvent 
this problem generalized least squares (GLS) may be 
employed. Changing adjustment period over time and the 
shift in factors that triggered the change in the real wage 
gap over time, however, renders the usage of GLS 
unsuitable.
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causality from excessive wage changes to employment changes 
may be blurred if wages fluctuate more than prices over the 
business cycle.4 If prices increase less than the nominal 
wage in a cyclical upturn, for instance, the real wage gap 
will increase side by side with a rise in income, and hence 
tend to push employment in an upward direction. Thirdly, 
Helliwell (1988) has shown that the profit maximization 
approach in labour demand, as used by B&S, relative to the 
cost minimizing approach, overstates the real wage gap when 
profitability is relatively low. Since revenues are likely 
to fluctuate more than costs over the business cycle, a 
"causality" from the real wage gap to employment is likely 
to be overstated. Fourthly, if firms increase prices due tc 
a surge in demand in the first period, and then increase 
the supply of goods in the next, a negative relationship 
between employment and the real wage gap is established 
(Summers (1987)) .
The model is estimated by pooling time-series and cross- 
section data for all the countries previously considered 
except New Zealand, Austria, Denmark and Greece, where the 
data period commence later than 1960. The real wage gap is 
the composite of the wage gap for private services and 
manufacturing. As the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity 
across countries is rejected at the 1 per cent level, the 
models are estimated by feasible generalised least squares
4. Bils (1987) finds the price-marginal cost margin ratio 
to be markedly countercyclical for the US industries.
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(FGLS) . The Lagrangian multiplier tests are performed to 
decide whether to estimate random effects or fixed effects 
models and the tests only weakly favoured the random 
effects model to the fixed effects model, at the 5 per cent; 
level.5 Hence the estimation results of both estimators are 
reported.
The estimation results are presented in table 5. The wage 
gap is insignificant, even at the 10 per cent level, in ail 
the estimates.^ Consequently, the wage gap canncc 
contribute much to the explanation of the change in the 
path of the unemployment rate over time and across 
countries. This result concurs with that of estimating 
model 3 in the sense that the path of the unemployment rate 
is mainly explained by its past values and the real wage 
gap and business cycles do not have a strong influence cn 
the path. The coefficient on the change in the GDP is 
significant at the 5 per cent level and has the expected 
sign in all the estimates.
Model 5. The results of estimating model 4 do nc: 
invalidate the real wage gap theory. The real wage gap 
theory relates the real wage gap to labour inputs and the
5. In the fixed effect models the slope coefficients are 
assumed equal, but the constant term different across 
countries by the inclusion of country dummies. In the 
random effects models the slope coefficients are assumed 
equal across countries, but the constant term is treated 
randomly and merged with the disturbance term.
6. The significance of the coefficient on the change in the 
real wage did not change much with the change in the GZ? 
excluded. These results are not reported.
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Table 5. Estimates of model 5 and 6:
<ut •
(It ■
- ut -i)
- lt -i>
- ßo + 
= ßo +
ßi <"xt 
ßi <«xt
- * x t -i)
- «xt-i>
+ ß2 (yt - yt 
+ ß2<yt - yt
-i> + 
-i> +
et
p37C + ('t
D e p . var. ßo ßi ß2 ß3 R2 (B) SSE N*T Type
ut " ut-4 2.04(0.66)
-0.164
(0.24)
-4.84
(5.08)
0.54 1.06 126 FE
ut - ut-l 0.24(0.14)
0.139
(0.15)
-4.24
(4.59)
0.21 0.74 126 RE
ut " ut-7 1.51(0.21)
0.133
(0.13)
-6.09
(4.64)
0.72 1.17 72 FE
ut " ut-7 2.70(0.75)
-0.487
(0.39)
-3.85
(4.30)
0.34 0.50 72 RE
- it -4 4.08(4.08)
-0.172
(3.88)
0.40
(9.11)
0.83 1.04 126 FE
it - it -4 0.40
(3.09)
-0.145
(3.18)
0.40
(7.33)
0.54 0.54 126 RE
it - lt-4 1.20
(5.33)
-0.224
(4.83)
0.34
(6.47)
0.10
(3.16)
0.83 1.07 126 FE
it - Xt-7 0.93(3.31)
-0.191
(3.07)
0.44
(8.27)
0.90 1.14 72 FE
it - 1t-7 0.84
(3.09)
-0.207
(3.18)
0.37
(7.33)
0.60 0.50 72 RE
it - Xt-7 1.28
(3.55)
-0.236
(3.30)
0.40
(6.87)
0.11
(2.44)
0.91 1.16 72 FE
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. N*T = number of 
observations. 17 country dummies are included in each equation. 
Feasible generalized least squares maximum likelihood estimation 
method is used to correct for heteroscedasticity across 
countries. FE = fixed effects model and RE = random effects 
model. R2 (B) = Buse raw-moment R2 and SEE = standard error of 
estimate.
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labour demand may be below its full employment level due to 
excessive wages. Estimates of the wage gap-unemployment 
relationship may be blurred as a result of changes in the 
part of the labour supply which is not explained by the 
real wage gap as discussed earlier. Hence model 4 is
nestimated with changes in working hours as the dependent 
variable and with the net operating surplus as a per cent 
of GDP, k , added as an explanatory variable
d t  - t-i* = ßo + ßl<«Xt “ «Xt-i> + P2<Vt - yt-i>
+ ß3^ + e5t' ßi<0, p2>0, p3> or <0. (7)
The model is estimated with and without Ji. tc is included tc 
account for a level effect in profits as the change in the 
real wage gap may be expected to have the strongest impact 
on employment when 71 is low (Gordon (1982) ) . The model 
assumes unemployment provides a buffer between labour 
demand and labour supply so working hours can be treated as 
labour demand. The assumption may periodically have been 
violated in the 1960s in some countries, when excess demand 
for labour was widespread and actual working hours have 
been less than desired. Although production and the labour 
recruitment decisions may be taken simultaneously, the
7. Strictly speaking, this requires an infinite elasticity 
of substitution between persons employed and hours. The 
practical error of relating the real wage gap to employment: 
in hours is that employers taxes and contributions tc 
social security, among other expenses, are mostly related 
to the number of persons employed.
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hypothesis of GDP being weakly exogeneous was not
orejected. Hence GDP is not instrumented.
In the model all variables encompass private services and 
manufacturing and are estimated by FGLS. Again the tests 
slightly favoured the random effects models to the fixed 
effects models. Hence, both the random effects and the 
fixed effects models are estimated and reported in table 5. 
The coefficient on the real wage gap has the negative 
expected sign and is significant at the 1 per cent level 
independent of model specification and the length of 
differences. The wage gap elasticity is estimated to be in 
the neighbourhood of 0.20. The income term is significant 
and its elasticity is in the neighbourhood of 0.40. 
Inclusion of the net operation surplus in per cent of GDP 
does not alter the results much, although the coefficient 
attached to the real wage gap tends to increase.
Do the models 1 and 2 predict turning points? Table 6 
reports the actual and predicted dates of turning points in 
the unemployment rate in the post sample period of the B&S 
estimates (the models 1 and 2) with the real wage gap in
8. A Hausman specification test for weak exogeneity of GDP 
in the single country estimates, where working hours were 
regressed on the real wage gap and GDP, only rejected the 
hypothesis of exogeneity for Canada. The following 
instruments were used: the cyclical and inflation adjusted 
structural General Government budget balance changes in per 
cent of potential GDP, the world trade volume, the monetary 
stock, Ml, deflated by consumer prices and GDP lagged one 
period. All instruments, except income, appeared unlagged 
and lagged one period. The results are not reported.
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Table 6. Prediction of turning points in the 
unemployment rate, from 1981 (1982) to 1988.
Country Actual Model 1 Model 2
Canada 1983/84 1984/85 1983/84
USA 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86
Japan 1984/85 1985/86 1983/84
Australia 1983/84 1984/85 1983/84
New Zealand 1984/85 1985/86 1987/88
Austria 1983/84 1984/85 1983/84
Belgium 1984/85 1984/85 1987/88
Denmark 1983/84 1983/84 -
Finland 1983/84 1983/84 1984/85
France 1987/88 1985/86 1983/84
Germany 1985/86 1984/85 1983/84
Greece 1984/85 1986/87 1984/85
Ireland - - 1983/84
Italy - - -
Luxembourg 1984/85 1985/86 -
Netherlands 1984/85 1984/85 1987/88
Norway 1983/84 1984/85 1986/87
Portugal 1986/87 1986/87 1985/86
Spain 1985/86 1986/87 1985/86
Sweden 1983/84 1984/85 1983/84
Switzerland 1984/85 1985/86 1984/85
UK 1986/87 1987/88 1984/85
Notes: a indicates that no turning point
has occurred or being predicted.
101
manufacturing. The turning point, or a continuous increase 
in the unemployment rate, is predicted by both models in 7 
of the 22 cases. For a couple of countries, the models 
predict the turning points too early. This prediction 
performance indicates either inadequate model 
specifications and/or that the real wage gap does not 
explain the path of the unemployment rate too well.
5 Zero Wage Gap Unemployment in the OECD Countries
In order to assess the influence of the real wage on the 
unemployment rate pattern across OECD countries via the 
labour demand function, table 7 compares the zero wage gap 
unemployment rate with the actual unemployment rate in 
1988. The zero gap unemployment rate is calculated by 
estimating the employment that would have prevailed in 1988 
if the real wage is zero. The labour demand wage elasticity 
is set to 0.20, as obtained in the estimates above, for all 
countries, and labour supply is assumed to be unaffected by 
employment. Hence, if the actual wage gap is 10 per cent in 
1988, for instance, the zero wage gap employment is 2 per 
cent higher then actual employment.
Table 7 shows that the high unemployment countries would 
not be better off, in terms of a lower unemployment rate, 
than the low unemployment countries in the zero wage gap 
situation. Moreover, the standard deviation of the zero 
wage gap unemployment rate across countries is 7.1 whilst
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Table 7. Actual and zero wage gap 
unemployment rate in 1988.
Country Actual Zero gap
Canada 7.8 6.2
USA 5.5 4.6
Japan 2.5 -4.1
Australia 7.1 5.5
New Zealand 6.0 8.6
Austria 3.6 -2.4
Belgium 10.0 5.0
Denmark 8.6 7.6
Finland 4.6 0.0
France 10.0 8.1
Germany 7.9 7.8
Greece 7.7 -0.7
Ireland 16.7 18.8
Italy 12.2 12.1
Luxembourg 1.5 -3.6
Netherlands 8.3 4.9
Norway 3.2 0.0
Portugal 5.8 6.7
Spain 19.5 24.5
Sweden 1.6 - 0.8
Switzerland 0.7 -3.9
UK 8.2 6.2
Standard Dev . 4.7 7.1
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4.7 for the actual unemployment. This result is remarkable 
in the sense that the real wage gap under the Cobb-Douglas 
technology assumption does not contribute to the 
explanation for the distribution of the unemployment rates 
across countries around the OECD mean in 1988.
6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has tested the extent to which the real wage 
gap has contributed to the rise in the unemployment rate 
after the first oil price shock using data for 
manufacturing and private services in 22 OECD countries. 
The estimates of the models used by Bruno and Sachs (1985) 
and Bruno (1986) were demonstrated to be inadequate and 
unable to reveal the genuine effect of the real wage gap on 
the unemployment path and in most cases unable to predict 
the turning points in the unemployment rates in the mid 
1980s. Another model specification, which circumvent most 
of the problems encountered in the Bruno and Sachs models, 
indicated that the real wage gap has contributed to the 
unemployment path for most countries. The estimates 
suggested, however, that most of the unemployment path was 
explained by past movements in the unemployment rate. This 
result suggests omitted variables rather than a hysteresis 
effect since hysteresis in unemployment is caused by an 
excessive wage which is accounted for in the estimates. 
Hysteresis in unemployment will be rigoursly analysed in 
chapter 7.
104
Estimates with pooled cross-section and time-series data 
lend further support to this finding and suggest that the 
real wage gap is unable to explain changes in unemployment 
rates across countries. The real wage gap theory, however, 
was not rejected on this ground since it theoretically 
relates to labour demand. The estimates with changes in 
labour demand as dependent variables were in fact related 
significantly (negatively) to the real wage gap across 
countries and over time.
Since the real wage gap affects unemployment via labour 
demand an attempt was made to estimate whether differences 
in unemployment rates across countries are partly a result 
of different changes in employment generated by different 
changes in the real wage gap. This was found not to be the 
case, which further supports the results obtained from the 
pooled cross-section and time-series estimates.
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Unemployment: OECD, Economic Outlook (EO) and Historical 
Statistics (HS). For Luxembourg, Switzerland and Greece 
(before 1978) : ILO, Year-Book (YB) and OECD, Labour Force 
Statistics (LFS).
Working hours: YB.
Employment: Employment in manufacturing and non- 
agricultural activities; OECD, LFS, HS and Main Economic 
Indicators (MEI). Government employment 1966-88: OECD, 
National Accounts (NA) and HS. Government employment 1960- 
88: Backward extrapolation of 1966-88 average yearly growth 
rate.
Cyclical and inflation adjusted structural budget balance 
changes in per cent of potential GDP: in the period 1972- 
83; OECD,"Structural Budget Deficits and Fiscal Stance", 
Working Papers, No. 15., 1984. In the period 1984-88: OECD, 
EO. In the period 1965-1972; OECD, Occasional Studies, 
1979, except for Australia, New Zealand, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Spain and Switzerland. 1960-64(71): the change in 
Government consumption divided by GDP; IMF, International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), Year-book.
World trade volume: IFS. The average of import and export 
volume.
Ml and M2: IFS.
Consumer Prices: IFS.
GDP and value-added price-deflators: OECD, NA. When net 
available for manufacturing production and manufacturing 
wholesale prices from MEI and IFS are used. Specific for 
countries: Japan: agricultural GDP not available in the 
period 1960-70. New Zealand: GDP in the private sector is 
calculated as total GDP minus Government consumption, 
deflated by the implicit GDP deflator from IFS in the 
period 1971-76. Agricultural GDP in fixed prices 1971-76, 
OECD, Country Survey: New Zealand. Manufacturing GDP is 
deflated by consumer prices 1971-76. France: private sector 
1960-69, GDP minus Government consumption, deflated by the 
value-added price-deflator, IFS. Ireland: private sector, 
GDP minus Government consumption, except for GDP in current 
prices in the period 1975-88. Agriculture, gross 
agricultural output and agricultural wholesale prices: 
OECD, Country Survey: Ireland. The Netherlands: Volume gas 
production, MEI, is used as mining GDP. Switzerland: 
private sector, GDP minus Government consumption adjusted 
to 1985 figures from NA. Agricultural sector, no data cn 
production available.
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Compensation to employees: 1970-88, OECD, NA. For the
following countries, sectoral compensation is not available 
over some or all of the period: Austria 1970-88, Belgium
1970-88, France 1970-76, Greece 1970-88, the Netherlands 
1970-74, Portugal 1970-76, Spain 1970-79. For these 
countries, the compensation to the total labour force is 
distributed in accordance to hourly wage rate and working 
hours.
Hourly wage in manufacturing: MEI and YB.
Hourly wage in non-agricultural activities: YB except
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Sweden, where it is 
assumed to follow the manufacturing hourly wage rate.
Net operating surplus: NA.
Unemployment rate: OECD's standardized unemployment rate is 
used for the 15 countries for which it is available from 
1966. The non-standardized unemployment rate is used for 
the remaining countries and periods.
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CHAPTER 4
WAGE GAP AND TECHNOLOGY
Abstract. In this chapter the real wage gap is derived, 
estimated and compared under the Cobb-Douglas, the constant 
elasticity of substitution and the translog technology 
assumption. Discrimination between the models suggests the 
translog approximation to be the best technology 
assumption. The estimates indicate the real wage gap to be insensitive to technology assumption up to the mid 1970s. 
Thereafter the path and the magnitude of the real wage gap 
is sensitive to technology assumption.
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1 Introduction
The wage gap theory in the previous chapter was tested 
employing the real wage gap estimated under the Cobb- 
Douglas (CD) technology assumption. This chapter derives, 
estimates and compares the real wage gap under different 
technology assumptions. Since the shape of the labour 
demand function is dependent on production technology, one 
will a priori expect the real wage gap to be sensitive to 
technology assumption. Despite this not much research has 
been carried out to formally estimate and compare the real 
wage gap under different technology assumptions. In Sachs 
(1983) and B&S (1985), full employment marginal 
productivity of labour is computed under the CD technology 
assumption. This assumption is somewhat relaxed in their 
later papers. In Bruno (1986) and Sachs and Wyplosz (1986) 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology is 
employed without involvement of direct estimation of 
technology parameters.
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate the real wage 
gap under the CD, CES and translog (TL) technology 
assumptions for private services and manufacturing in the 
22 OECD countries considered in the previous chapter. The 
TL function, under factor augmented technological progress, 
is adopted as a flexible technology representation and is 
superior to the CES formulation (see for instance Poliak et
al. (1984) ) .
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The chapter finds, in agreement with B&S, that the real 
wage gap increased substantially from the mid 1960s to the 
mid 1970s in most OECD countries. For the 1980s, however, 
the real wage gap decreased more under the CD and CES 
technology assumption than under the TL technology 
assumption. Finally, nested and non-nested tests suggest 
that the TL technology assumption is superior to the other 
technology assumptions.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 derives the 
real wage gap under CD, TL and CES technology. Section 3 
presents the data and the empirical estimates are shown in 
section 4. Section 5 compares the real wage gap estimated 
under different technologies and section 6 discriminates 
between the estimates. Section 7 contains some concluding 
remarks.
2 The Wage Gap Under Different Production Technologies
The real wage gap depends on the production technology 
assumption via the full employment marginal productivity of 
labour. This section derives the real wage gap under 
different production technologies.
Ill
2.1 Cobb-Douglas Technology
The restricted CD production function is given by Q = 
ALaK^_a, with L as working hours and K capital services. 
With small letters denoting logs the CD technology real 
wage gap in the previous chapter was defined as
wx = (w - pq) - (qf - lf + log(a)), (1)
where wx is the real wage gap, w the total labour costs 
divided by working hours, and Pq the value-added price- 
deflator and a(Qf/Lf) the full-employment marginal product 
of labour.
2.2 Translog Technology
The translog production function in the two factor case, 
with factor augmenting technical progress, can be written 
as
log Q = Adyocq + ßtlog T + a^log L + aklog K 
+ l/2y11(log L) 2 + l/2yjck(log K) 2 
+ Yi^log L log K + 0ltlog T log L
+ 0ktlog T log K + 1/20tt(log T)2, (2)
where log(T) is technological progress approximated by a 
log time trend. By assumption, the production function is
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linear homogeneous in inputs, implying the following 
homogeneity constraints on the translog form
a l  + a k = 1 Y l l  + Ylk  = 0 Ykk + Ylk = 0 0 l t  + e k t  = 0 • (3)
The full employment marginal productivity of labour can be 
calculated as the following. The full employment output,
-p -eQ , is computed from estimates of equation (2) with L = L~, 
where is approximated as the sum of employed and
unemployed person hours1
log Qf = A.oyaQ + ßtlog T + a^log Lf + a^log K
+ 1 / 2  Y u  ( l o g  Lf ) 2 + 1 / 2  Ykk ( loc? K ) 2 
+ Y i k lo<3 1 0(3 K + 0 i t lo (? T l o g l j f
+ ©ktlogT 10<3K + 1/2 (logT)2. (4)
1. could alternatively be estimated as employed plus 
unemployed person hours minus the non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), the bench-mark 
level of the unemployment rate where the inflation stares 
increasing. Artus, for instance, estimates high-employment 
as the sum of employed and unemployed net of structural 
unemployment. This measure is not used here partly in order 
to certify a consistent comparison of the real wage gap 
estimated under the different technologies and partly 
because it is highly questionable whether it is possible zo 
adequately estimate the NAIRU. Estimation of the NAIRU 
requires an estimate of a price and a wage equation in 
which unemployment is required to be statistically 
significant. The last two chapters demonstrate unemployment 
to be insignificant in wage equations for most countries.
The difference between Artus' definition of full employment 
and the definition employed here is likely to be miner 
anyway since the difference between 5y/5l and ÖYf/ÖLf is 
due to the non-linearity of the production function in 
variables and is approximately the same in the 
neighbourhood of L.
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The actual capital stock is assumed to be equal to the full 
employment capital stock. This may not be true since 
profitability, which is higher under full employment, 
influences investments via changes in financial constraints 
and Tobins' Q which was discussed in chapter 2. The results 
by Cartinal et al. (1988), however, suggest the effects of 
profitability on investments are likely to be small, 
although sttistically significant.
Differentiating equation. (4) gives the full employment 
marginal productivity of labour
dQf/dLf = Qf/Lf [logoc-^  + YnlogLf + Y l k loc?K + ®ltlo9T]'
and so is wx = (w - Pq) - dQ^/dL^. From this it can be seen 
that the real wage gap is not only dependent upon the full 
employment average product of labour as in the CD case. It 
is also dependent on the log of full employment, the log of 
capital and the log of labour augmented technological 
progress. Note, that the sum of capital and labour 
augmented technical progress, and 0kt:, in equation (2) 
is restricted to zero. Capital (labour) augmenting 
technological progress results in labour (capital) saving 
technological progress. This in turn, tends to lower 
(higher) the full employment marginal productivity of 
labour, and hence the warranted wage, over time.
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The TL production function to be estimated is given by 
equation (2) subject to the homogeneity constraints (3) . 
Given the large number of parameters to be estimated, 
relative to the length of the data period of 29 years in 
most cases, the parameter estimates are likely to be 
imprecise. Hence, equation (2) is estimated in conjunction 
with a cost share function, a method suggested by Berndt 
and Christensen (1973) . Since the cost share of capital and 
labour add to unity, only the labour cost share function is 
estimated. The labour cost share function is derived as
CSL = Slog Q/Slog L = log oc^  + Y n lo<3 L + log K
+ 0ltlog T, (6)
where CSL is the labour share of total costs.
2.3 CES Technology
In this section the real wage gap is first derived directly 
under the CES technology assumption. Thereafter the CES 
derived wage gap following the methods suggested by Bruno 
(1986) and Artus (1984), are briefly presented.
Assuming Hicks-neutral technological progress and constant: 
returns to scale, the CES production function is given by
Q = y e ^ K l  - 5) L P + 5k ~P] 1/P, (7)
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where p (1 - a)/o, with a as the elasticity of
substitution, e ^  technological progress and 5 a 
distributional parameter. The full employment marginal 
productivity of labour then is
dQf/dLf = (ye^t)"P(l - 5) [Qf/Lf] 1+P, (8)
where is derived from equation (7) with substituted 
for L. The real wage gap is the actual real product wage 
minus dQ^/dL^.^
In order to avoid direct estimation of the CES production 
function Bruno (1986) suggests an approximation formula. In 
this approximation the log of the marginal labour 
productivity, still under the assumption of Hicks-neutral 
technological progress, is calculated as
log(dQ/dL) = log(Q/L) + ( (1 - o)/a) Sk log(K/L), (9)
2. The CES production function under factor augmenting 
technological progress is given by
Q = [5 (A exp (A.l t) L) P + (1-5) (ß exp (XK t) K)~P]_1^P.
The full employment marginal productivity of labour is then
MPLf = 1/p[5(Ae^LtLf)"P + (1-5) (Be^KtK)~P]“ (1+P}/P
* 5p (Ae^-^L^) - +P) A exp (A.L t) .
The parameters cannot be identified by direct estimation of 
the production function. Imposing the marginal condition 
and isolate the log (Q/L) and log(Q/K) on the left hand side 
gives two expressions that can be estimated to provide 
parameter estimates to MPL .^ Note, that factor augmenting 
technological progress cannot be identified in the CD case 
as will be shown in chapter 6.
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where Sk is the share of capital of the national product. 
The second term on the right hand side of equation (9) 
approaches zero as G approaches one; that is the CD case. 
If 0 < o < 1 and constant, an increase in the K/L ratio 
enlarges the marginal productivity of labour, and hence the 
warranted real product wage.
Artus (1984) is probably the first to suggest a method to 
estimate the CES real wage gap. He establishes two models; 
one with a production function composed of labour and 
capital and a two-tier production function with labour, 
capital and energy. As the constant elasticity of 
substitution assumption and transformation is highly 
restrictive with more than two inputs, demonstrated by 
Uzawa (1962) and McFadden (1963), only the two factor case 
will be considered here.^ The estimation procedure is as 
follows. Employing a Taylor approximation of equation (7), 
as suggested by Kmenta (1967), we get
q = lny + Xt + (1 - 5)1 + 5k - l/2p(l - 5) 5 [ In (K/L) ]2. (10)
As the distributional parameter, 5, cannot be assumed to be 
constant over the estimation period, Artus suggests an 
approximation where the distribution between capital and 
labour changes by a linear time trend
3. The real wage gap path estimated from the two methods 
are quite similar anyway (Artus (1984)).
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InQ — lny + Xt + (1 - 8q — S-^ t) 1 + (8q + 8-^) k
- 1/2 p <1 - 80 - Sjt) <80 + Sjt) [ln (K/L) ]2. (11)
Due to few observations, relative to the number of 
parameters to be estimated, Artus suggests following two- 
step procedure. Equating the marginal product of labour, 
derived from equation (11), with the real product wage, we 
get the labour share of the national product after some 
manipulations
SL = (1 - 5q -8]_t) + p (5q + 81t) (1 - 5g - 51t)ln(K/L) . (12)
The two-step procedure is first to estimate the stochastic 
version of equation (12) in order to obtain estimates of 8q 
and 81, and then to estimate equation (11) with the 
parameter estimates of 8q and 8^  from equation (12). Artus 
estimates equation (12) over a period where he expects the 
conditions, under which (12) is derived, to hold; that is 
essentially from 1955 to 1973. The full employment wage 
rate can then be estimated as
ln(w/pq)f = ln(Q/L)f + ln(SL)f = lny + Xt
+ (80 + 8xt)In(K/Lf) - l/2p(l - S0 - 8Xt)
* (80 + 8X) [log (K/Lf) ]2 + ln(SL)f. (13)
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The wage gap is calculated as (w/pq) minus (w/pq)^.^ Note 
there are some disadvantages from obtaining parameter 
estimates from the CES approximation compared to direct 
estimation of the CES production function (see Griliches 
and Ringstad (1971)). Three other problems are involved in 
the method suggested by Artus. First, the two-step
estimation procedure yields two estimates of p and the real 
wage gap is sensitive to which of estimate of r is 
employed. Second, 8 is assumed to change at the same rate 
over time before and after 1973. This assumption is 
unlikely to hold as analytically demonstrated and tested 
below. Third, the period the share function is assumed to 
hold remains guess-work. Artus estimates the share function 
over the period from 1955 to 1973 (a shorter period for 
some countries); a period where he expects the marginal 
condition, with labour being paid its marginal product, to 
hold. This assumption, however, is unlikely to hold since 
employers may have been off their notional labour demand 
schedules in the periods of pronounced excess demand for 
labour, notable in periods of the 1960s.
3 Data
The data for GDP, employee compensation and the value-added 
price-deflators are explained in the previous chapter. 
Capital stock is measured as net capital stock, except for
4. The real wage gap can alternatively, and much easier, be 
estimated as wx = (w - p ) - dQf/dLf, where dQf/dLf = 
y V l1- (1 - 6 + p8(l - 8) log (K/L) ) .
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Japan, where gross capital stock is used. The capital stock 
data are taken from different sources listed in the data 
appendix, and when necessary updated with national account 
investments. For the few countries where capital stock data 
are not available, the perpetual inventory method is used 
after the following principles: the capital GDP ratio is 
assumed to be equal to 0.91 and 1 for manufactures and 
private services respectively in 1960, where the 
multiplication factors are found as the average ratio of 
capital and GDP in the respective sectors for Canada, the 
US, France and Germany in 1960. Since national account 
investments published by the OECD do not distinguish 
between structures and equipment, the perpetual inventory 
method is applied to sectoral investments in structures and 
equipment with a 6.9 per annum depreciation rate estimated 
as the average depreciation rate for the Danish economy 
(Otto (1987)). The share of capital, SK, is estimated as 
gross operating surplus.
User cost of capital, used to compute the cost shares, is 
calculated as
c = pk [(r + T) - 0.5pk/pk],
where pk is the price of capital, r is a long-term 
government bond interest rate, T a depreciation rate of 
capital stock, set to 6.9, and pk/pk capital gain. pk is 
calculated from a price index of investment goods. Capital
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gain is usually not multiplied by a factor of 0.5 as done 
here. This is done here because the investment deflator is 
likely to exaggerate capital gains. This is especially true 
in periods of the 1970s, where high inflation rendered 
capital costs negative. The oil price shocks may 
additionally have rendered some of the capital stock 
obsolete (Artus (1984)) . Since the oil price shocks 
coincided with the high inflation periods the capital 
gains, as the result of inflation, is exaggerated in the 
considered period. More importantly, c measures the 
expected user costs of capital in the cost share function. 
Since the major parts of capital gains, in particular in 
the wake of the two oil price shocks, are likely to have 
been unexpected, Pk^Pk is likely to have exaggerate 
expected capital gains. The multicountry nature of this 
study excluded a more rigourous calculation of (expected) 
user costs.
Capital shares are estimated as the following. For 
manufacturing, the capital share is calculated as the gross 
operating surplus as a percent of gross value added. These 
data are first readily available from 1966 or later. For 
private services gross operating surplus is available only 
for a few countries over a relatively short time span. 
Hence, capital shares for the manufacturing plus private 
services are calculated as the gross operating surplus for 
the whole economy as a per cent of GDP in manufacturing and 
private services. Since the Government sector accounts for
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the highest proportion of the sectors not covered in this 
study the error made by applying the gross operating 
surplus of the whole economy to private services and 
manufacturing is likely to be small.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Estimates of Translog Production Function
The stochastic versions of models (2) and (6) are estimated 
using Zellner's iterative estimation procedure (SURE) where 
error correlations across equations are accounted for. The 
variables are normalized to two in the initial period. The 
estimations are performed with the homogeneity and the 
cross-equation restrictions imposed.^ The cross-equation, 
or symmetry, restrictions are tested by the likelihood 
ratio test
LR = n(log[Qr] - log[Qu]) ,
A Awhere [f2rj and [Qu] are determinants of the estimated error 
covariance matrices for the restricted and unrestricted 
models and n the number of observations. The statistic is 
distributed as a chi-square under the null hypothesis with 
four degrees of freedom, which is the number cf 
restrictions imposed. To assure that the estimated
5. Artus (1984) argues convincingly in favour of the 
assumption of constant return to scale, and hence the 
assumption of homogeneity, on macro level.
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production functions are well-behaved, it is tested whether 
they are quasi-concave and monotone. Monotonicity requires 
8Q/8k and 8q/8l > 0 at every data point, and quasi­
concavity requires the bordered Hessian matrix to be
negative definite. Finally, the elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital, obtained from Uzawa (1962), is 
estimated as
Glk = <Ylk + CSLCSK) 1 CSLCSK'
where CSK is the capital cost share. Treating the cost
share sample means as constant over sub samples, the
asymptotic variance of is given by
asy var (alk) = (1/CSLCSK)^  asy var (7^ ) .
The estimations, which uses data for manufacturing plus 
private services, are presented in table 1. The estimated 
production functions are well-behaved with the exception of 
Italy and Sweden, where SQ/8k < 0 in three and five data
points respectively. The majority of the coefficient 
estimates are significant at the 5 per cent level. The 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for co-integration are 
computed as the estimate of ß-^ divided by its standard 
deviation from the regression Aej_t = ß-^ Q + ß n eit-l + 
ßi2^et-l + eit' where e^ are the residuals from the 
production or the cost share function. Since the sample 
size is small, implying a low power of the ADF tests, a
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critical value of 10 or 15 per cent of the "t-statistic" is 
more appropriate than the usual 5 per cent. At this 
critical level the null hypothesis of lack of co­
integration is accepted in almost all the cases. The case 
for accepting the null, however, is not strong. The lack of 
co-integration implies that we do not have a long-run 
steady-state relationship between the variables involved in 
the equation which may reflect that capital services are 
not adequately measured. The Lagrange multiplier tests of 
first order serial correlation indicate the presence of 
first order autocorrelation. Some positive serial 
correlation is acceptable, and to be expected, in the co­
integration equation
The imposed symmetry restrictions are rejected in half of 
the cases at the 1 per cent level. The restricted model, 
however, is employed for all countries because the 
unrestricted model gives parameter estimates with high 
standard errors and hence wide confidence intervals for the 
real wage gap. Disaggregation into manufactures and private 
services did not alleviate this problem.  ^ Tests of 
structural stability are not performed due to the short
6. The symmetry restrictions are usually not tested in the 
TL production function literature. Berndt and Christensen 
(1974) and Griffin and Gregory (1976) are exceptions. 
Although the symmetry restrictions are rejected in the 
study of Berndt and Christensen they proceed with the 
restricted model. Unfortunately, both studies test the 
symmetry restrictions by means of a F-test. The non-linear 
system implied by the usage of the SURE method in both 
studies render the power of the F-tests low, and hence 
increases the likelihood of accepting the null hypothesis 
when the alternative is true.
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length of the sample period relative to the numbers of 
parameters to be estimated.
The estimates of the elasticity of substitution and the 
factor augmented bias in technological change are of 
special interest because they are both important 
determinants of the warranted income distribution. The
estimates of a are quite stable over time, but differ
somewhat across countries. Note, however, that the standard 
errors, and hence the confidence intervals, of the
estimates of G are notably high. The estimates of the
factor augmenting technological progress are capital 
augmenting, or Solow-neutral, for 12 countries and labour 
augmenting for four countries at the 5 per cent level.
4.2 Artus' CES Approximation
The estimates of the Artus' CES approximation are performed 
for manufacturing as well as for the private sector. The
7. In the traditional neoclassical literature on income 
distribution the elasticity of substitution has often been 
the focus parameter because of the CES technology 
assumption. In the TL technology formulation the elasticity 
of substitution parameter affects the warranted 
distribution of income more indirectly.
8. The severe diagnostic problems in the estimates of the 
equations (11) and (12) may not be a result of the 
estimating the Kmenta CES approximation alternative to a 
direct estimate of the CES production function. I attempted 
to estimate the CES production function directly, with and 
without 5 changing, with and without a time trend, with and 
without 5 estimated from equation (14) and with and without 
factor augmented technological progress. The parameter 
estimates were often of an unlikely magnitude and were 
highly sensitive to specification.
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estimates with data from the manufacturing sector are 
performed to compare my estimates with Artus’ estimates 
that are limited to the manufacturing sector. For 
manufacturing and private services equation (12) is 
estimated over the period 1960 to 1973 to provide equation 
(11) with coefficient estimates of 5q and 8^  in accordance 
with the suggestion made by Artus (the estimation period 
terminates in 1969 for some countries Artus considers). For 
manufacturing, equation (12) is estimated over the whole 
sample period 1966-88. The Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno 
non-linear algorithm with Artus' average coefficient 
estimates as starting values is employed in the estimation 
of equation (12) . The estimates can be compared with the 
estimates obtained by Artus only approximately because his 
estimates cover different estimation periods and he uses 
efficiency adjusted gross capital stock amongst other 
things.
The estimates for the private sector are presented in table 
2. Most of the coefficients are significant at the 5 per 
cent level. The parameter p in most cases is estimated to 
be in the neighbourhood of zero, implying a unity 
elasticity of substitution. The rate of Hicks-neutral 
technological progress, indicated by the coefficient on X, 
is negative in nearly half of the cases, implying 
technological regress, which is at variance with other 
studies of technological progress. The negative coefficient 
estimate on the distributive parameter, 8^ , obtained for
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some countries is also remarkable and is opposite to its 
equilibrium path. This can be seen from the following. From 
the profit function we have the first order condition 
(wL)/(rK) = (dQ/dL)L/((dQ/dK)K). Differentiating the CES 
production function with respect to L and K respectively, 
and isolating 8 on the left hand side yields
8 =  [w/r]/((w/r) + (K/L) 1 + P] . (14)
With p = 0 or 1, 8 has been increasing for all countries 
over the sample period. This indicates that the time trend 
in the estimates of equation (12) captures something which 
has nothing to do with d. More seriously, regression of 8, 
calculated from equation (16) with r = 1, on a constant and 
a linear time trend, shows structural instability for 
nearly all countries diagnosed by the likelihood ratio test 
LRq in table 2. Hence, it is inappropriate to extrapolate 
81 beyond 1973 with a time trend.
Nor are the diagnostic tests of the estimates of Artus’ 
model encouraging. The ADF tests accept the null of unit- 
roots in the residuals at the 15 per cent level for nearly 
all countries and the ADF values in general are much lower 
than in the TL estimates. This suggests that a more 
reliable long-run relationship is obtained in the TL case. 
The residuals of the estimates of equation (11) exhibit 
severe first order autocorrelation. The presence of first 
order serial correlation is much less pronounced for the
131
residuals of the estimates of equation (12), however. 
Concerning parameter stability, a likelihood ratio test, 
alternative to the conventional F-test, is employed to test 
for structural stability since the F-test has a low power 
when the residuals are serial correlated. The stability 
test is performed with a breaking point in 1973/1974; a 
period where a relatively high and steadily GDP growth 
period, with a steady path in relative prices, was followed 
by a more turbulent environment. The null hypothesis of
parameter stability of the estimates of equation (11) is
rejected for all countries; at the 1 per cent level.
Finally, the estimates of equation (12) are tested for
structural stability; that is whether or not it is
appropriate to limit the estimation period to 1960 to 1973, 
as suggested by Artus, alternatively to the period 1960 to 
1988. The tests strongly support Artus’ suggestion to limit 
the estimation period to 1973.
The estimates for manufacturing are displayed in table 3. 
The coefficients in most cases are significant at the 5 per 
cent level, p is mostly positive, but small, implying an 
elasticity of substitution just below one. Technological 
regress is found for a third of the countries. For all 
countries where it is significant, 8^  is positive as we 
would expect. The diagnostic tests indicate a misspecified 
model and/or bad data, although not to the same extent as 
the estimates for the private sector, composed of private 
services and manufacturing.®
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5 Comparison of the Wage Gaps
This section compares the real wage gap estimated under the 
various technology assumptions; (1) Artus' CES 
approximation; (2) TL technology; (3) CD technology; and 
(4) Bruno's CES formula. Estimation of the full employment 
marginal labour productivity under the CD technology and 
Bruno's formula follow the trend-through-peak method 
discussed in the data section in the previous chapter. 
Bruno's CES formula is computed with p = 0.5 in accordance 
with his own estimates. The real wage gap on average is 
normalized to zero in the (full employment) period from 
1965 to 1969 except for two countries (1966-69 for Denmark 
and 1971 for New Zealand) in the estimates.
Table 4 displays the wage gap estimations in three periods. 
The magnitude of the real wage gap is remarkable diverse 
across methods. The wage gap is on the average lowest under 
CES technology, highest under TL technology and in the 
middle ground under CD technology. Under the CES technology 
assumption, the real wage gap is on average negligible in 
1988, whereas it is 18.8 under the TL technology 
assumption. If the real wage gap is partly responsible for 
the high unemployment rate in the OECD countries, we would 
expect the real wage gap to be relatively high in 1988.
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Table 4. The real wage gap for services and manufacturing under 
different technologies.
1973 1979 1988
CD BR AR TL CD BR AR TL CD BR AR TL
Canada 9 10 5 14 13 17 9 21 6 11 3 26
USA 2 2 3 7 4 1 1 12 1 -8 -15 20
Japan 19 -15 25 3 35 14 36 25 35 4 34 13
Australia 13 7 9 17 18 16 14 37 7 1 2 25
New Zeal. -7 -4 -1 2 3 7 4 16 -15 -27 -15 28
Austria 24 17 15 25 35 23 25 32 29 22 18 29
Belgium 22 13 12 20 33 30 23 28 16 12 8 6
Denmark -3 -13 -11 -14 4 5 1 -5 5 1 0 -1
Finland 12 8 8 18 14 16 10 15 6 10 5 17
France 6 -3 2 7 21 14 17 25 13 11 13 21
Germany 8 5 9 0 7 6 9 15 -2 -4 1 11
Greece -4 -8 -4 4 29 5 23 30 41 10 35 46
Ireland 8 -5 -2 13 7 -8 -4 16 -6 -10 -14 6
Italy 6 5 6 16 11 8 11 26 -2 -5 -5 31
Luxemb. 15 1 -2 14 42 35 12 31 35 27 -5 24
Netherl. 18 16 17 24 26 25 24 32 13 9 12 22
Norway 11 17 12 12 17 21 18 15 20 33 21 21
Portugal 3 0 4 18 19 20 11 35 11 -4 -6 25
Spain 11 22 0 14 14 20 -5 14 -4 11 -26 0
Sweden 9 1 - 14 23 5 - 30 9 -23 - 28
Switzerl. 8 3 4 6 14 0 5 4 14 -4 6 9
UK 0 -6 -2 8 -4 -4 -2 7 -16 -17 -19 7
Average 8.3 3.3 5.2 11 17.5 12.5 11.5 22. 0 9.8 2.7 2.5 18 .8
S. Dev. 8.2 9.9 8.2 8.9 12.1 11.0 10.7 10. 9 15.3 15 16.2 11. 4
Note: CD = CD technology, BR = Brunos' CES approximation formula, 
AR = Artus' method and TL = TL technology. The for Sweden is 
due to a wage gap exceeding its logical limit.
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The real wage gap, under the different technology 
assumptions, are displayed in figures 1 to 3 for three 
important countries; that is Canada, France and Germany. 
Under all technology assumptions, the real wage gap 
increased strongly from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s or 
mid 1980s in the French case. The path in the 1980s, 
however, is somewhat conflicting. The decline in the real 
wage gap is in the 1980s modest under the TL technology 
assumption compared to the other technologies.
6 Discrimination Between the Models
The previous section showed the real wage gap to be 
sensitive to technology assumption suggesting a selection 
of the better technology assumption is desired. Table 5 
discriminates between the different technology assumptions. 
Discrimination between the CD and the TL case is done wich 
a likelihood ratio test because the CD production function, 
unlike the CES production function, is nested within the TL 
model. The likelihood ratio test, LRqD, in the last column 
of table 5 is significant at the 1 per cent level in nearly 
all cases, indicating that the TL technology assumption is 
likely to be the better technology assumption of the two.
The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is used zo 
discriminate between Artus’ CES approximation and the other 
technologies. I have refrained from employing non-nested 
tests since they are difficult, if not impossible, zo
Figure 1 . Wage Gap: Canada ~ 1 3 7  -
I960 1972
Figure 2 . Wage Gap: Germany
I 9 6 0 1964 1968 1972 1980 1988
Figure 3 . Wage Gap: France
f  ,•••-'
I960 1964 1972 1976 1980 19841968 1988
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Table 5. Discrimination between technologies.
cda i c ^ A I C tla i c lrcd
Canada -7.40 -1.28 -7.69 18.27
USA -7.46 -7.05 -7.45 24.94
Japan -6.12 3.33 -6.25 46.98
Australia -6.84 -0.19 -7.11 28.13
New Zeal. -6.71 -2.13 -7.06 27.18
Austria -5.29 -0.24 -6.31 55.10
Belgium -6.52 0.54 -6.90 27.55
Denmark -4.63 0.45 -8.07 78.89
Finland -6.65 -0.13 -6.68 2.90
France -8.28 -0.77 -8.76 30.74
Germany -7.92 1.01 -8.60 31.03
Greece -6.58 0.95 -7.00 23.76
Ireland -6.18 0.95 -6.25 43.50
Italy -6.20 -0.77 -7.22 58.29
Luxemb. -7.01 -6.14 -7.17 27.84
Netherl. -6.40 0.54 -6.86 48.72
Norway -6.57 -0.49 -7.82 29.29
Portugal -5.62 1.99 -6.04 30.45
Spain -7.34 -0.94 -6.63 12.76
Sweden -7.15 -6.29 -6.84 33.64
Switzerl. -7.49 -0.74 -7.42 2.01
UK -7.06 0.30 -7.24 29.00
Note: CDa i c = AIC criterion with CD technology
ARA jq = AIC criterion with Artus' method, TLAIC 
AIC criterion with TL technology and LR^D 
likelihood ratio test for CD technology, %M6) 
distributed under the null of CD technology.
139
perform in the framework used above and their distributive 
properties are unknown. The lower AIC value under the CD 
and TL technology assumptions than under Artus' CES 
approximation in all cases suggest that the CD and TL 
technology assumptions are likely to be the better 
technology assumptions. This finding, combined with the 
findings that the estimates of Artus' CES approximation are 
likely to be misspecified suggests that not much, if 
anything, can be gained by using his intricate method 
compared to the simple CD technology case.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has derived and estimated the real wage gap 
under the CD, CES and TL technology assumptions for 22 OECD 
countries. Although the magnitude of the wage gap is fairly 
sensitive to technology assumption, the estimates clearly 
indicate the existence of significant a wage gap for most 
countries in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. 
During the 1980s the wage gap has declined for all 
countries, and on average is negligible in 1988 under the 
CD and the CES technology assumptions. The decline in the 
wage gap under the TL technology assumption, in contrast, 
has been modest during the 1980s, and it still is high in
1988.
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Finally, different model selection criteria suggests the TL 
technology assumption to be the superior of the 
technologies when the real wage gap is estimated.
DATA SOURCES
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Gross operating surplus: NA and HS. Manufacturing industry 
for Greece, Ireland and Portugal: gross domestic product 
minus working hours multiplied by compensation to employees 
(as calculated above).
Interest rates: IFS.
Capital Stock: OECD: Flows and Stocks of Fixed Capital. The 
exceptions are the following. Denmark: Otto (1987). Italy: 
Modigliani, F., F.P. Schioppa and N. Rossi, 1986, Aggregate 
Unemployment in Italy, 1960-1983, Economicar 53, S245-273 
(Data Appendix). Spain: Dolado, J. J., J. L. M. de Molina 
and A. Zabalza, Spanish Industrial Unemployment: Some 
Explanatory Factors, Economica, 53, S313-S334 (Data 
Appendix). Austria: Pichelmann, K. and M. Wagner, Labour 
Surplus as a signal for Real-wage Adjustment: Austria, 
1968-1984, Economica, 53, S75-87 (Data Appendix). New 
Zealand, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Switzerland: 
inventory perpetual method (see text).
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CHAPTER 5
LABOUR DEMAND UNDER DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGY ASSUMPTIONS
ABSTRACT. Labour demand functions are in this chapter 
derived under different underlying identifying assumptions 
and the following technology assumptions: Cobb-Douglas, CES, 
constant relative elasticity of substitution and translog 
technology. The models are estimated for private services 
and manufacturing in 15 of our 22 countries and are 
discriminated between by nested tests, information criteria 
and the coefficient estimates. The chapter finds the wage 
elasticity of labour demand to be very sensitive to choice 
of technology and identifying assumption. Ironically, 
probably the most popular specification of labour demand is 
found inferior to the two most preferred labour demand 
specifications.
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1 Introduction
Labour demand functions have always played a prominent role 
in theoretical and applied macroeconomics because they 
provide information about the relationship between 
employment on one side and factor prices, output prices and 
macroeconomic activity on the other side. Wage elasticities 
of labour demand have been parameters of especially concern; 
particularly in the wake of the wage explosion from the mid- 
1960s to the mid 1970s and the successive increase in 
unemployment in the OECD area. The evidence, however, 
indicates substantial disagreement about the magnitude of 
the elasticities and the reason for this is impossible to 
uncover due to different identifying assumptions and 
technology assumptions, sample period, sectoral and country 
coverage.1 2 In fact, the choice of technology assumption and 
the selection of the cost minimizing or the profit 
maximizing approach are usually not discussed, if stated at 
all.
Whereas many flexible form production functions have been 
suggested the last two decades, the Cobb-Douglas (CD) and 
the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) are still the 
preferred technology assumptions in studies of labour 
demand. Most recent studies employ CD technology under 
profit maximization followed by CES technology under profit 
maximization.^
1. See Hammermesh (1976, 1986) for surveys of elasticities.
2. The following studies employ CD technology under the
assumption of profit maximization: Andrews and Nickell
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This chapter derives labour demand under profit maximizing 
and cost minimizing behaviour and under following technology 
constraints: CD, CES, constant relative elasticity of 
substitution (CRES) and translog (TL) technology.^ The 
derived labour demand functions are estimated for private 
services and manufacturing in 15 of our 22 OECD countries 
where capital stock is available on sectoral level over the 
period 1960 to 1988. Two questions are asked. First, what is 
the magnitude of wage elasticity of labour demand and how 
sensitive is it to the underlying technology and identifying 
assumptions. Second, which identifying and technology 
assumptions, when estimating labour demand functions, are 
most likely to represent the data generating process best. 
The latter question is especially important since 
specification of the labour demand function plays an
(1982), Bean et al. (1986), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Dolado 
et al. (1986), Hatton (1988), Jenkinson (1986), Layard and 
Nickell (1985, 1986), Nickell and Symons (1990), Pissarides 
(1991), Sneessens and Dreze (1986) and Symons and Layard
(1984) . The following studies employ CD technology under the 
assumption of cost minimisation: Clark and Freeman (1980), 
Franz and König (1986), Hickman (1987) and Nadiri and Rosen 
(1969, 1974) . The following studies employ CES technology 
under the profit maximization assumption: Hall et al. 
(1989), Harris (1985), Lewis and Markepace (1981), 
Modigliani et al. (1986), Rosen and Quandt (1978) and Russel 
and Tease (1991). Most of multicountry nature have 
estimated labour demand functions derived under the 
assumption of profit maximization and CD technology so 
labour demand is a function of real product wage and capital 
stock (Bean et al. (1986), Bruno (1986), Bruno and Sachs
(1985) and Symons and Layard (1984)) . The capital stock in 
Bruno and Sachs (1985) and Symons and Layard (1984) is 
approximated by a linear and cubed time trend respectively. 
Why another labour demand specification in these studies nat 
has been chosen is puzzling.
3. See seminal papers by Cobb-Douglas (1928) (CD), Arrow et 
al. (1961) (CES), Hanoch (1971) (CRESH) and Christensen et 
al. (1971) (TL).
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important role in the chapters 6 and 8. Although the TL 
technology assumption was found to be superior to the CD and 
CES technology assumptions in estimating the real wage gap, 
in the previous chapter, it does not automatically follow 
that the same holds true for estimations of labour demand. 
The data requirements are quite different when the real wage 
gap is estimated compared to estimation of labour demand.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 derives 
labour demand under different identifying and technology 
assumptions. The econometric issues are discussed in section 
3. Section 4 present the empirical estimates and section 5 
discriminates between the models. Section 6 derives and 
discusses the wage elasticities under the different 
identifying assumptions and technology assumptions. Section 
7 briefly discusses the principal findings of the chapter.
2 Labour Demand and Technology
This section derives labour demand under different 
identifying and technology assumptions. The existence of 
competitive markets is assumed throughout. Whereas this is 
presumably an unrealistic assumption the purpose of the 
study is the keep the analysis simple and close to the main 
stream literature for comparative purposes.4
4. Layard and Nickell (1986) estimate labour demand under 
assumption of a non-competitive goods market. In next 
chapter it is demonstrated that it may be difficult to get 
satisfactory results under the assumption of non-competitive 
goods market.
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2.1 Cobb-Douglas Technology
Given the unrestricted CD production function Q(L,K) = 
@LaK ,^ where Q is gross domestic product (GDP), L labour 
services, K capital services, and ©, a and b are
parameters. Denoting logs with small letters, the stochastic 
versions of the derived labour demand, under profit 
maximization and cost minimisation behaviour respectively, 
are given by^
Model 1
1 = cxq + (w - p ) + oc2k + e-j_, a2<0, a2>0, (1)
and
Model 2
1 = ß0 + ßi(r - w) + ß2q + e2, ß1,ß2>0, (2)
where L is measured by working hours, W compensation to 
employees per working hour, the value-added price-
deflator and R user cost per unit of capital.^ The 
parameters are given by
5. See appendix for derivation.
6. Direct wages and output prices are instead of total 
labour costs and the value-added price deflator used 
frequently. Usage of direct wages is problematic as indirect 
labour costs have been increasing in proportion to total 
labour costs over the past decades and account for almost 50 
per cent of total labour costs in most OECD countries 
(Swedish Employers' Confederation (1989)). If output prices 
are substituted for the value-added price-deflator the 
labour demand equation must include prices of intermediate 
products. By the same token, intermediate inputs have to be 
included in the labour demand function if output instead of 
GDP is used as dependent variable.
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ocq = 1/(a - 1) [-log 0 - log a], = l/(a - 1),
a2 = b/(a - 1), P0 = -l/(a + b) ßx = b/(a + b) , 
ß2 = 1/(a + b) .
The coefficient on capital stock in equation (1) is assumed 
to be positive as an increase in the capital stock increases 
the marginal productivity of labour.
2.2 CES Technology
The unrestricted CES production function is given by 
Q (L, K) = y [5l “P + (1 - 5)K~P]_v /P,
where p = (1 - a)/a, where o as the elasticity of
substitution, v is the returns to scale parameter and 8 the 
distributional parameter. The stochastic versions of the 
derived labour demand, under profit maximization and cost 
minimisation respectively, are given by
Model 3
1 = COq + C01 (w - p ) + ü)2q + £3 , CO1 <0, CO2 >0, (3)
and
Model 4
- Xq + ^i (r - w) + x2k + £4 ,1 , t2>0 . (4)
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The parameters are given by
co0 = g log (8vy) , (jd1 = - o, co2 = (1 + p/v) / (p + 1),
Tq = - G log [ (1 ~ 5) / Ö ] , x1 — - s, T2 = 1.
2.3 Translog Technology
The translog cost function is given by
log C(W,R,Q) = log Yq + Ye log Q + yw±og W + Yrlo<? R 
+ 1/2 Yw w dog w)2 + 1/2 Yrr (log R)2 
+ Ywrlog w log R + Yqw log Q log w 
+ Yqr log Q log R + Yqq (log Q)2 ,
where W is compensation per working hour and R user costs of 
capital. By applying Shepard's lemma we get the derived 
labour demand function
1 = S log C(W,r ,Q)/8 log w = gw + yww log w + ywr log R 
+ Yqw lo3 Q-
The stochastic version of this equation is an unrestricted 
version of model 2
Model 2 (unrestricted)
1 — X,q + Aqw + A.3q + £5, A.q<0 /■ ^2 / ^ 3>0 • (5)
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For %2 = ~ 3^, we have the cost minimizing derived labour 
demand function under CD technology, which will be called 
the restricted version of model 2.
2.4 Constant Ratios of Elasticity of Substitution Technology
The CRES production function is given by
F(K,L,Q) = Dl Q-e(L)d(L)Ld(L) + Dr Q-e <K) d <K> Kd <K) = 1(
where D^ , d(i), and e(i) are the distribution, substitution
and expansion parameters respectively for i = K, L. The 
stochastic versions of the derived labour demand, under cost 
minimisation, is given by
Model 5
1 = cp0 + cpi (r - w) + cp2k + (p3q + e7, cp1,(p2»93>0 (6)
The parameters are given by
<P0 = ai log (D1d1/Dkdk) , <p]_ = 1/(1 - dx),
^2 = al ^ek^k - el<^l^  ' ^3 = (1 ~ dk) / (1 - dj_) .
Model 5 is convenient because it contains models 2 and 4 as 
special cases and hence allows for nested tests to 
discriminate between models 2 and 4.
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3 Econometric Issues
Data. The data employed are described in the chapters 3 and
4 .
Stochastic Specification. Since equation (2) is the 
restricted form of equation (5) , we only need to estimate 
equation (5) and test the restriction imposed by equation 
(2). Due to Clark and Freeman (1980), the coefficients on r 
and w in models 4 and 5 are also estimated unrestricted. 
Clark and Freeman have shown that estimates of restricted 
opposite signed coefficients on r and w are likely to result 
in a downward biased estimate of the wage elasticity. The 
point is that r has a higher standard deviation than w. This 
implies that models that relate demand for labour to 
relative factor prices essentially relate demand for labour 
to the price of capital rather than both costs of labour and 
capital. Since r probably is measured with a considerable 
error the wage elasticity is likely to be downward biased.
All models are estimated in log-levels with the dependent
7variable lagged one period to allow for lagged adjustment. 
The costs of using this simple adjustment mechanism is that
7. This dynamic specification is termed by Hendry et al. 
(1984) a reduced form or "dead start" equation. In a general 
framework where a general unrestricted form with lagged 
dependent and independent variables first is established, 
with "insignificant" variables sequentially restricted to 
zero afterwards, may be more suitable in many cases. In the 
present case with 29 observations available only for each 
country, the merits of a more unrestricted specification are 
disputable. Furthermore, the tables with the results would 
explode in size and be much less reader-friendly.
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it forces the adjustment lag to be the same for all 
explanatory variables which seems reasonable. No matter 
whether income or capital stock is used as an explanatory 
variable, they both influence labour demand via the marginal 
productivity of labour condition. In the optimising 
framework used in this chapter the recruitment decision is 
independent of whether labour costs or the marginal 
productivity of labour has changed. The advantage of using 
this simple adjustment mechanism is that all results are 
first-round regressions; no pretesting and specification 
search have been conducted. The estimates are therefore not 
influenced by prior intentions. The models are estimated in 
log-levels because it is the long-run parameters that are of 
interest. Estimation in differences, alternatively, may give 
misleading results if the goods market is dominated by 
monopolistic competition on the goods market and if labour
demand is dominated by changes of price mark--up over
marginal cost over the business ocycle.° Since mark-ups
fluctuate much over the business cycle, as shown by Bils
(1987), short-run estimates are not likely to give unbiased 
parameter estimates.
Estimation Method. It is conceivable that the residuals in 
the estimates for private services and manufacturing are 
correlated because these sectors may simultaneously be off 
their notional labour demand schedule over the business 
cycle. Hence, a gain in efficiency may be obtained by
8. Labour demand under monopolistic competition is derived 
in the next chapter.
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employing Zellner's iterative estimation procedure (SURE), 
where error correlations across the equations are allowed 
for.
The production and the labour demand decision is taken
simultaneously and labour demand influences real wages via 
the labour demand schedule; that is w/p and q may not be 
weakly exogenous. Hence the three stage least squares 
estimation technique is employed.^ Following instruments for 
q are employed: GDP, changes in the inflation and cyclical
adjusted fiscal balance in percent of potential GDP, 
monetary stock, Ml, deflated by consumer prices and world
trade volume. All variables are unlagged and lagged one 
period except GDP which is lagged only one period. Following 
instruments for w/p are employed: w/p in the other sector,
the own sector w/p and real monetary stock. All variables
are unlagged and lagged one period except the own sector 
w/p, which is lagged one period.
Diagnostic tests. Since 29 observations only are available 
for each country, the number of diagnostic tests have been 
kept to an absolute minimum. Lagrangian multiplier tests for 
first order serial correlation are performed by regressing
9. Since the labour demand functions and their attached 
production functions belong to the same system estimation of 
labour demand and the production function as a system with 
cross-equation restrictions imposed will give more efficient 
estimates in theory. The costs of employing this procedure 
is that the CES and CRES production functions need to be 
estimated by non-linear estimation technique, where 
parameter estimates are very sensitive to their starting 
values. Furthermore, it is not guarantied that tests of 
cross equation constraints will be accepted.
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the residual on a constant and its lagged value. Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for co-integration are computed as 
the estimate of \i^ divided by its standard deviation from 
the regression Ae^t = + M-i2^ et-l + eit' where 
e^ is the residual from the estimate of the labour demand 
function. Finally, a likelihood ratio test for structural 
stability which is robust to the non-linear SURE estimation 
is performed for the whole system is estimated as
LR = n (log[flr] - log[£lu]) ,
A Awhere [£lr] and [£>u] are the determinants of the estimated 
error covariance matrices for the restricted and 
unrestricted models, respectively, and n the number of 
observations. The break point is chosen to be 1974/75 for 
the following reasons. First, it is more likely that labour 
has been off the notional labour demand scheme in the more 
turbulent period after the first oil price shock than before 
it. Second, the "wage explosion" preceding the first oil 
price shock, and the subsequent slow-down in GDP growth, may 
have forced firms to reflect more upon changes in real wages 
in their labour recruitment decisions. Third, the speed of 
technological advances, which influences on labour demand 
are ignored in the estimations, probably slowed down after 
the first oil price shock. This may have affected labour 
demand positively or negatively dependent upon the 
technology parameters in the labour demand functions. This 
aspect is discussed further in chapter 8.
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4 Empirical Results
The estimates of the models are presented in tables 1 to 5. 
The long-run coefficients in the tables are all computed as 
the short-run coefficient estimate divided by one minus the 
coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable. It is 
important to note the reported long-run wage coefficients 
are not elasticities, although they are usually interpreted 
in that way. This question is addressed in section 7. 
Differences in elasticities between sectors are also 
addressed in section 7.
Model 1 (CD production function under profit maximization). 
Estimates of model 1 are displayed in table 1. The 
coefficients in most cases have the expected sign; that is 
negative coefficient on real wages and positive coefficient 
on capital. The the magnitude of the long-run coefficient 
estimates differ widely across countries and between 
sectors. Since technologies are likely to be quite similar 
across countries this finding suggests that we cannot have 
much confidence in the results. Moreover, the coefficient 
estimates are not very significant.
The diagnostic tests in general suggest that the estimates 
are free of first order autocorrelation and that labour 
demand, on one side, and w/p and k, on the other side, are 
co-integrated. A structural break in the labour demand 
functions seems to have appeared in the period 1974/75 for 
all countries. Parameter instability is, however, not
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limited to the CD profit maximization case but, as shown in 
the estimates below, is present in all the models. This 
suggests that parameter instability is not due to the 
identifying and the technology assumptions. Errors in 
variables is more likely to the major course of the 
parameter instability: The labour demand functions are 
derived under the assumption of full input utilization, 
defined as cost minimizing production point. Since labour 
and capital are quasi-fixed factors, it is unlikely that 
producers were on their notional capital and labour demand 
schemes in the 1974/75 and 1981/82 down-turns. The profit 
squeeze, furthermore, that peaked in the mid 1970s, may have 
made firms more real product wage conscious. In fact, the 
real wage elasticity tended to increase over the period 
1961-1974 to 1975-1988 (estimates not shown here). A growth 
in technological advances may also have contributed to the 
structural break.
Model 2 (the CD or the TL production functions under cost 
minimisation) . Estimates of model 2 are presented in table 
2. The long-run coefficient estimates on w and q have the 
expected signs in nearly all cases, are significant at the 5 
per cent level and do not differ much across countries. As 
may be expected, the coefficients on user cost are only 
significant at the 5 per cent level in half of the cases, 
probably because expected capital costs are poorly measured. 
Unless the coefficient estimates on w and r have low t- 
ratios, the restriction of equality between the coefficient 
on r and minus w is unambiguously rejected. Whether this
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implies rejection of CD technology in favour of TL
technology or that r is poorly measured cannot be concluded.
The important point is that the better estimates are
obtained in the unrestricted case. The hypothesis of an
income elasticity of one, that is constant returns to scale,
cannot be rejected in most cases. That most of the income
elasticity point estimates are below one may be due to
increasing returns to scale, errors in measurement and/or
i nthe omission of variables for technological progress. w The 
diagnostic tests, in general, give no indication of first- 
order serial correlation and the lack of co-integration.
Model 3 (CES production function under profit maximization). 
Table 3 presents the estimates of model 3. The long-run 
coefficients on the real wage, which is minus the elasticity 
of substitution, in most cases are in the range of minus 0.5 
and minus 1. The long-run income elasticity is distributed 
around one (constant returns to scale). The long-run 
coefficient estimates are quite similar across countries. 
The diagnostic tests, in general, give no indication of 
first-order serial correlation and lack of co-integration.
Model 4 (CES production function under cost minimisation).
The estimates of model 4 are shown in table 4. The
coefficients on user cost have low t-statistics and their
signs are often the opposite of the expected. When they are
10. Errors of measurement may bias the coefficient either 
way. Griliches and Hausman (1986) suggest a method that 
control for the bias by employing panel data. By applying 
their method to labour demand they find that the coefficient 
on income is downward biased.
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significant at the 5 per cent level, the restrictions of 
equal, but opposite, signs of the coefficients on user and 
wage costs, are unambiguously rejected. The long-run 
coefficients on wages in most cases have the expected sign. 
The coefficients on capital are in general significant at 
the 5 per cent level, and the long-run estimates in the 
neighbourhood of 0.5, which corresponds to a elasticity of 
substitution of 2/3 (1/(1 + 0.5)). By and large the 
diagnostic tests suggest that the equations are co­
integrated and the residuals do not exhibit first order 
serial correlation.
Model 5 (CRES production function under cost minimisation). 
Table 5 presents the parameter estimates of model 5. The 
diagnostic tests and long-run estimates are not shown in the 
table since the functions are not globally valid in K in 
most cases (monotone and quasi-concave). Global validity, 
among other things, requires the coefficient on K to be 
positive (Hanoch (1971)).
5 Discrimination Between the Models
Discrimination between the nested models is done by 
employing nested tests whereas discrimination between the 
remaining models are done by comparing the reliability of 
the estimates and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
The diagnostic tests are not used to discriminate between 
the models because they give almost the same results across 
models. Non-nested model selection criteria are not employed
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because the known tests are not robust in non-linear 
estimates (Pagan and Wickens (1989)).
Nested tests. Model 2 and 4 are nested within model 5. Wald 
tests of parameter restrictions are displayed in table 5. 
The null hypothesis of zero (or negative) coefficient on the 
capital stock is rejected in four of the 30 cases considered 
at the 1 or 5 per cent level (the critical values are 6.64 
and 3.84 respectively) . For income, the null hypothesis is 
rejected in 21 cases. This result suggests that model 2 is 
better than model 4.
Discrimination between the non-nested models. Model 4 is 
ruled out in the nested tests above and model 5 is ruled out 
because it is not globally valid. Hence we are left with 
three models; that is model 1, 2 and 3. The AIC, displayed 
in the original tables, slightly favours model 2 over model 
3, while model 1 clearly is the least favoured of the three: 
the average AIC is -7.107 for model 1, -7.358 for model 3 
and -7.403 for model 2. If, however, we exclude the 
estimates where the coefficient on user cost is negative and 
significant at the five per cent level, in contrast to the 
theory, in model 2, the average AIC slightly favours model 3 
over model 2. Since the coefficient estimates of model 2 are 
additionally more diverse across countries than technology 
is likely to justify, this specification can be ruled out as 
the preferred specification. Hence, model 3 is the preferred
model.
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6 Long-Run Wage Elasticities of Labour Demand
The parameter of chief interest is the long-run wage 
elasticity. The wage elasticity consists of a movement along 
the isoquant and a movement of the isoquant. The former is 
the substitution effect and the latter the output or scale 
effect. The scale effect is negative: An increase in W, for 
instance, tends to push W/Pg upward which lower labour 
demand via lower output.^  The composite wage elasticity of 
labour demand is given by
t|ll = dl/dw = 5l/5w I q + 5l/5q 8q/5p 5p/8w,
which, with sign reversal to certify a positive elasticity, 
under the assumption of linear homogeneity reduces to
TILL = ~ (1 -  SL ) a  ~ SLr l / (8)
where SL is the share of labour in total costs and Tj the 
scale elasticity; that is the own-price elasticity of demand 
for Q.12 (1 SL)G under the different technology
assumptions is identified ao
Model 1. - (1 - Sl ) g = - l/a1 since G is restricted to one
Model 2. - (1 - SL )G = - assuming a + b = 1
1 1 . With a multiple input production function consisting of 
weakly separable subfunctions, the wage elasticity is 
furthermore affected by the subfunction output effect 
holding total output constant. This effect allow inputs to 
be adjusted to the cost-minimizing levels. See Berndt and 
Wood ( 1 97 9 )  for an exposition.
1 2 . See Hammermesh ( 1 9 8 6 )  for a proof.
178
Model 3. - (1 - S L)0 = - (1 SjJ G)^
Model 4. - (1 - s L)o = - (1 -
Next, consider the scale effect. Some effort has been made 
to estimate the own-price elasticity on macro level (see 
references in Hammermesh (1976)). A price increase, for 
instance, affects output via different propensity to consume 
between different groups, the Pigou effect, deteriorating of 
external competitiveness, and monetary crowding out (left­
ward shift in the LM-curve). The reliability of macro price 
elasticity of demand estimates, however, are deemed to be of 
very low value. The effect of external competitiveness and 
monetary crowding out on output, for instance, depends much 
on whether the authorities accommodate the price rise or not 
by monetary and exchange rate policies. Furthermore, the 
Pigou effect, which is the demand effect via the impact of a 
changed net asset position on consumption, is likely to 
change much over time due to changes in net asset position 
of the private sector. Due to these problems the wage 
elasticities are presented under the assumption of constant 
output.
Table 6. Average long-run wage elasticities: - (1 - Sl )g .
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Man Ser Man Ser Man Ser Man Ser
3.84 2.38 0.29 0.14 0.44 0.41 0.09 0.07
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Table 6 presents the absolute value of estimates of wage 
elasticity of demand on average across countries. 1 - SL is 
set to 0.50 in manufacturing and 0.75 in services. The 
dynamic unstable estimates, where the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variables exceed one, are excluded. The 
long-run wage elasticities differ widely between the models, 
which underscores the importance of the right choice of 
model. The wage elasticity in the preferred model 3 is 0.44 
for manufacturing and 0.41 for services.
A final question concerns the sensitivity of elasticities to 
specification. That wage elasticities differ under different 
technology assumptions may be expected as a result of the 
sensitivity of shape of the labour demand curve to 
technology. The sensitivity of the estimates to underlying 
identifying assumption, but the same technology assumption, 
is more worrisome. Does it mean that the whole set of 
assumptions identified with neoclassical production theory 
are rejected? Probably not. It might be the specification of 
the model. It might be with the data and the way it is 
constructed. Data on capital services and user costs are 
known to be poor. Hicks-neutral technical change has been 
assumed, and might not be valid either. Another serious 
problem is the aggregation over inputs and over firms.
7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has derived, estimated and compared labour 
demand with different underlying technology and identifying
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assumptions for private services and manufacturing. The 
estimations of the labour demand functions demonstrate that 
wage elasticities of demand are very sensitive to different 
underlying technology and identifying assumptions.
Discrimination between models suggested that labour demand 
derived under the assumptions of CES technology and profit 
maximization is likely to be the best specification, 
followed by the translog cost minimisation approach. 
Ironically, the most popular model of labour demand; that is 
the Cobb-Douglas profit maximization approach, was found to 
be the third best specification. The finding that labour 
demand derived under the CES technology assumption under 
profit maximization is likely to give the best results is 
encouraging because the data requirements are much less 
demanding than they are in the other model specifications.
The average wage elasticity of labour demand across 
countries is estimated numerically to be 0.44 for 
manufacturing and 0.41 for private services in the preferred 
model. This findings is in the upper range of other 
estimates surveyed by Hammermesh (1986) .
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APPENDIX: Derivation of Labour Demand Under Different
Technology Assumptions
CD Technology
Profit maximization: 
max 7t = Pq 0 L a Kb - W L - R K ,  
where 71 is the profit, then 
8 7c/5 L = P 0 a La_ 1 Kb - w = 0, 
which gives equation (1) .
Cost minimisation:
min c = W L  + R K  = W L  + @ _1/b Q1/b L~a/b, 
where c are total costs, then 
5 c/5 L = W - a/b R 0 ”1^b Q1/b l " (a+b)/b, 
which gives equation (2) .
CES Technology
Profit maximization:
max 7i = P y[5l “P + (1 - 5)K~P]~v/P - W L - R K, 
then,
8 tt/8 L = py [5l ~P + (1 - 5) K"P] _v/P_1 v 5 l "P_1 - w 
= P Q P /v+1 V 5 L~p-1 - W = 0, 
which gives equation (3) .
Cost minimisation:
min c = W L + R K s.t. y[5L"P + (1 - 5)K-P]-V//P, 
which gives the ratio of the first order conditions 
W/R = 5 L-P~1/[(1 - 5) K~P~1], 
which gives equation (4).
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CRES Technology
Cost minimisation: 
min c = W L + R K
s.t. Dl Q-e(L)d(L)Ld(L) + Dk Q-e(K)d(K)Kd(K) = 1(
which gives the ratio of the first order conditions 
W/R = D1d1v-e(L)d(L)Ld(L)-l/DKdKv-e(K)d(K)Ld(K)-1
which gives equation (6).
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CHAPTER 6
THE RISE IN THE UK UNEMPLOYMENT: THE SEARCH FOR AN
EXPLANATION
Abstract. The model used by Layard and Nickell to account 
for changes in unemployment is suggested to be incomplete 
as a result of unrealistic underlying assumptions and 
cross-equation constraints, inconsistency, and inadequate 
estimation method. An alternative approach, that circumvent 
some of the problems which encounter the Layard-Nickell 
approach is suggested as a tool to account for the 
unemployment path. Dynamic simulations with the model 
suggest that wage stickiness, persistence and low GDP 
growth all have played role in the UK unemployment increase 
from 1967 to 1983.
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1 Introduction
In the seminal papers by Layard and Nickell (1985a; 1985b; 
1986) a structural model which accounts for "exogenous" 
factors that may have caused the rise in the unemployment 
rate in the UK since 1967 is derived. The model has gained 
wide popularity as a tool used to account for the 
unemployment path in OECD countries (Bean et al. (1986), 
Dolado et al. (1986), Huay and Groenewold (1989), Pehkonen 
(1989), and Pissarides (1991)). In order to account for the 
unemployment path Layard and Nickell (LN) derive a reduced 
form unemployment equation from estimates of three 
equations: A labour demand equation, a price equation and a 
wage equation. Simulations of the reduced form equation 
then allow LN to decompose the causes of unemployment 
changes into changes in each "exogenous" factor.
The model suggested by LN is important because it sheds 
light on factors that may have contributed to the rise in 
UK unemployment; an exercise that has important policy 
implications. However, this chapter argues that in many 
respects the LN model is an inadequate tool to account for 
a given unemployment path for the following reasons. First, 
LN impose estimation restrictions that are unlikely to 
hold. Some of the restrictions imply that changes in 
technological progress and capital stock do not influence 
the unemployment path; only wage push factors, beyond
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productivity, and cyclical changes in GDP are allowed to 
affect the unemployment path. Second, labour supply is 
assumed to be exogenous and hence cannot be a factor that 
has contributed to changes in unemployment. Third, the 
estimation method suggested by LN is inadequate and their 
results change a great deal when a better estimation method 
is used.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, I discuss 
the theoretical content and underlying assumptions in the
LN model. Second, I examine the sensitivity of parameter
estimates both to the model specification and the
estimation method, using the LN (1986) data. Third, an
alternative model of unemployment that avoids some of the 
shortcomings of the LN model is suggested and simulated.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents and 
discusses the LN equation system. The reduced form employed 
by LN to account for the rise in the unemployment is 
discussed in section 3 and the empirical estimates of the 
LN model, using different estimation methods and model 
specifications, are presented in section 4. An alternative 
approach to account for the rise in unemployment is 
suggested and estimated in section 5. Conclusions are
addressed in section 6.
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2 The Layard-Nickell Model
In this section the structural equations employed by LN in 
their 1986 paper are briefly presented.
2.1 Structural Model
LN derive the following equation system 
Labour demand
N = f1 (W/P, <3e, A, K) (1)
- + + +
Price-setting
P/W = f2 (Ge,K/N,P/Pe, A) (2)
? -  -  ?
Wage-setting
W/P = f3(Ge,A,P/Pe,N/L,Z,K/L,PW/P°) (3)
? + + + + +
where
N = labour demand, measured as the number employed males 
and females 
L = labour force
W = compensation to employees per hour worked 
P = value-added price deflator
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deviation of expected aggregate demand from
potential (full utilization of resources) output 
A = labour augmenting technical progress 
K = capital stock
Pe = expected value-added price deflator 
Pw = world manufacturing prices
Z = wage push factors such as mismatch, the replacement 
ratio and an index of union power 
P° = output prices.
Equations (1) to (3) are derived as follows. The labour 
demand function is derived under the assumptions of profit 
maximizing behaviour, Cobb-Douglas technology and imperfect 
competition. The labour demand function departs from the 
perfect competition case by the expected demand variable 
Ge, derived from an equation where the price mark-up on 
marginal cost is dependent upon the business cycle via the 
product demand elasticity.1 The effect of Ge on employment
1. Capital stock, the marginal user costs and the marginal 
wage rate are assumed fixed when the labour demand is 
derived. Labour demand is presumably derived as the 
following: given the profit maximization problem
max P° Y - W N - R K
where R is cost of capital, P° output prices and Y GDP. The 
first order condition for profit maximization is P° = 8(W N 
+ R K)/ÖY, assuming constant output prices. Under imperfect 
competition and constant factor prices we get
p° = p 8(w n + r K) /8y = j. w 5n /8y + ji r 5k /5y ,
where j. is the price mark-up. Assuming that ÖK/ÖY is zero 
and ' homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production function, Y =
/ rv "t“ Vo ZO TO(AN) i\ , then 
P° = |i W/ (AdaNdd-lK l-d >
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depends on whether the price mark-up on marginal cost is 
countercyclical or procyclical. If the price mark-up on 
marginal cost is procyclical than the business cycle has a 
positive impact on employment and vice versa. LN assume oe 
to have a positive impact on labour demand. The term "A" is 
included to account for labour augmenting, or Harrod- 
neutral, technical progress and it is expected to affect
oemployment positively.
Isolating N on the left hand side and taking logs gives 
n = - 1/(d - l)log d + 1/(d - l)logp + d/(d - l)log A 
+ k + 1/(d - 1)(w - p°).
The value-added price-deflator is employed for p°, since 
raw materials are not included in the production function. 
If 5k /5y is different from zero there is not an easy 
solution to the optimization problem. Even in the short-run 
8k /5y cannot be assumed fixed since firms have the 
possibility to rent vehicles and other mobile machinery. 
Assuming that user costs and wage to vary as a consequence 
of changing Y complicates the derivation of labour demand 
even more. As shown by Bils (1987), the marginal wage is 
very sensitive to cyclical fluctuations.
2. The term A is not Harrod-neutral technical progress, as 
noted by LN, but Hicks-neutral technical progress. Factor 
augmenting technical progress cannot be identified when the 
elasticity of substitution is unity, as under the Cobb- 
Douglas technology assumption, demonstrated by Sato (1970). 
This can be seen from the following. Given the homogeneous 
Cobb-Douglas production function Y = (AN)aK^_a; then A = 
Y^ ' aN~^K~~ (1 _al/a . This is equivalent to logA = l/a[logY - a 
logN - (l-a)logK], which is the formula used by LN to 
estimate "labour augmenting" technical progress. Now assume 
that B is Solow-neutral, or capital augmenting, technical 
progress so Y = Na (BK)1-a. Then B = Y1' (1-a)N“a/ (1_a)K_1, 
which implies that logB = 1 / (1 —a) [log Y - a logN - (1- 
a)logK]. This expression only differs from Harrod-neutral 
technical progress by a constant.
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The price equation is derived from the pricing rule that 
prices are mark-ups on expected marginal costs.
The wage equation encompasses four possible mechanisms by 
which wages are being determined: Demand and supply of
labour in a competitive market, independently by firms, 
independently by unions and by bargaining between firms and 
unions.
2.2 Stochastic Specification
Denoting logs with lowercase letters, LN specify equations 
(1) to (3) stochastically asJ
nt = a0 + alnt-l + a2nt-2 + a3 (wt-l ” Pt-1}
+ a4 (p*t - p°t) + a5ADt + a6WTt + a7at
+ (1 - <xl - a2) kt + etl, (la)
a.3<0 ; a4, a5, ocg, a7>0; (1 - a7 - a2)>0,
(pt - wt) = ß0 + ßi (Pt-i _ wt-l) + ß2A2wt + P3^2wt-1
+ p4GSt + Ps(kt ~ nt) + P6at + et2' (2a)
$2’ ?3/ ß5<0' p4>0 /‘ ßg> or <0,
(Wt - Pt) = y0 + YiMMt + y2pt + 73vt (pmt - p°t)
+ y4A(vt (pmt - p°t)) + T5UPt + y6ut
3. Other specifications estimated by LN are not considered 
because they are not employed by LN to account for the rise 
in unemployment rate.
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+ T7tlt + 8^t2t + + TioIPD
+ ^ll(kt ~ 1t) + ^i2at + et3' (3a)
71,72/73'74' 75' 77/ 78' 79' 7n' 7i2>0'- 
76' 7io <0'
where,
WT = 
AD =
MM
P
IPD =
UP = 
U
kl = 
k2 = 
k3 =
Ei = 
A 2«t =
deviation of world trade from its trend
inflation and cyclical adjusted fiscal balance as a
percent of potential GDP
job mismatch measured as the absolute change in the 
proportion of employees in industry relative to the 
absolute change in total employment 
replacement ratio
income policy impulse dummy equal one in 1976 and 
1977, zero elsewhere 
ratio of imports to GDP 
import prices
union wage mark-up over non-union employees
male unemployment rate
employment tax borne by the firm
income tax rate
indirect tax rate
zero-mean, finite-variance stochastic term, 
acceleration of the rate of change in wages as a 
proxy of the price expectational errors
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In equation (la) the variables WT, AD and (P*/P°) are 
proxies for cyclical movements in price mark-ups over 
marginal costs. The terms Az-wt and A^wt_7 in equation (2a) 
replace the price expectation error, (P/Pe), from equation 
(2), assuming price expectation errors are positively 
correlated with accelerations in the rate of change in 
wages. The Z term in equation (3) is replaced by MM, p, UP, 
t]_/ t2/ tß and IPD in equation (3a) as discussed in the 
previous section. The log of N/L in equation (3) is 
approximated as minus the unemployment rate, U. The long- 
run coefficient on the capital stock variable in equation 
(la) is restricted to one as implied by the derived labour 
demand under the homogeneous Cobb-Douglas technology 
assumption and profit maximization.
LN impose four cross-equation restrictions on the system
p5/ (1“ßl) = (1 - <x1 - a2)/a3 (4)
- 1 - ß6/(l - ßx) = (1 - o x - a2)/a3 (5)
- T n = (1 - a 1 - a2)/a3 (6)
- Ti2 = a7/a3 (7)
The restrictions given by equations (4) and (5) ensure 
consistency in the model since the price and the labour 
demand equations are derived from the same system. The 
restrictions given by equations (6) and (7) ensure the 
existence of a solution to the model and are discussed in
section 3.
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2.3 Comments on the Model
Employment equation: First, LN employ a labour demand 
function derived under Cobb-Douglas technology but for a 
number of reasons a CES technology may be better: It is 
less restrictive and GDP appears as a explanatory variable 
instead of the capital stock. The capital stock and the 
flow of services from the stock are very difficult to 
measure.4 The empirical results, presented below, clearly 
favour the CES over the Cobb-Douglas derived labour demand 
function.
Second, in the stochastic specification, LN include three 
cyclical shift variables directly in the equation instead 
of Ge that appears in the theoretical specification. This 
substitution gives rise to a number of problems. The 
competitiveness variable, (p - p°), which is employed as a 
cyclical shift variable and exhibited in their figure 9a, 
Layard and Nickell (1986), is highly trended. Hence, this 
variable is not likely to account for cyclical changes in 
price mark-ups over costs. Furthermore, the fiscal stance 
variable, AD, cannot a priori be assumed to move in a
4. The CES derived labour demand under profit maximization 
was in chapter 5 found to perform best of the labour demand 
functions considered. The Cobb-Douglas derived labour 
demand under profit maximization is found not to perform 
well.
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procyclical fashion. If fine tuning works perfectly, it 
will move in a countercyclical fashion.
Finally, as will be demonstrated in the empirical section, 
the parameter estimates of the model are very sensitive to 
whether cyclical shift variables or Ge is included directly 
in the estimated equation. As shown below the conclusions 
and parameter estimates obtained by LN are very dependent 
on the cyclical demand variables that are included in the 
equations.
Third, price mark-ups on marginal costs are assumed to move 
in a pro-cyclically fashion which implies that Ge has a 
positive impact on employment. Other researchers, however, 
who have directly focused their studies on variations of 
the mark-up over the cycle, conclude that the mark-up 
behaves in the opposite way to that hypothesized by LN. 
Bils (1987), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Price (1991), 
for instance, find that mark-ups typically fall during 
booms. Since the empirical estimates of the LN model show 
that mark-ups move procyclically and have contributed much 
to the higher unemployment it is likely that the proxy 
variables LN employ for oe do not measure mark-up effects 
but is perhaps measuring Keynesian demand shifts. In other 
words, many of the cyclical variables should be included in 
the model in their own right.
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Price equation: This equation is derived from the condition 
marginal revenue = marginal costs. Once marginal cost is 
determined a price mark-up over marginal cost is appended 
to marginal cost. Prices thus depend on expected output 
demand and the marginal costs. Expected output demand is 
modelled differently between employment and price
equations. In the price equation, expected output is 
modelled as potential output, where potential output is 
defined as full employment output: YPot = (L^)aK^_a. In the 
employment equation, on the other hand, expected output is 
modelled as an extrapolative expectation formation process 
embedded in the dynamic specification of the model. It is 
not clear why the modelling of expected output should 
differ in the two equations. Moreover, the output
expectations mechanism hypothesized in the price equation 
is unlikely to hold. It states that output is expected to 
increase at a pace compatible with full employment output. 
If that is the case UK producers output expectations have 
been consistently wrong since 1967, when UK unemployment 
first began to increase. A study by Madsen (1992) suggests 
that production expectations are more likely to be 
regressive or to follow a combined regressive and second 
order error learning process.
3 Accounting for the Rise in Unemployment in the LN Model
To account for the unemployment path LN substitute the wage 
equation (3a) for (w - p) in the employment equation (la)
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and compute the long-run solution. Ignoring time subscripts 
and noting that 1 - n is approximately equal to U, we get
(1 - ax - a2)U + a3y6u = - (a0 + a3y0) - a4 (p* - p°)
- a3AD - a6WT - (1 - a3 - a2 + a3Yn) (k - 1)
- (a7 + a3y12)a - a3 [y3MM + y2p + y3v (pm - p°)
+ Y4^ (v (pm - P°) ) + Y5UP + Y7^i + 78^2 + ^9^3
+ Y l O I P D  + Y i2a  ^• (8)
where changes in the unemployment rate can be accounted for 
by shifts in the "exogenous" variables.
It can now be seen that the restrictions (6) and (7) are 
imposed to ensure that the sum of the coefficients on k - 1 
and "a" in equation (8) are zero so k - 1 and "a" do not 
influence unemployment. Without these restrictions, LN 
argue, the increase in the K/L-ratio and in the efficiency 
of labour, "a", would otherwise put a persistent upward or 
downward pressure on U. The restriction that unemployment 
cannot be affected by the ratio of the capital stock to the 
labour force is unduly restrictive and it is not clear how 
such a mechanism would operate in a real economy. Any 
relationships between the labour force, the capital stock 
and unemployment are fundamental issues which need to be 
addressed rather than assumed away. The restriction given 
by (6) effectively rules out changes in labour supply, and 
its relationship to the capital stock, as a source of 
unemployment in the long-term. To put the point another way
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the model should be specified to allow an exogenous change 
in the labour force to affect unemployment if that is what 
the data indicate. In the LN model any exogenous increase 
in the labour supply depress the real wage sufficiently 
through the wage equation that the additional labour force 
is just employed through the labour demand function and 
unemployment does not change. That exactly the right 
magnitude for the wage change should occur stands in sharp 
contrast to New Keynesian economics and in contrast to LN 
emphasis on wage push factors affecting the real wage in 
the long-run.
The argument against the restriction given by equation (6) 
can more formally be put in the following way. Equation (8) 
can be rewritten as
(1 - ax - a2 - a3y11)U + a3Ygu = - a3y11 (k - n)
- (1 - a1 - a2)k + (1 - a1 - a2)l + X, (8a)
where X is a vector of the wage push and cyclical demand 
variables
x = - (a0 + a3Y0) - a4 (p* - p°) - oc5ad - a6WT - (a7 
+ a3y12)a - a3 [y3MM + y 2 p + y3v (pm - p°) + y4A(v (pm 
- p°) ) + Y5UP + y3t3 + T8t2 + ^9t3 + YiOIPD + ^12a  ^*
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Now assume that the log of labour supply, 1, is a function 
of variables contained in the vector Z. Then U = 1 - n = Z 
- n and equation (8a) becomes
(1 - ct-L - a2)U + a3y6u + a3y6u = - a3yxl (k - n)
- (1 - «2 - a2)k + (1 - a1 - a2)Z + X. (8b)
Assuming that X is constant unemployment increases with 
higher labour supply, Z, and falls with an increase in 
capital labour ratio since a3<0. A higher capital stock, 
k, on the other hand, lowers unemployment via higher 
marginal productivity of labour and hence increased labour 
demand. From this it can be seen that if labour supply is a 
function of Z the restriction given by equation (6) is not 
necessary. A secular increase in K, for instance, need not 
put a persistent downward pressure on unemployment because 
labour supply may have increased meanwhile. In equation 
(8b) unemployment changes as a result of changes in labour 
supply, productivity, cyclical demand, capital stock and 
wage push variables.
Hence one consequence of the restriction (6) is that 
changes in capital stock do not affect unemployment. An 
increase in capital stock, for instance, increases the 
marginal productivity of labour and hence the demand for 
labour. However, the increased marginal productivity of 
labour increases wages, via the wage equation, to such an 
extent that unemployment remains unaltered. Therefore,
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unemployment only can change as a result of changes in wage 
push factors and in cyclical changes in price mark-ups on 
wages. A change in demand, that influences demand for 
labour via a change in the marginal productivity of labour, 
cannot influence unemployment in the model.
What does the restriction (6) means in practical terms? It 
means that the effect of trend GDP growth slow-down that 
occurred after 1973, in most OECD countries, cannot have 
affected the unemployment path in the model. GDP only can 
affect unemployment cyclically in the model via the Ge 
term. Hence, alone wage push factors, beyond productivity, 
are able to affect the trend unemployment path. This, in 
turn, implies that the trend unemployment path 
approximately is dependent upon the real wage gap path 
under the Cobb-Douglas technology assumption since the 
coefficient on the productivity term is close to unity in 
the wage equation. Since the chapters 2 and 3 in the thesis 
demonstrate the inability of the real wage gap to explain 
the secular rise in the unemployment in OECD countries not 
much confidence can be given to the LN model. Moreover, LN 
could have taken a much shorter route by regressing the 
unemployment rate on the real wage gap and a cyclical GDP 
variable and the real wage gap on wage push factors.
Finally, the restriction given by equation (7) implies that 
income growth caused by Hicks-neutral technical progress 
cannot affect the unemployment path. Increased marginal
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productivity of labour, induced by technological progress 
for instance, does not affect unemployment because of 
increased real wages.
Statistically, the restriction given by equation (6) is 
justified by LN as it cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent 
level (the restriction given by (7) is not considered as 
the variable "a" is excluded in their final estimates). 
This result occurs because the coefficient on the capital 
stock in the unrestricted estimates of the employment 
equation has a high standard error, which gives room for a 
wide confidence interval, as shown in the empirical 
estimates below.
In order to account for the rise in unemployment over 
certain time intervals, LN estimate the change in U from 
equation (8) given the change in the "exogenous" variables 
over the same time intervals. The time intervals considered 
are 1954-64, 1965-72, 1973-77 and 1978-81. Usage of
equation (8) over these short time intervals is strictly 
speaking inaccurate as equation (8) imposes a long-run 
solution. The dynamic adjustment due to changes in 
"exogenous" factors do not conclude within the time 
intervals considered. In their labour demand function, for 
instance, only 0.66 per cent of the dynamic adjustment has 
taken place after three years.
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Note that the price equation is not used to account for 
unemployment, but estimated in conjunction with the 
employment and the wage equations; probably to gain 
efficiency which may work through two channels. One channel 
is via the cross-equation restrictions (4) and (5) and the 
other is the use of generalized least squares, where the 
efficiency of the parameter estimates increases with the 
number of equations included in the system. Since the cross 
equation restrictions (4) and (5) implicitly impose the 
restriction that the different expectations formation 
mechanism in the price and labour demand equations are the 
same these restrictions are likely to lower the efficiency 
of the estimates.
4 Empirical Estimates of the LN Model
In this section the sensitivity of the LN parameter 
estimates to cross-equation restrictions and to the 
estimation method is assessed first. Then we test the 
sensitivity of the parameter estimates in the labour demand 
to different specifications.
4.1 Sensitivity of Parameter Estimates to Cross-equations 
Restrictions and Different Estimation Method
LN estimate equations (la), (2a) and (3a) by three stage 
least squares (3SLS) under the non-linear cross equation 
restrictions (4) to (8). It is not clear why LN employ 3SLS
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as an alternative to the instrument variable method (IV) or 
2SLS. 3SLS is a potentially dangerous estimator to use 
because the parameter estimates are very sensitive to 
misspecif ication in contrast to OLS, IV or 2SLS (see for 
instance Rao (1974)). If one equation in the 3SLS system is 
misspecified it feeds through the whole system and 
parameter estimates of the other equations will be 
affected.
In order to assess the sensitivity of the parameter 
estimates to the estimation method and the imposition of 
cross-equation constraints, the LN model is estimated in 
five different ways: (i) 3SLS with cross-equation 
restrictions imposed (original LN estimates); (ii) 3SLS 
without cross-equation restrictions imposed; (iii) 2SLS 
with cross-equation restrictions imposed; (iv) 2SLS without 
cross-equation restrictions imposed; (v) 3SLS with cross­
equation constraints imposed, employing the general to 
specific procedure with the 5 per cent bench-mark level. 
This estimate will shed light on to the extent to which the 
LN parameter estimates will change with a consequent model 
reduction procedure. The LN estimation strategy has not 
been consequent in the sense that some variables have been 
deleted due to "insignificance" and others have not, and it 
is not clear in which sequence the coefficient restrictions 
of zero have been imposed.
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The results of estimating the models are presented in table 
1. The 2SLS estimate with cross-equation restrictions are 
not displayed because convergence was not obtained after 
260 iterations and the parameter values did not seem to 
converge but to fluctuate around constant means. The 
original LN estimates from their tables 4 to 6 (1986) are 
presented in the first column of the table. Replication of 
the LN model with their data gave approximately the 
parameter estimates obtained by LN. Note that the 
diagnostic tests reported in table 1 do not correspond to 
the tests reported by LN. The tests LN report are 
inappropriately calculated from single equation estimates.
The results indicate the following. The cross-equation 
restriction given by equation (4) is rejected at the 5 per 
cent level, suggesting that the estimates should have been 
performed without this restriction. Presence of first order 
serial correlation in the labour demand equation in the 
original LN estimates indicate specification problems. 
Relaxing the imposed restrictions in the original LN 
estimates, shown in the third column of table 1, changes 
the parameter estimates. However, the parameters in the 
wage equation, that are essential to account for the 
unemployment change in the LN model, do not change much. 
Major changes in the parameter estimates and higher 
standard errors result when we move from the unrestricted 
3SLS estimates to the unrestricted 2SLS estimates. The 
coefficients on capital stock, real product wage and
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Table 1. Parameter estimates of the LN model.
3SLS Rest.1 3SLS Rest.2 3SLS Unrest.2 2SLS Unrest.^
E m p l o y m e n t :
Const. 2.570 (4.9) 1.814 (4.7) 2.442 (3.3) 2.793 (2.6)
nt-l 1.057 (8.2) 0.785 (1.7) 0.727 (9.4) 0.712 (6.3)
nt-2 -0.361 (2.6) 0.002 (2.2) 0.001 (0.6)
k 0.304 0.215 0.179 (3.0) 0.005 (0.0)
* (w-p)t-1 -0.285(4.9) -0.213 (5.0) -0.171 (3.0) -0.008 (0.1)
* (pw-p°)t 0.0667 (3.2) 0.043(1.5) -0.049(1.0)
AD 0.718 (3.6) 0.805(4.6) 0.593 (3.4) 0.737 (2.2)
WT 0.0686 (1.9) 0.138 (3.4) 0.157 (3.7) 0.168 (2.8)
S.E. 0.0077 0.0102 0.0001 0.0001
LM 1.87 1.93 0.99 1.22
P r i c e s :
Const. -4.180 (4.2) 0.002 (0.5) 0.128 (2.1) 0.016 (2.2)
(p~w)t-1 0.544 (5.0) 0.584(6.5) 0.904 (9.7) 0.990 (9.2)
*A2 (w^ .) -0.336 (4.2) -0.019 (4.2) -0.020 (4.0)
*A2 (wt_1) -0.242 (3.8) 0.010 (2.3) 0.006 (0.7)
*o 0.038 (2.1) 0.002 (1.9) 0.002 (1.4)
*<k-l)t -0.486 -0.021 (4.2) -0.002 (0.3) 0.004 (0.6)
S.E. 0.0150 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000
LM 1.24 0.82 1.26 1.74
W a g e s :
Const. 8.410 (9.0) 8.838 (53.5) 0.081 (5.8) 4.633(0.7)
*ut -0.062 (4.4) -0.079(4.9) -0.115 (2.0)
0.039 (3.3) 0.029 (3.0) 0.048 (6.1) 0.054 (2.1)
*Pt 0.182 (1.5) 0.002(1.9) 0.002 (1.9) 0.008 (1.2)
*V(pm-p°)t 0.499 (2.5) -0.115(0.6) -0.093 (0.1)
*A(v(pm-p°)t) 0.419 (2.0) -0.157 (0.6) 0.616(0.6)
*UPt 0.085 (4.1) 0.058 (2.9) 0.087 (3.5) 0.147 (1.4)
tit 0.179 (0.9) 0.010 (0.0) 0.701 (0.6)
IPD -0.021 (1.7) -0.009 (0.8) -0.030 (1.0)
* (k-l)t 1.070 1.008
0.055 (2.4)
1.133 (13.2) 0.891 (2.4)
S.E. 0.0145 0.0317 0.0002 0.0008
LM 1.31 1.93 0.69 1.03
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Table 1 Cont.
Wald(R^) 5.18 7.18
Wald(R2) 0.42 1.14
Wald(R3) 1.01 3.65
BP(DIAG) 17.66 9.69
t(Ld)P 0.09 0.58
t(Ld)w 0.09 1.09
t (p)1 0.48 0.32
t <p)w 0.01 1.41
t (W) 1 0.87 2.62
t (W)P 0.38 0.11
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. LM is a Lagrangian multiplier
test of first order serial correlation, t (26)-distributed under the 
null of no serial correlation. Wald(i) is the Wald test for the 
parameter restriction R^, (1)-distributed under the null of the
imposed restriction. / (1 —ß-^ ) = (1 - - a2)/a«3, R2 : - Y u
= (1 - a-j_ - a2) /a3, R3: Coefficient on capital stock in labour
demand = (1 - a-j_ - a2) . BP (DIAG) is the Breusch Pagan test of the
unrestricted form for diagonal covariance matrix (0.5m(m-1))- 
distributed under the null of diagonal covariance matrix, where m 
is the number of equations, t(j)1 = t-test for zero residual from 
equation i in the j'th equation, where i, j = Ld, P and W, where Ld 
= labour demand equation, P = price equation and W = wage equation. 
Variables with an asterisks are instrumented.
1. Original NL estimates; 3SLS and cross-equation restrictions.
2. General to specific; 3SLS and cross-equation restrictions.
3. 3SLS without cross-equation restrictions.
4. 2SLS without cross-equation restrictions.
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competitiveness, in the labour demand equation, become 
insignificant at the 5 per cent level. The coefficients on 
union mark-up, replacement ratio, the income policy dummy, 
and the import price shocks in the wage equation also 
become insignificant.
The 3SLS estimates with cross-equation restrictions imposed 
using the general to specific procedure are presented in 
the second column of table 1. The estimates are performed 
without the restriction given by equation (4) since it is 
rejected. The estimates are quite different from the LN 
estimates; especially the estimates of the wage equation. 
Although Ge is significant in the wage equation it is 
dropped in the LN estimates (Ge appear in equation (3) but 
not in its stochastic specification (3a)). It is not clear 
why Ge is dropped in their estimates of the wage equation. 
Employers' labour taxes, the ratio of domestic to import 
prices and the income policy dummies are all insignificant.
To shed light on the efficiency gain from employing 3SLS as 
an alternative to 2SLS, two statistical tests are 
performed. It is worth noting that these tests do not 
indicate whether the efficiency gain is "false" or "true" 
but only whether the residuals are contemporaneously 
correlated. In the first test a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test for diagonal covariance matrix is 
performed (Breusch and Pagan (1980)). The LM test for the 
unrestricted 2SLS LN estimates is (3) = 17.66 and (3) =
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9.69 for the reduced 2SLS unrestricted LN model. Hence, the 
hypotheses of zero off diagonal elements are rejected at 
the 5 per cent level but not at the 1 per cent in the 
latter case. This indicates that efficiency may be gained 
by the use of 3SLS. In the second test, the residuals from 
the other two estimates in the unrestricted 2SLS system are 
tested for significance in the third equation. The t- 
statistics of the residuals, shown in the columns 1 and 2 
of table 1 all are insignificant, except for one case, 
suggesting the lack of contemporaneous correlation in the 
residuals and hence no efficiency gain by employing 3SLS.
Overall this section has demonstrated that the parameter 
estimates of the LN model are very sensitive to estimation 
method, cross-equation restrictions and choice of model 
reduction procedure. It is of especially concern that the 
model is upheld by their estimation method and the cross­
equation restrictions and that most parameter estimates 
become insignificant if 2SLS is employed and the cross­
equation restrictions are relaxed.
4.2 Sensitivity of Parameter Estimates to Specification of 
the Labour Demand Function
Since LN find that cyclical demand factors in the labour 
demand function account for 6.56 per cent points of the 
7.00 per cent points increase in the male unemployment rate 
in the UK over the period 1975-79 to 1980-83, it is of
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importance to elaborate on the sensitivity of the parameter 
estimates of the labour demand function to different model 
specifications. Different specifications of labour demand 
are estimated with real product wages, oe and capital stock 
or GDP as explanatory variables. The simplest possible 
dynamic specification, where the dependent variable is 
lagged one period, is chosen to save degrees of freedom and 
to avoid specification search. The deviation of the log of 
GDP from its logarithmic time trend is used as a proxy for 
oe. The estimate of oe provided by LN is not used since it 
contains a time trend, and Ge is only supposed to account 
for cyclical movements in the price mark-up over marginal 
costs. The generated regressors problem by the inclusion of 
Ge generated from another regression is ignored.
The estimates are presented in the upper half of table 2. 
The first model in table 2 (Model 1) uses real wages, Ge 
and capital stock as explanatory variables as in the LN 
labour demand function. Only Ge is significant, at the 5 
per cent level and first order serial correlation is 
present at the 5 per cent level. If the capital stock is 
deleted from this equation real wages remain insignificant 
and first order serial correlation is still present (Model 
2) . With only real wages and capital stock as explanatory 
variables both are insignificant and the residuals still 
exhibit first order serial correlation (Model 3) . 
Employment of GDP instead of capital stock does not change 
the outcome (Model 4). Assuming CES technology and perfect
Table 2 . Single equation parameter estimates.
Employment Work . Hours
Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 Mod 5 Mod 6
Const. 4.79
(2.18)
4.04 
(2.83)
0.93
(0.61)
4.94
(1.89)
1.23
(0.96)
3.25
(1.91)
nt-l 0.52(2.45)
0.59
(3.97)
0.93
(6.57)
0.55
(2.35)
0.81
(5.27)
0.71
(5.21)
* (w-p) t 0.16
(0.59)
0.01
(0.52)
0.11
(0.46)
0.28
(0.61)
-0.40
(2.10)
-0.56
(2.05)
kt -0.14 (0.56)
-0.13
(0.59)
*Yt -0.33(0.59)
0.49
(1.96)
0.66
(1.88)
0.44
(2.86)
0.44
(3.49)
0.62
(1.74)
LM 4.61 3.05 2.18 2.45 1.56 1.32
Labour Supply Wages
Mod 7 Mod 8 Mod 9
Const. -5.80
(8.08)
-4.82
(12.39)
Const. 5.74
(2.19)
*wdisPt 0.20
(0.86)
(w-p)t_1 0.48
(2.06)
*wdispt_1 -0.26
(1.27)
MMt 0.04
(2.36)
MMAt 0.01
(4.34)
0.004
(20.36)
* (y-n)t 0.72
(2.17)
*nt 0.53(7.53)
0.44
(11.24) *ut
-0.08
(2.74)
LM 1.43 3.49 *UPt 0.10
(1.85)
LM 0.30
Note: see note to table 1.
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competition implying that labour demand becomes a function 
of real wages and GDP gives more encouraging results. The 
coefficients are all significant at the 5 per cent level, 
have the expected signs and the residuals are free of first
order serial correlation (Models 5 and 6). The only
difference between model 5 and 6 is that model 6 uses
working hours as dependent variable whereas model employs
employment as the dependent variable.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these estimates. First, 
oe dominates labour demand to such an extent that other 
variables in the equation lose importance/significance. 
This indicates that oe is likely to capture the effect of 
capital stock or GDP on labour demand. Hence, the 
coefficient on oe is likely to exaggerate the effects of 
cyclical changes in price mark-ups over wages on labour 
demand if it at all captures the cyclical impact of mark­
ups on unemployment as previously discussed. Second, the 
CES derived labour demand function gives better results 
than the Cobb-Douglas derived labour demand function. This 
is probably a result of the less restrictive character of 
the CES production function and that capital stock, the 
services from which are difficult to measure, is not needed 
as regressor.
These results have strong implications for the LN 
estimates. Since the CES derived labour demand function 
under perfect competition in the goods market gave the best
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results of the models considered it would be logical to 
include this equation in the LN model. If this is done 
changes in oe do not have any impact on the unemployment 
path in equation (8) and only wage push factors can 
influence unemployment. This finding furthermore reinforces 
the argument put forth in the previous section that it is 
inappropriately to assume that capital stock cannot affect 
the unemployment path.
5 An Alternative Approach to Account for the Unemployment 
Path
This approach employs a labour demand and a wage equation 
in much the same way as LN but adds a labour supply 
equation. The addition of a labour supply equation allows 
us to focus especially on this factor as a cause of 
unemployment. The estimates are then used to simulate the 
rise in unemployment.
5.1 Stochastic Specification and Empirical Estimates
The following stochastic equations are estimated
(n^ . + h^_) =  (Dq + C03 (n t - l  + ^ t - 1 ^  + w 2 ^w t ~ Pt^
+ co3yt  + et 4 , a)2<0; «3>0, (9)
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(wt - pt) = Tq + xl (wt-l “ Pt-1} + T2Pt + x3UPt 
+ x4ut + x5(yt - nt) + xgMMt + x7vt (pm
“ P°t> + x8tlt + x9t2t + x10t3t + et5' (10)
x2' x3' x5' x6' x7' x8' x9r x10>^; x4<^/
(lt~ popt) = ( J ) q  + Pint + 02MMAt + ^ w ^ ^ t
+ ())4wdlsPt_1 + et6, (ll)
1^/ §2 ' 3^' P4>0/
where MMA is the accumulated value of mismatch, MM, POP 
the working age population, H weekly hours worked, and 
wdisp s reai disposable income; that is direct wages after 
the deduction of direct taxes and deflated by consumer 
prices.
Equation (9) is the CES labour demand under profit 
maximization and perfect competition. Equation (10) is a 
wage equation quite similar to the LN wage equation and 
consistent with the labour demand function where income is 
substituted for the capital stock and labour supply 
conditioned upon the variables given by equation (11) . ^
5. Mismatch is estimated following LN as the absolute value 
of the expression
(NIndt _ Nm d t_l)/(NTott . NTott_l)(
where the superscripts Ind and Tot refer to the industry 
and whole economy, respectively.
6. Strictly this requires population as explanatory 
variables in the wage equation. This variable is, however, 
not considered since the wage equation already has a large 
number of included explanatory variables.
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Derivation of the wage equation is shown formally in next 
chapter. The coefficient on the Y/N-ratio is equal to l/o 
if the real wage follows its warranted path, where <3 is the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. To 
use Y/N instead of K/N in the wage equation gives an 
econometric advantage. Since the standard deviation of K is 
much lower than the standard deviation of N or L, the 
coefficient on either the K/N-ratio or the K/L-ratio is 
likely to reflect the influence of L on W/P. The standard 
deviation of Y, in contrast, is not much different from the 
standard deviation of N and better estimates should attain.
The labour supply, given by equation (11), follows a 
standard labour supply model except for inclusion of the 
variable MMA to account for the persistence effect in 
labour supply and mismatch between labour demand and 
supply. The persistence effect is suggested by Clark and 
Summers (1982). According to Clark and Summers, individuals 
who entered the labour market under an economic upturn tend 
to remain in the labour force after they are laid off under 
a down-turn. The mismatch between labour demand and supply 
affects labour supply as the following. The decline in 
manufacturing employment after the two oil price shocks, 
for instance, has been found to have contributed to the 
increased unemployment in Australia and the OECD countries 
respectively (Gregory (1990) and Glyn and Rowthorn (1988)). 
The decline in manufacturing employment has created a pool 
of unemployed blue collar workers who have not been able to
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find employment in the service sector, which to a large 
extent has recruited female labour from outside the labour 
force.
The use of MMA in the labour supply function 
unrealistically assumes that the labour force does not 
adjust to a structural shift over time. It is, however, 
difficult to build a more sophisticated adjustment pattern 
into a model for a single country and with only a few 
observations available. In contrast to the labour demand 
and wage equations, the speed of adjustment due to changes 
in the explanatory variables over time cannot be assumed to 
be similar for each variable in the labour supply equation. 
Hence, the dependent variable is not lagged in the 
stochastic specification. It is assumed that labour supply 
reacts to employment and structural shifts immediately, 
whereas it may take some time before a change in real 
disposable income affects the decision to join the labour 
force.
The general to specific method is employed in the empirical 
estimates with 5 per cent as the bench-mark level. The 
estimates of equations (9) to (11) are presented as models 
6 to 9 in table 2. The estimate of labour demand has been 
discussed in the previous section. The results of 
estimating labour supply is given as model 8 in table 2. 
The real disposable income is insignificant and the 
variables MMA and n are highly significant and with the
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right signs. The coefficient on n is 0.44 which is small 
compared to the estimates in chapter 8 of the thesis. The 
presence of first order serial correlation may suggest 
misspecification. Due to the lack of a better alternative, 
however, the estimate will be maintained to account for the 
rise in unemployment.
The estimate of the wage equation is presented as model 9 
in table 2. All variables have the expected sign. Assuming 
that the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour is below or equal to one, the coefficient estimate 
on the Y/N-ratio of 0.72 suggests that real wages do not 
catch-up with the change in the marginal productivity of 
labour. This implies that the impact of a rise in the GDP 
on employment is positive and not neutral as assumed in the 
LN model.
5.2 Accounting for the Unemployment Path
The identity U = (L - N) * 100 / L is employed to account 
for the unemployment path. The estimated wage equation is 
substituted into the labour demand equation so employment 
is expressed as a function of the "exogenous" variables in 
the dynamic simulations. Similarly, the labour demand 
estimates are substituted for N in the labour supply 
equation. The idea is then to simulate a hypothetical 
unemployment path assuming a continuation of the existing 
conditions in the full employment period 1953 to 1966. In
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the first step, the hypothetical path of the "exogenous" 
variables are computed as follows: The growth in GDP, POP, 
accumulated mismatch, MMA, and labour productivity, Y/N, 
are assumed to follow the average growth rates in the full 
employment period. Similarly the average value of the level 
of mismatch, weekly hours worked, and union mark-up 
observed in the full employment period are assumed to hold 
in the unemployment period. In the second step, the 
estimated equations of labour demand and supply are 
dynamically simulated with the hypothetical path in the 
"exogenous" variables. The lagged dependent variables are 
initially set equal to their actual values in 1966. 
Decomposing the causes of the unemployment path is computed 
as the difference between the unemployment rate simulated 
with the actual values and the hypothetical values of the 
"exogenous" variables. The model is first simulated with 
the actual variables. Subsequently it is simulated with the 
hypothetical path of one of the "exogenous" variables and 
the contribution to unemployment as a result of this 
variable is computed. This procedure is followed for all 
"exogenous" variables.
The factors that may have contributed to the unemployment 
path are presented in table 3. Income and productivity are 
merged under the heading of GDP in the table since they are 
closely related. GDP growth is not decomposed into factor 
usage and technological progress since it is difficult to 
isolate the contributions of each variable separately in
219
Table 3 . Accounting for the change in the unemployment rate 
for males.
1953-66 1967-74 1975-79 Total
to to to
1967-74 1975-79 1980-83
Mismatch (MM) 0 . 34 0..08 0 .49 0 . 91
Wage inflexibility (UP) 1 . 60 0..57 0 .71 2 .88
Persistence (MMA) 0 .47 1..16 1 .13 2 .76
Population (POP) 1.. 63 0..59 0..77 2 . 99
Hours (H) -0.. 92 -0..26 -0..26 -1 .44
GDP (Y) 0 . 94 1 . 60 2..59 5 .13
Total 4 .06 3..74 5..43 13,. 15
Actual 1 ,. 94 3,.01 7 .00 12 ,. 95
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the estimations. This aspect is discussed further in 
chapter 8.
Wage push factors and population growth contribute most to 
the unemployment increase from 1953-66 to 1967-74. After 
the first oil price shock, however, the persistence effect 
of unemployment, and especially low GDP growth, take over 
as the most important factors contributing to the 
unemployment growth. Looking at the period from 1966 gives 
the following dynamic picture: Wage push factors and 
population growth initiated the first modest rise in 
unemployment. The strong rise in unemployment after 1973 
and 1979, however, was fuelled by structural shifts in 
labour demand and low GDP growth. Fewer weekly working 
hours have tended to lower unemployment during the whole 
period. The result that wage push factors have not played a 
role in explaining the increase in the male unemployment 
rate after the first oil price shock is consistent with the 
finding of the previous chapters that the real wage gap has 
not changed much after 1974 for the UK.
My results in table 4 are compared to the results obtained 
by LN. Labour supply factors have contributed much to the 
rise in unemployment over the period in my estimates 
whereas LN assume labour supply to be exogenous. Therefore, 
wage push and demand factors have played a smaller role in 
my estimates a larger role in the LN estimates. In the last
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Table 4 . Comparison of causes of the changes in the 
unemployment rates in table 3 with the results of Layard and 
Nickel1.
1953-66
to
1967-74
1967-74
to
1975-79
1975-79
to
1980-83
Total
LN results:
Wage push factors 1.55 2.77 1.19 5.63
Demand factors 0.12 0.54 6.56 7.22
Total 1.67 3.31 7.75 12.85
Table 3:
Wage push factors 1 . 94 0.65 1.20 3.79
Demand factors 0.94 1 . 60 2.59 5.13
Labour supply factors 2.10 1.75 1 . 90 5.75
Hours (H) -0.92 -0.26 -0.26 -1 .44
Total 4.06 3.74 5.43 13.23
Actual 1.94 3.01 7.00 12.95
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period considered lower demand virtually explains all the 
rise in the unemployment in the LN estimates.
6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has discussed the model suggested by Layard 
and Nickell (1985a; 1985b; 1986) to account for the 
unemployment path. It is suggested that the model is in 
many respects inadequate. Theoretically, the model is 
derived under an unfounded set of implicit assumptions and 
with cross-equation restrictions imposed that are unlikely 
to hold. Empirically, their estimates are found to be 
upheld by an inadequate estimation method. A change in 
econometric method result in major changes in the outcome 
of the LN model.
An alternative approach, building on the framework 
suggested by LN, is suggested. The model is simple and 
circumvents some of the problems encountered by the LN 
model. Simulations with "exogenous" factors that might have 
caused the rise in the UK unemployment demonstrate that 
wage push factors and wage stickiness fuelled the modest 
rise in the unemployment rate from 1966 to 1973. Structural 
shifts in labour demand and low growth in GDP, however, 
have been the most important factors behind the strong rise 
in unemployment after the first oil price shocks.
DATA SOURCES 223
All data from data appendix in LN (1986) except following 
series. Population in working age: OECD Labour Force
Statistics (LFS). GDP price deflator: OECD National
Accounts (NA) . GDP: NA. Ml: IMF International Financial
Statistics, Yearbook (IFS) line 34. Direct wage costs: 
average monthly earnings in all industries;IFS. Consumer 
prices: IFS. Weakly hours worked:ILO Year Book.
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CHAPTER 7
TESTS OF NEW KEYNESIAN THEORIES OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Abstract. New Keynesian theories of unemployment predict 
that wage stickiness has increased over the past 30 years, 
especially in the wake of the first oil price shock, and 
the wages are most sticky in countries with the highest 
rate of unemployment. The validity of the predictions are 
tested using data for 20 OECD countries. The majority of 
the tests reject the predictions made by the New Keynesian 
theories of unemployment.
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1 Introduction
New Keynesian theories of unemployment, including 
efficiency-wage models, union bargaining models, insider- 
outsider theories and implicit contract theories have 
gained popularity in the wake of the seemingly persistent 
and high unemployment in most OECD countries. Common for 
these theories is the proposition that institutional 
factors have rendered real wages more sticky, and hence 
less responsive to unemployment, in the past two decades. 
Once wages are driven wages above their full employment 
levels they are slow to adjust downward. The strength of 
the wage-unemployment trade-off may, as a logical 
consequence of these theories, have declined in the past 
decades; especially in the wake of the first oil price 
shock when unemployment started to increase significantly 
in all OECD countries. The theories furthermore predict 
real wages to be most sticky in the countries with the 
highest unemployment rate.
This chapter tests New Keynesian theories of unemployment 
via wage equations employing data for our 20 OECD countries 
(the data period is two short for New Zealand and Denmark). 
I test whether the wage restraining nature of unemployment 
has declined over time, especially since 1974, whether 
unemployment exerts the strongest negative pressure on 
wages in the countries with the lowest unemployment rate 
and whether the temporary unemployment component has a
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stronger negative impact on wages than the persistent 
unemployment component.
Section 2 briefly presents the New Keynesian theories of 
unemployment tested in this chapter and section 3 outlines 
a wage equation employed to test them. The models used to 
test these theories are discussed in section 4. Section 5 
discusses the econometric method and presents the empirical 
estimates. Pooled time-series and cross-section estimates 
are presented in section 6. The results in this study are 
compared to the results of other studies in section 7. 
Section 8 briefly summarises the finding of the study.
2 New Keynesian Theories of Unemployment
Some of the New Keynesian theories of unemployment were 
discussed in chapter 2. The most important content of them 
is briefly described below. Efficiency-wage theories assume 
that worker productivity is a function of wages (Stiglitz 
(1986)). Unemployment may exist because from the firms' 
point of view it is optimal to keep wages above the market 
clearing level to prevent workers from shirking, to lower 
labour turnover, to attract a high quality labour force and 
to increase worker morale. In the union bargaining model by 
McDonald and Solow (1981), the firm and the union act as a 
bilateral monopoly. If in response to shifts in demand both 
sides decide to share gains from trade, the outcome will 
usually be one of large employment fluctuations and small
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real wage fluctuations. Insider-outsider theories assume 
that wages are set by insiders (employed) whose interests 
are presented by the unions (Gregory (1982); Blanchard and 
Summers (1986); Lindbeck and Snower (1986)) . A negative 
shock to the economy has long-term effects as unemployed 
workers forego the opportunity to maintain skills and lose 
contact with the labour market. Moreover, the insiders have 
bargaining power over outsiders due to turnover costs, 
training costs and firing costs. Implicit contract theories 
assume that it is optimal for firms and workers to arrange 
implicit contacts to minimize the income variability of 
workers since they are more risk averse than employers 
(Gordon (1990)). The outcome is sticky wages that prevent 
the labour market from clearing after an adverse demand 
shock.
3 The Wage Adjustment Model
The wage equation derived by Gordon (1987a) is used to test 
real wage flexibility. Output is assumed to be a function 
of labour inputs, L, and a multiplicative factor ©, 
composed of productivity, capital and materials
Qt = 0tQ(Lt) , Q'>0. (1)
Under the assumptions of profit maximization and perfect 
competition given the production function, labour demand is
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Ldt = Ld (Wt/PVAt,© t), L ,d(Wt/PVAt)<0 , L'd (@t)>0/ (2)
where W is compensation to employees and PVA the value- 
added price-deflator. Note, that the arguments in labour 
demand are expectational parameters, but written as actual 
values to keep the exposition close to Gordon's. Supply of 
labour is assumed to be a positive function of real take 
home pay
Lst = Ls (Wdirt (l - tt)/PECPIt), L ,s>0, (3)
where Wd -^r is direct wage payments, tt the average direct 
tax rate on income and PE^P  ^ the expected consumer prices. 
The excess demand for labour is assumed to be a ratio of 
labour demand and labour supply
xt = LV LSt- <4>
With lowercase letters denoting logs, the equations (2) and 
(3) inserted in (4) can be rearranged to give
wt = wt (xt,pVAt,peCPIt,0t,tt,£t), (5)
w 't (xt)>0' w't (pVAt)>0, w't (peCPIt) >0, w't(0t)>O, 
w't (tt)>0, w't(^ t)>0,
where is pay-roll taxes to account for the wedge between
and W .
231
3.1 Stochastic Specification of Wage Equation
The following stochastic specification of equation (5) is 
employed as a point of departure to test the New Keynesian 
theories of unemployment
wt = ^0 + ^lwt-l + ^2ut + ^ 30t + ^4PV\  + ^5^t + ?l6tt + ^7Tt
+ et , A*2<0 , , A.^ , A.g, X~j > 0. (6)
where x present the wedge between pVj^  and p^^, that is 
terms-of-trade and indirect taxes, U is the unemployment 
rate as a proxy of excess demand for labour and et a zero- 
mean finite-variance disturbance term. The simple partial 
adjustment mechanism, with the dependent variable lagged 
one period, is assumed in order to save degrees of freedom. 
The underlying assumption of equal speed of adjustment to 
innovations in the dependent variables is, however, not to 
restrictive since all explanatory variables influence wages 
at the same time. Price expectations are embedded in the 
partial adjustment mechanism, which may also reflect the 
inertia in the wage adjustment process due to institutional 
arrangements. Trend productivity is employed for 9 since 
wages are assumed not to be influenced by temporary 
fluctuations in productivity caused by labour hoarding and 
other cyclical influences.
232
4 Models Used to Test for Real Wage Rigidity
Six models are employed to test the validity ' of the New 
Keynesian theories of unemployment. Four timeseries models 
are estimated for individual countries. The coefficient 
estimates from these models are used in two cross-section 
models.
4.1 The Timeseries Models
Model 1. This model tests whether the unemployment rate 
exerts a stronger downward pressure on wages over the 
period 1961-73 than over the period 1974-89 by employing 
the following spline function
wt = «o + a lwt-l + a2u\  + a 3uBt + a4PVAt + a50t + «69:
+ a7tt + a8it + elt, (7)
and to define the null hypothesis as Hq : a,2 = a3, and the 
alternative as a2 < 0X3 ,
1. Branson and Rotemberg (1980) and Gordon (1987b) have 
less formally tested whether an excess demand for labour 
place a lower pressure on wages after 1970 (Branson and
Rotemberg) and 1980 to 1984 (Gordon) for a smaller country 
sample. Since they use GDP (Branson and Rotemberg) and the 
deviation of "natural" to actual GDP (Gordon) as excess
demand proxies, these tests may not serve as very powerful 
tests of New Keynesian theories of unemployment. As pointed 
out by Sachs (1980), the productivity slow-down in the wake 
of the first oil price shock has resulted in a GDP that
indicate looser labour markets than actually exist, and
hence bias the estimates in favour of less real wage 
flexibility in the second period.
233
where UA is the unemployment rate from 1961 to 1973 and 0 
thereafter and UB the unemployment rate from 1974 to 1989 
and 0 before then. The null hypothesis is that unemployment 
abruptly ceased to put a sufficient downward pressure on 
wages after the first oil price shock.
Model 2. This model tests whether the unemployment rate 
exerts decreasing levels of pressure on wages in the period 
from 1962 to 1989
wt = ßo + ßlwt-l + ß2ut + p3time*Ut + ß4PVAt + Ps^t + ßö^t
+ Pitt + P8xt + e2t' (8)
and to define the null hypothesis as Hq : ß3 = 0, and the 
alternative as ßß > 0.
The time variable takes the value 1 in 1962, 2 in 1963 etc. 
The model assumes that the bargaining strength of insiders 
relative to outsiders has risen and/or the disutility of 
being unemployed, due to lower opportunity costs of being 
unemployed, has been falling in line with the increased 
unemployment in the OECD countries. The test is more 
powerful than the test in model 1 in the sense that 
institutional factors that have weakened the effect of 
unemployed on wages are likely to have changed smoothly 
over time. Model 1, on the other hand, may be more powerful 
than model 2 in the sense that persistence in unemployment
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was initiated by an adverse shock and an eventual rise in 
the real wage rigidity in the 1970s.
Model 3. This model tests for persistence in unemployment; 
that is whether unemployment is path dependent. According 
to the hysteresis hypothesis (insider-outsider models), the 
long-term unemployed, due to human capital depletion, exert 
a weaker downward pressure on wages than those who are
otemporary unemployed. Equally, persistence may be 
generated in efficiency wage models if the efficiency of 
outsiders is dependent upon lagged unemployment or if wage 
adjustment to shocks is slow. The theories hence predict 
the temporary unemployment component, , to exert a 
stronger downward pressure on wages than the persistent 
unemployment component, uP, in the stochastic equation
wt = To + Tiwt-1 + Y2uPt + T3utt + T4PV\  + Tset + TßCt
+ yitt + T8Tt + e3t' (9)
and to define the null of hysteresis as Hq : Y2 = Y3, and
the alternative as : Y2 > Y3 •
The persistent unemployment component is estimated as the 
predicted value of unemployment in the second-order 
autoregressive process
2. Although hysteresis is frequently assumed to be 
synonymous with persistence the two terms are
conceptionally different. Hysteresis requires that d = 1 in 
the equation Ut = d^t-l + zt + et' whereas persistence 
requires 0 < d < 1.
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ut “ ^0 + ^1^-1 + rl2ut-2 + e4t' (10)
and the temporary element is the residual, e^. The AR(2) 
decomposition is employed since the often more preferred 
ARMA process requires unemployment to be differenced to 
obtain stationarity. Since the estimations are performed in 
levels the ARMA decomposition is unwarranted.
Model 4. The most obvious way to test whether unemployment 
benefits push wages upwards, as predicted by union 
bargaining models and shirking efficiency wage models, is 
to include replacement ratios in the wage equations and 
then test their statistical significance. Since replacement 
ratios are not available for all countries, cover different 
periods and are only readily available up to 1984, the 
residuals, obtained in the preceding models, are regressed 
on the replacement ratios. The test is conservative as some 
of the impact on wages benefits may have been picked up by 
some of the regressors in the wage equations.
3. Some may be tempted to estimate an ARIMA process and 
subsequently integrate the predicted change in the 
unemployment rate to obtain the predicted unemployment 
rate. The stochastic residuals, using this procedure, 
will, however, generate random walk predictions of the 
unemployment rate.
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4.2 The Cross-Country Models
Model 5. This model tests whether wages are most rigid in 
the countries with the highest unemployment rate following 
the two-step procedure used by Grubb et al. (1983), 
Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988) and Klau and Mittelstat 
(1986). In the first step a wage equation is estimated for 
each country. The unemployment rate, averaged over a 
certain period, is subsequently regressed on the estimated 
coefficients on U-j_, where the subscript "i" refers to 
country i. The following equation is estimated
uxi = v0 + vlWRi + e5i, (13-)
and the null hypothesis is specified as Hq : = 0, and the 
alternative : v^  > 0.
The unemployment variable Ux  ^ is defined as the average 
rate of unemployment for country i over the period x. WRxy 
is the estimate of the long-run coefficient on the 
unemployment rate over the same period, for country i, in 
models 1 to 3.
This is a very weak test of New Keynesian theories because 
it omits the channels whereby wage rigidity may be passed 
on to unemployment and assumes unemployment to be due only 
to wages in excess of their market clearing levels. More 
seriously, discouraged worker effects tend to be most
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pronounced in low unemployment countries, that is labour 
force participation tend to mimics employment, also when 
employment is declining. Hence, a given rise in the 
unemployment in Austria, Switzerland and Japan, for 
instance, indicates a looser labour market relative to the 
same rise in unemployment in other OECD countries. Because 
of this effect, the coefficients on the unemployment rates 
in the wage equations numerically become higher for these 
countries and therefore tends to establish a statistical 
significant relationship between cross-country unemployment 
rates and the wage rigidity coefficients. To overcome this 
problem the change in the unemployment rate from 1962-73 to 
1974-89 is additionally regressed on the change of the 
coefficient on unemployment from 1962-73 to 1974-89 in 
model 1.
Model 6. This test relates the cross-country wage rigidity 
to the real wage gap. Assuming that the proportion of the 
real product wage, in excess of the marginal productivity 
of labour, in country i is a function of its unemployment 
rate multiplied by its wage rigidity coefficient we get^
Wj_ - pVA 01 = Wx = Kq + K-^ WRyU ,
and assuming WR to be constant, then
4 . This is in fact a wage equation with homogeneity in 
productivity and prices imposed.
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AWxxi - K0 + K1WRxiAUxi + e6i, (12)
and to define the null hypothesis as Hq : = 0, and the
alternative as > 0,
where Wx is the real wage gap under a Cobb-Douglas 
technology. The model is estimated in differences to remove 
individual heterogeneity.
5 Empirical Estimates
5.1 Econometric Issues
Levels or differences. Models 1 to 3 are estimated in
levels for several reasons. First, estimation in
differences usually requires a dynamic specification that 
demands a larger number of observations than are available 
on an annual basis. Second, estimating in differences 
imposes the restriction of same speed of adjustment over 
time of the dependent variable to changes in the 
explanatory variables unless an error correction model is 
employed. It is conceivable that wages may have adjusted to 
price changes with different time lags due to periods of 
incomes policy and other wage restraining measures. The 
dynamics of the ratio between long-term and short-term 
unemployed over the business cycle may additionally render 
the pace of wage adjustment to changes in the unemployment 
rate rather unstable. Third, Coe (1985) finds changes in
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the unemployment rate to be insignificant in wage equations 
specified in differences, which render tests of New 
Keynesian theories of unemployment inconclusive.^ Fourth, 
estimations in differences tend to suppress relations among 
variables at say business-cycle frequencies in the 
relatively short time period considered here.
Estimating in levels with series containing unit roots may 
give spurious relationships in the Granger-Newbold sense. 
If the variables in the regression, however, are co­
integrated, the relationship is likely to be non-spurious 
(Engle and Granger (1987)). As a consequence, Dickey-Fuller 
tests for co-integration are performed.^
Functional form. All variables, except U, are log-linear. 
Some authors, in the Phillips curve literature, have 
employed 1/U instead of U as a regressor, because 
unemployment cannot become less than zero, and hence muse 
approach zero as excess demand approaches infinity. The 
slow-down in the growth of the unit labour costs after the
5. The wage equation is frequently estimated in differences 
with the exception of the unemployment term, which is 
maintained in levels as in the Phillips curve framework. 
Since the unemployment rate is integrated of an order which 
is higher than zero such a regression is likely to give 
biased parameter estimates and render inferences invalid. 
The hypothesis of non-stationary rate of unemployment was 
accepted by augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for integration, 
even at the 20 per cent critical level.
6. Dickey-Fuller tests may gain power if they are augmented 
with lags of the dependent variable, provided that the lags 
are significant (Engle and Granger (1987)) . Since the 
lagged variables were insignificant, at the 5 per cent 
level, in nearly all the cases a Dickey-Fuller test is 
performed in all cases.
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mid 1970s suggests that even a high unemployment rate may 
put significant downward pressure on wages, which opposes 
the use of 1/U, where changes in U, when U is high, do not 
have much impact on wages. Comparing estimates with U and 
1/U in the wage equation, Coe (1985) obtains better 
estimates when U is employed. The results are better in 
terms of serial correlation and the root mean squared error 
in the forecast period.
Estimation method. Instruments are used for the 
unemployment rate and the value-added price-deflator since 
the unemployment rate is likely to be a function of wages 
and prices are mark-ups on wages. The instruments used for 
the unemployment rate are the unemployment rate lagged one 
period and contemporaneous and lagged values of the 
cyclical and inflation corrected fiscal balance in per cent 
of potential GDP, monetary stock, Ml, deflated by consumer 
prices, a quantity index of OECD exports and a time trend. 
The instruments used for the value-added price-deflator 
include the value-added price-deflator lagged one period 
and contemporaneous and lagged values of Ml and consumer 
prices.
The general to specific method is employed to gain 
efficiency with 10 per cent significance as the bench-mark 
level. Coefficients with signs opposite to the expected
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nsign are deleted. This only occurred for x in a few 
occasions and may suggests that nominal wage rigidity has 
prevented wages to decline in response to declining terms- 
of-trade. Estimates with x decomposed into an increasing 
and a decreasing component, however, did not change the 
sign of the coefficient on x. The maximum likelihood 
estimator, that takes first order serial correlation into 
account, is employed in the estimates with first order 
serial correlation.
Diagnostic tests. Three diagnostic tests are performed:
Dickey-Fuller tests for co-integration , a Lagrange
multiplier test for first order serial correlation and
Ramsey's RESET test of the power three for functional
form/misspecification. Note that the RESET and the DF tests 
may not be valid in the instances where the maximum 
likelihood algorithm, to account for first order serial 
correlation, is employed.
Data. Wages and the value-added price-deflator are measured 
as compensation to employees in manufacturing and private 
services and are detailed in chapter 2. The unemployment 
rate is the OECD standardized unemployment rate for 15 of 
the countries from 1966; the non-standardized unemployment 
rate is employed for the remaining countries and the period 
not covered by the standardized unemployment rate. Trend
7. The conclusions remain unaltered with "wrong" signed 
variables included.
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productivity is estimated as a steady exponential growth
between the bench-mark years 1960, 1973, 1979 and 1989.
Although higher frequency data would allow more
satisfactory dynamic specifications, annual data have the
advantage over higher frequency data that it filters out 
undesirable noise. The sources and estimation of the 
different tax rates are described in the data appendix.
5.2 Empirical Results
Results of the diagnostic tests in the models 1 to 3. 
Overall the diagnostic tests, presented in the tables 1 to 
3, suggest that specification problems are present but not
too severe to jeopardize inferences drawn f rom the
estimates.® The Dickey-Fuller tests suggest that the
variables are co-integrated. The maximum likelihood 
procedure is used in about a third of the estimates. Though 
the maximum likelihood procedure gives more precise 
parameter estimates, it may not correct for the 
specification problems that are likely to be present in the 
estimates with first order serial correlation in the 
residuals. The RESET tests suggest functional form problems 
in 40 per cent of the instances at the 5 per cent level, 
which is likely to be due to the real wage "explosion" from 
the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s.^
8. Note that the diagnostics tests that are most likely to 
indicate specification problems are employed.
9. In the RESET tests the predicted values of wages of the 
power of three is included in an additional regression of 
the wage equation and tested for significance. Since both
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Model 1. The results of estimating equation (2) are 
presented in table 1. The coefficient estimates have the 
expected magnitudes. The coefficient on UB is negative and 
significant for 6 of the 20 countries, indicating some 
trade-off between unemployment and wages after 1974. The 
trade-off, however, is much stronger and clearly evident 
before 1974 with the coefficients on UA significantly 
negative for 17 countries. The Wald tests reject the 
hypothesis of equality of UA and UB for 11 countries at 
the 5 per cent level (x2(1)q Q5 = 3.84), with 0C3 > a2 in 
all cases. These results indicate that unemployment has 
declined as an effective equilibrating factor on the labour 
market after 1974, which concurs with the predictions made 
by the New Keynesian theories of unemployment.
Model 2. The results of estimating model 2 are presented in 
table 2. The chief parameter of interest, namely ß2, is 
significantly negative for 9 countries and significantly 
positive for only one country, at the 5 per cent level. 
This large fraction of negative coefficients allows us to 
reject the alternative hypothesis that the New Keynesian 
theories are true. The results are at variance with the 
results of estimating model 1 and suggest the wage 
flexibility profile may have been cyclically behaved.
the actual and the predicted values of wages rose strongly 
in the "wage explosion" period, but the actual wages 
outpaced the predicted wages, we may expect the RESET tests 
to be significant.
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Identification of the time profile is addressed in section 
6 by employing pooled time-series and cross-section data.
Model 3. The results of estimating model 3 are presented in 
table 3. The Wald tests reject the hypothesis of equality 
between 72 anc* Y3 for 4 countries at the 5 per cent level, 
with 72 < 73 in all the cases. The temporary unemployment 
component is negative and significant, at the 5 per cent 
level, in 4 instances and the persistent unemployment 
component is significant in 10 instances. Overall, the 
results reject the alternative hypothesis of persistence in 
unemployment.
Model 4. The last three columns in table 4 present the F- 
tests of correlating the residuals of the models 1 to 3 
with the replacement ratios. Significance, at the 5 per 
cent level, is obtained only in four of the 45 cases 
considered, with two wrong signed. Consequently, wage 
aspiration is not likely to be a positive function of 
benefit levels as predicted by shirking efficiency wage and 
union bargaining models.
Model 5. Table 5 presents the t-statistics of the 
coefficient on WR. There is no significant correlation 
between the unemployment rate and the wage stickiness 
across countries, even at the 10 per cent level, no matter 
which period the estimates cover, which coefficient
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Table 5. t-ratios of vn in model 4 : c X H- II < O + v1WRxi + e51
Regressor u1961-73 u1974-89 u1961-89 Au 1973-89 Au 61-73/74-89
Model 1 :
WRt (1974-89) 0.45 CMC\loi
WRt (1961-73) 0.93 -0.12
WRt (61-73/74-89) i o tM> -O
Model 2:
WRt(t = 1) 0.04
WRL(t = 8) 0.16
WRt (t = 15) 0.59 1.06
WRt(t = 21) 0.59 1 . 05
WRt(t = 28) 0.60 1 .04
Model 3:
au (pers) 0.28 -0.10 0.13 -0.27
au (temp) 0.44 0.30 0.55 0.10
Notes: t = 1 in 1962, 2 in 1963 etc
Table 6. t-ratios of in model 5:
AwXx = K0 + KlWRxlAuxi + e6i*
Model 1 : x = 1961-73 y = 1974-89
0.21 -0.15
Model 2 : t = 15 t =21 t = 28
0.95 0.97 0.99
x = 1961-89
Model 3: Persistant Temporary
0.31 0 . 95
Notes: See notes to table 5.
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estimates are used and whether changes or levels are 
employed. Hence, the alternative hypothesis is rejected.
Model 6. The t-ratios of estimating model 6 with 
coefficient estimates from models 1 to 3 are presented in 
table 6. In none of the considered cases are the 
coefficients on WRxi^uxi significant, even at the 10 per 
cent level. The real wage gap has therefore not increased 
mostly in countries with the strongest degree of real wage 
rigidity and the predictions made by the New Keynesian 
theories consequently are rejected.
6 Pooled Cross-Section and Time-Series Analysis
The seemingly contradictory results obtained from 
estimating model 1, which suggests that wages became more 
rigid after 1973, and model 2, which suggest wages have 
become more flexible over time, requires a closer look at 
the time profile of wage rigidity. The identification of 
wage rigidity year for year requires the usage of pooled 
time-series and cross-section estimates. If the almost 
simultaneous rise in the unemployment across countries has
been due to, or partly due to, increased real wage
rigidity, the degree of real wage rigidity may have
followed almost the same path across countries. The "wage
flexibility" path, presented by the parameter (p, is traced 
out estimating the equation
2551988
A (w) j_ = cp o i t + r j A (U i) +A(Z)^ + e-j_7^-, (13) 
j=l962
where j takes the value 1 for a particular year, and zero 
elsewhere, and Zj_ is a vector of all the other variables, 
for country i, that are contained in the wage equation (for 
instance equation (6)). Since the unemployment experiences 
have been different across countries, estimates are 
performed for two country groups of equal size divided 
after the average unemployment rate over the period 1974 to 
1989. The data is transformed to growth rates (the 
unemployment rate is measured in differences) in order to 
remove part of the heterogeneity across countries. Feasible 
generalized least squares is employed to account for the 
rest of the heterogeneity across countries, since the 
hypothesis of homogeneity was rejected at the 5 per cent 
level using the OLS dummy variable method. ^  The fixed 
effect model is used as the Lagrange multiplier test 
rejected the hypothesis for a random effects model at the 5 
per cent level.^
The results are presented in table 7. Tracing the 
development of the real wage rigidity parameters over time 
does not shed much light on the variant results cf
O10. A lagrange multiplier test for homogeneity, X (9)- 
distributed under the null of homogeneity, gave the values 
101.71 and 24.33 for the low and the high unemployment: 
group respectively when the OLS estimator is used. The test 
statistics fell to 9.33 and 6.53, respectively, wish 
estimates from the generalized least squares.
11. The Lagrange multiplier test for random effect model, 
X^ (1)-distributed under the null of a random effects model, 
is 4.66 for both country groups.
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Table 7 . Parameter estimates of pooled cross- 
section and time-series.
Low unempl* 1 2 High unempl^
A ( w)t- - 1 0.237
A (pV A ) t 0.814
A(0)t 0.862
A ( 0 t 0.600
A  (t) t 0.048
A(x)t 0.199
A(u)t,1962 2.715
A(u)t,1963 -3.620
A(u) t, 1964 0.713
A(u) t, 1965 -1.432
A(u) t, 1966 -4.341
A(u)t,1967 -1.174
A(u) t, 1968 -0.676
A(u)t,1969 0.138
A ( u > t, 1970 -4.697
A(u) t, 1971 -1.651
A(u)t,1972 1.676
A ( u > t, 1973 -0.458
A <u )t,1974 -3.101
A (u)t,1975 1.385
A <u > t, 1976 -2.238
A (u)t , 1977 -3.259
A(u) t, 1978 -4.621
A(u) t, 1979 -3.120
A(u)t,1980 -1.004
A(u) t, 1981 -0.964
A(u) t, 1982 -0.985
A(u)t,1983 -1.119
A(U) t, 1984 -0.712
A(u) t, 1985 0.494
A(u) t, 1986 -2.484
A(u) t, 1987 -2.216
A(u)t,1988 0.188
(5.57) 0.155 (3.59)
(14.0) 0.900 (15.9)
(7.65) 1.576 (9.12)
(11.6) 0.272 (5.80)
(2.32) 0.121 (4.28)
(3.64) 0.196 (3.29)
(0.58) -0.418 (0.53)
(0.85) -2.463 (1.08)
(0.10) -1.953 (1.46)
(0.27) 0.307 (0.25)
(1.06) -2.922 (2.24)
(1.09) -0.462 (0.33)
(0.42) -1.938 (1.41)
(0.09) -2.568 (1.43)
(2.71) -0.420 (0.63)
(0.73) -2.141 (2.10)
(0.65) 1.465 (1.13)
(0.10) 1.465 (1.14)
(1.72) 1.592 (1.19)
(2.34) 1.252 (3.73)
(2.34) -0.247 (0.34)
(3.91) -2.780 (2.73)
(3.23) -2.400 (2.79)
(2.03) -1.100 (1.37)
(0.68) -0.862 (1.50)
(0.84) -0.911 (2.68)
(1.36) -0.130 (0.42)
(1.94) -1.152 (1.78)
(0.41) -0.907 (1.88)
(0.18) -0.580 (0.83)
(1.64) -0.457 (0.33)
(1.28) -0.574 (0.51)
(0.14) -0.189 (1.98)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.
1. Japan, Australia, Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and 
Switzerland.
2. Canada, USA, Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain and UK.
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estimating models 1 and 2 and may to some extent reflect 
different time paths of the real wage flexibility across 
countries. The estimates, however, provide us with useful 
information. First, the degree of wage flexibility in the 
low unemployment countries fluctuated around a constant 
mean up to about 1980. Thereafter, unemployment ceased to 
put a downward pressure on wages. Second, the highest, and 
most significant, degree of real wage flexibility in the 
high unemployment countries, prevailed in the period from 
1977 to 1984 and agree with the hypothesis that the 
persistent unemployment component plays an important role 
in exerting a downward pressure on wages.
Since the results above suggest a change in the wage 
behaviour after 1977 in the countries with the highest rate 
of unemployment, model 1 was estimated with 1976/1977 as 
split period. With this split period, most of the 
coefficients on the rate of unemployment over the period 
1961-76 became insignificant, even at the 10 per cent 
significance level (the results are not shown here). In the 
few cases where the coefficients on the rates of 
unemployment were significant, unemployment exerted a 
stronger downward pressure on wages after 1977 than before
1976.
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7 Comparison With the Findings of Other Authors
The rejection of the hypothesis that the unemployment rate 
is highest in countries with the most rigid real wages is 
at variance with the finding of Grubb et al. (1983);
Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988) and Klau and Mittelstadt 
(1986) The disagreement may be explained by the
following. First, other studies use manufacturing wages and 
not wages in the non-agricultural private sector. For the 
US, Hall (1975) finds wage stickiness to differ widely 
across sectors with services being the sector with the 
highest degree of wage flexibility. Second, the wage 
elasticity with respect to prices is restricted to one in 
Grubb et al. (1983) and Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988)
As indicated in the first three columns in table 4, the 
restriction of pVA = 1 is rejected in nearly half of the 
cases at the 5 per cent level. The implications of imposing 
the homogeneity restrictions are biased parameter estimates 
and the imposition of co-integration.1  ^ Third, indirect
12. Other authors apply an other measure of real wage 
rigidity, where inflationary innovations may have real 
effects on employment via slow wage adjustment to price 
increases (Branson and Rotemberg (1980); Klau and 
Mittelstadt (1986); Bruno and Sachs (1985)). In this 
chapter real wage rigidity corresponds to the coefficient 
on the unemployment rate in the wage equation, and is 
termed real wage rigidity following Grubb et al. (1983) .
13. Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988) estimate the wage 
equation with an accelerating expected price term to 
account for lagged wage adjustment to prices. This element, 
however, is not likely to affect the argument below.
14. The bias of restricting the long-run coefficient on 
value added prices to unity can be computed as the 
following. Let the wage equation for simplicity be given by
Wt = otj_Ut + a2pVAt + et.
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taxes, terms-of-trade, direct taxes and pay-roll taxes are 
not included in their models. Hence, their parameter 
estimates may embody an omitted variables bias to the 
extent that the time trend, that is included in most 
studies, does not account well for the omitted variables. 
Fourth, the estimates of Grubb et al. (1983) and Coe (1985) 
may be biased since the estimates are performed with 
unemployment rate is measured in levels and the remaining 
variables measured as growth rates.
The evidence that real wages probably have not become more 
rigid over time is at variance with the hypothesis that the 
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, NAIRU, has 
increased. Most studies find NAIRU to track the actual 
unemployment rate closely (Coe (1985); Adams et al. 
(1987)) . Since the unemployment rate has increased over the
Rearranging yields
(w/pVA)t = a1Ut + (a2 - l)pVAt + et .
If the term (a2 - 1) is omitted, the least-squares 
estimator of a^ is
est(a1) = Z(w/pVA)tUt/Zu2t
= X(a1Ut + (a2 - l)pVAt + et)tUt/IU2t
= ax + <a2 - l)Zpv\ u t/U2t + LetUt,
then the expected value of the estimate of a^ is
E (est (a1)) = ax + (a2 - l)b12,
where bio is the regression coefficient in the regression 
where pVAt is regressed on Ut . If a2 < 1/ the estimate of 
a^ is downward biased since Ut and pVA are likely to be 
positively correlated.
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past two decades in all of the OECD countries, the NAIRU 
estimates imply that unemployment has declined to put a 
sufficient downward pressure on wages and that the 
persistent component of unemployment does not affect wages 
to the same extent as the temporary component of 
unemployment.
Why do the estimates of an increasing NAIRU and its
implications for the wage equation not concur with the
results of this chapter? When NAIRU is estimated as the
unemployment rate free of cyclical influences, from an 
estimate where the unemployment rate is regressed on 
cyclical and structural factors, it is not surprising that 
it gravitates towards the actual rate of unemployment over 
time. In the other commonly used method, a price and wage 
equation are estimated and solved for the unemployment rate 
which is consistent with a stable rate of inflation. Most 
of these estimates are likely to be biased because 
important variables are often left out of the price and 
wage equations. In fact, the assumption of an increased 
NAIRU over the past 15 years or so is at variance with the 
declining real wage gap, found in the chapters 2 and 3, 
since the mid 1970s for most OECD countries because NAIRU 
to a large extent reflects the real wage gap (Adams et al.
(1987)) .
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8 Conclusions
Most of the evidence in this chapter does not suggest that 
real wages have become more sticky over the past three 
decades in the OECD countries in contrast to the 
predictions made by the New Keynesian theories of 
unemployment. The time-series tests of whether wages have 
become more rigid or flexible over time, however, give 
results that to some extent depend on which model is 
employed and the choice of the split period in the spline 
function. This underscores the pitfalls of using only one 
model to test New Keynesian theories of unemployment.
Decomposition of unemployment into a persistent and a 
temporary component gave the result that temporary 
fluctuations in unemployment exert a lower downward 
pressure on wages that persistent unemployment for a high 
fraction of countries, which is the opposite of the 
predictions made by insider-outsider models and efficiency 
wage models of unemployment. This result is further 
supported by the pooled time-series and cross-section 
estimates. Finally, the failure of unemployment to put the 
strongest downward pressure on the warranted real product 
wage in the countries with the highest degree of real wage 
flexibility is furthermore evidence against the New 
Keynesian theories of unemployment.
DATA SOURCES
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The wedge between consumer prices and the value-added 
price-deflator is computed as the ratio between the two. 
Direct taxes are calculated as General Government direct 
tax and other contributions receipts divided by GDP, from 
OECD's National Accounts (NA) . Pay-roll taxes are computed 
as compensation to employees NA divided by direct wages in 
the non-agricultural sectors from ILO's Year Book. 
Replacement ratios are from Chan-Lee et al. (1987).
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CHAPTER 8
HOW MUCH HAVE WAGES, MISMATCH, INCOME AND PRODUCTIVITY 
CONTRIBUTED TO UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE OECD COUNTRIES?
Abstract. A model to simulate changes in unemployment under 
different paths' of "exogenous" variables is established 
for 20 countries to assess factors that may have been 
responsible for the rise in unemployment since 1973 and why 
unemployment experiences have differed across countries. 
The simulations suggest that changes in the combined 
effects of aggregate demand and productivity and mismatch 
have been the most important factors contributing to the 
rise in unemployment since 1973. These factors also explain 
some of the cross country differences in unemployment 
rates.
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Following the seminal paper of Layard and Nickell (1986) 
several country studies have attempted to account for the 
rise in the rate of unemployment, especially in the special 
issue of Economica on unemployment in 1986. In these 
studies the rise in the unemployment rate in the OECD 
countries since the first oil price shock has been found to 
be a result of too low GDP growth and changes in wage push 
factors which have driven the wage upward in excess of its 
equilibrium level. Two problems are encountered in these 
studies. First, the Layard and Nickell model is inadequate 
in many respects as discussed in chapter 5. Second, studies 
of individual countries cannot be easily used to account 
for the cross country differences in unemployment 
experiences.
This chapter develops a model to shed light on factors that 
may have been responsible for the rise in the unemployment 
over time and the different unemployment experiences across 
countries. The model is in many respects similar but more 
detailed and less restrictive than the model suggested in 
the latter part of chapter 6. The model consisting of 
labour demand, labour supply and wage setting is estimated 
to simulate the unemployment path for each country in two 
experiments with different sets of assumptions about 
changes in the "exogenous" variables determining the rate 
of unemployment. In the first experiment an unemployment 
path after 1973 is simulated with most of the "exogenous" 
variables assumed to grow at the yearly average growth rate
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from 1961 to 1989 for the individual countries. The 
simulated unemployment path is then compared with the 
actual unemployment path. Hence, the contribution to the 
change in the unemployment rate as a result of the slow­
down of the GDP after 1973, for instance, can be uncovered. 
In the second experiment the "exogenous" variables for the 
individual countries are assumed to follow the average 
value of other OECD countries. Comparing the path of the 
actual unemployment rate with the unemployment path 
simulated with every "exogenous" OECD variable gives an 
indication to the extent to which diverse paths’ of the 
"exogenous" variables have been responsible for the 
different unemployment experiences across countries.
This model differs from that of Layard and Nickell (1986) 
(LN) in the following respects. First, the supply of labour 
is endogenous, whereas it is treated as an exogenous factor 
in the LN model. Second, changes in GDP and productivity 
have long-term effects in this model, whereas they cannot 
affect the unemployment rate in the LN model. Third, no 
cross-equation restrictions are imposed on the model in 
contrast the LN model. Fourth, price homogeneity is not 
assumed in the wage equation as in the LN model. Since the 
coefficient on prices is below unity in most cases, shown 
in the empirical section, inflation has a positive impact 
on employment.
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The chapter is organised as follows. The equations employed 
to simulate unemployment are established in section 2. The 
equations are estimated in section 3. The unemployment 
paths' under alternative assumptions about changes in the 
"exogenous" variables are simulated and compared with the 
results of other authors in section 4. Conclusions and 
policy implications are briefly discussed in section 5.
2 The Model
The model comprises of equations for labour demand, wages 
and labour supply. Whereas the labour demand and the labour 
supply equations are employed to simulate the hypothetical 
unemployment path, the wage equation is used to trace out 
the factors that have been responsible for the wage path. 
More detailed discussions of the labour demand, labour 
supply and the wage equations are found in chapters 5, 6 
and 7 respectively.
Labour supply. Labour force participation is assumed to be 
a positive function of real take home pay, population of 
working age (15-64 years of age), POP, labour demand, Ld, 
and mismatch, MM,
Lst = Ls (Wdirt (l - tt)/PECPIt,POPt,Ldt,MMt), (1) 
+ + + +
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where Wd -^r is direct wage payments, tt the average direct 
tax rate on income and the expected consumer prices.
Labour demand is measured as employment which is assumed to 
affect labour supply via discouraged worker effects.
Mismatch is intended to account for changes in the
composition of jobs and the persistence effect in labour
supply as discussed in chapter 6.
Labour demand is given by
Ldt = Ld (Wt/PVAt,@t) , (2)
+
where W is compensation to employees and PVA the value- 
added price-deflator.
Wage equation. With lowercase letters representing logs the 
wage equation is given by
wt = wt (xt,pVAt,peCPIt,6t,tt,£t), (3)
+ + + + + +
where is pay-roll taxes to account for the wedge between
wdir and W .
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3 Empirical Estimates 
3.1 Specification
Stochastic specification. The equations (1) to (3) are 
stochastically specified as
lst = ßo + ßlP°Pt + ß2ltdt + ß3mmt + ß4wdlSpt + P4wdlSPt-l 
+ elt (4)
ldt = a0 + alldt-l + a2 (w-p)t + a3yt + e2t (5)
wt = + Ylwt-1 + ^2ut + ^3et + ^4PV\  + YsCt + Y6tt
+ Yl't + YQmmt + T9P°Pt + e3t' (6)
where wci;'-sP is the real after tax wage, lt^ is the labour 
demand for the whole economy whereas 1^ only covers most of 
the private sector as discussed in the data section below, 
% is the wedge between p^A and consumer prices, pPPI, that 
is the composite of terms-of-trade and indirect taxes, u 
the rate of unemployment as a proxy of excess demand for 
labour, y is GDP and e a zero-mean finite-variance 
disturbance term.
A time trend, or a split time trend to account for the 
productivity slow-down after 1973, as a proxy for labour 
augmenting technological progress are omitted from the
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estimates of labour demand since it was positive in many 
instances. Since the elasticity of substitution, indicated 
by the negative of the long-run coefficient on the real 
product wage in the estimates below, is lower than one in 
almost all cases, a positive coefficient on the time trend 
indicates technological regress.
The dynamics of the wage and labour demand equations are 
restricted to the dependent variable lagged one period. The 
dynamics allowed for in the labour supply are limited to 
real disposable income since labour supply may be assumed 
to adjust instantaneously to the remaining explanatory 
variables.
1. The factor augmenting production function is given by
Y = Q [ A (t) L, B(t)K] ,
where A and B are input efficiency parameters. Under CES 
technology and constant returns to scale, the factor 
augmenting production function becomes
Y = [5 (A exp (A.Lt) L) ~P + (1-5) (B exp (A,Kt) K) _P]^P,
where p = (1 - g )/g , g the elasticity of substitution and 5 
a distributional parameter. Optimazation under profit 
maximization yields
P ^ yP+15 (A exp (A^t) ) - W = 0, then
L = 5G (W/PVA)_G(A exp (?iLt) ) g_1Y.
If g < 1, then A exp(A.Lt) and L are negatively related.
Note, that Hicks-neutral technological progress in the 
Cobb-Douglas derived labour demand function, where the 
labour demand is a function of real wages and capital 
stock, may be expected to affect labour demand positively 
since it influences income, and hence the marginal 
productivity of labour, positively.
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Estimation method. The instrument variable method is 
employed with each instrument entered contemporaneously and 
lagged one period. The instrumented variable is lagged one 
period. In the labour demand equation the arguments in the 
wage equation are used as instruments for real wages, and 
the following instruments are employed for GDP: Population 
of working age, cyclical and inflation adjusted fiscal 
balance as a per cent of potential GDP, real capital stock, 
Ml divided by consumer prices and world trade volume. In 
the labour supply equation the arguments in the labour 
demand equation are used as instruments for employment and 
the instruments used for GDP in the labour demand equation 
are used as instruments for real disposable income. In the 
wage equation the instruments for the GDP in the labour 
demand equation are used as instruments for the 
unemployment rate and Ml, consumer prices and labour costs 
as instruments for the value-added price-deflator.
The general to specific method is employed to gain 
efficiency with 5 per cent significance as the bench-mark 
critical level. Coefficients with signs opposite to the 
expected sign were deleted. This occurred only for x and is 
discussed in the previous chapter. The maximum likelihood 
estimator that takes first order serial correlation into 
account is employed in the estimates with first order
serial correlation.
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Data. Labour costs, employment in the labour demand 
equation and the value-added price-deflator cover private 
service and manufacturing. Trend productivity is estimated 
as a steady exponential growth between the bench-mark years 
1960, 1973, 1979 and 1989. Labour demand is measured in 
person hours. Mismatch is measured as the accumulated value 
of the change in the manufacturing employment in the years 
that it is falling. The disadvantage of this procedure is
that it does not account for the fact that some of the
laid-off workers will drop out of the labour force after
some years of unemployment while others find employment 
elsewhere. The tax rates used in this chapter are the same 
as the previous chapter. Data sources are detailed in 
chapters 3 and 7.
3.2 Empirical Estimates
Labour demand. The results of estimating equation (5) , 
presented in table 1, are encouraging. The coefficients are 
significant in all the cases, except for real wages for 
Greece and Italy. Moreover, the magnitude of the long-run 
coefficients are quite similar across countries, 
conceivably reflecting not too dissimilar technologies. 
Whilst the diagnostic tests do not indicate 
misspecification, the tests may be invalid in the few cases 
where first order serial correlation is corrected for.
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Labour supply. The results of estimating the labour supply 
function are presented in table 2. The real disposable 
income is insignificant in all instances, as it is with 
most other macroeconomic studies. Labour supply is very 
responsive to labour demand and population of working age. 
The tendency for labour supply to mimic employment in 
Japan, Austria, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland is 
noteworthy and implies that changes in the level of 
employment have a muted impact on unemployment. The low 
coefficient on population of working age for most of the 
same set of countries is remarkable too. Mismatch is 
significant for seven countries, all of which have 
experienced a stronger decline in the manufacturing 
employment than the OECD average, with the exception of 
Japan.
Unemployment benefits have often been suggested as a 
contributing factor to the rise in the unemployment via 
higher wage claims and higher incentives to join the labour 
force (Bean et al. (1986); Layard and Nickell (1986); 
Layard et al. (1991); Dolado et al. (1986); Minford
(1983)). Since replacement ratios are not readily available 
for all countries and span a shorter time period than 
considered, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
residuals of the wage and labour supply equations are 
regressed on the replacement ratios for the years for which 
data are available. Replacement ratios do not explain the 
residuals significantly in any case suggesting that
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unemployment benefits are not likely to affect labour force 
participation and there is unlikely to be an omitted 
variable bias in the parameter estimates.
Wage equation. The results of estimating equation (6) are 
presented in table 3. The need to correct for the presence 
of first order serial correlation in most of the estimates 
suggests specification problems. The wage explosion from 
the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s may be the cause of the 
problem. The problem is not dealt with here, in order to 
keep the analysis as simple as possible, and because the 
strong wage aspirations over this period are difficult to 
model. In contrast to other studies that account for the 
unemployment path, price homogeneity has not been assumed 
since biased parameter estimates result if this assumption 
is violated. As appears from table 3, the hypothesis of
2. The bias of restricting the long-run coefficient on 
value added prices to unity can be computed as the 
following. Let the wage equation be given by
wt = alxt + a2PV\  + et'
where X is a vector of all other variables. Rearranging 
yields
(w/pVA)t = a1Xt + (a2 - l)pVAt + et.
If the term (a2 ~ 1) is omitted, the least-squares 
estimator of a^  is
est (a2 ) = Z(w/pVA)tXt/Zx2t
= Z(a1Xt + (a2 - l)pVAt + et)tXt/Zx2t
= a: + <a2 - l)ZpVAtXt/X2t + XetXt,
then the expected value of the estimate of a^  is
E (est (a]_) ) = a^  + (a2 ~ l)b-^ 2 /
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price homogeneity is rejected for half of the countries. 
Since the long-run coefficients on the value-added price- 
deflator in most instances are below one, long-run nominal 
price rigidity exists, and higher prices have a positive 
impact on labour demand.
Except for France, the trend productivity and the value- 
added price-deflator are significantly different from zero 
and the long-run coefficients on trend productivity is 
close to unity. Pay-roll taxes are not fully passed on into 
wage costs. Direct taxes influence labour costs marginally 
and the combined impact of terms-of-trade and indirect 
taxes on labour costs are negligible or non-existent. 
Finally, for Belgium and Germany only do replacement ratios 
explain the residuals, suggesting that wages are not likely 
to be much affected by unemployment benefits. This result 
concur with the results in the previous section.
4 Accounting for the Unemployment Path
Two simulation experiments are performed to shed light on 
factors that may have contributed to the changes in the 
rate of unemployment over time and across countries. In the 
first experiment an unemployment path after 1973 is 
simulated with most of the "exogenous" variables assumed to
where bio is the regression coefficient in the regression 
where pV  ^ is regressed on Xt. If a2 < 1/ the estimate of 
a^  is downward biased since Xt and pVA are likely to be 
positively correlated.
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grow at the yearly average growth rate from 1961 to 1989 
for the individual countries and compared with the actual 
unemployment path. In the second experiment the "exogenous" 
variables for the individual countries are assumed to 
follow the average value of other OECD countries.
The developments in productivity and income are 
independently treated in the simulation experiments; that 
is labour demand is simulated with an "exogenous" income 
path and wages are simulated with an "exogenous" 
productivity path. However, income and productivity are 
merged in the presentation below under the heading GDP 
because of difficulties in separating the net impact of 
productivity and factor usage on labour demand. In fact, 
income and productivity are highly correlated. To separate 
the effects of factor use and productivity on income, and 
hence labour demand, is a complex task and hence
, Odisregarded.J
3. Higher productivity affects labour demand via two 
channels. First, higher real product wages, caused by the 
productivity term in the wage equation, lower labour 
demand. This, in turn, increases labour productivity, due 
to substitution towards capital, which further increases 
the real wages via the wage equation. This process 
continues until convergence. The second effect of 
productivity works via factor biased technological 
progress. The effect can be seen by considering the labour 
demand function with factor augmenting technological 
progress repeated from footnote 1:
L = öG (W/PVA)_G(A exp (XLt))g_1Y,
where A exp(X.Lt) is labour augmenting progress which 
affects labour demand negatively for o < 1. So if c < 1 the 
substitution effect from capital to labour as a result of 
higher labour productivity (labour augmenting progress) is 
not strong enough to outweigh the displacement of labour.
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Employment in the residual sector, lt^ - 1^ , composing of 
the General Government, agriculture and mining, is ignored 
as a potential factor which has contributed to the changes 
in the rate of unemployment. A change in the government 
employment has an impact on the unemployment path via the 
balanced budget multiplier. However, its impact is time 
variant, depending on the way in which the fiscal stimuli 
is financed and the strength of crowding out, which is 
likely to differ over time and across countries. The impact 
of both these effects are to difficult to identify in a 
simple model. Finally, the coefficient on the value-added 
price-deflator of 1.34 for Japan is set equal to unity and 
the coefficient on the population in labour supply of 2.20 
for Denmark is omitted because these coefficient estimates 
do not make much sense.
Experiment 1. This experiment simulates the equations (4) 
to (6) with the hypothetical drifts in the "exogenous" 
variables for each country since 1973. The "exogenous" 
variables are divided into a group of upward trended 
variables and a fraction of variables that cannot increase 
indefinitely. The former group comprises of GDP, 
productivity, mismatch, population of working age and the 
value-added price-deflator. The paths' of these variables
Whereas the first effect can be computed, the second cannot 
because labour augmenting technological progress is 
excluded in the labour demand function and is hence likely 
to be captured by the income term.
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after 1973 in the experiment are estimated using the 
average growth rates over the period 1961 to 1989. The 
latter group composes of pay-roll taxes, direct taxes, 
indirect taxes and terms-of-trade. The simulations are 
performed from the base value of the variables in 1973.^
The results of simulating model 1 are presented in table 4. 
The numbers in the table indicate the percentage points the 
unemployment would have changed from 1973 to 1989 had the 
"exogenous" variables followed the "artificial" paths' 
rather than the actual paths'. Estimation errors do not 
influence the results as the contributions are computed as 
the difference between the unemployment path simulated with 
the actual and the "artificial" changes in the "exogenous" 
variables. The results suggest that the combined effect of 
productivity and GDP growth slow-downs after 1973, denoted 
GDP in table 4, has been the main factor contributing to 
the unemployment rise in most of the countries. Denmark and 
the UK are exceptions. The results for the UK reflect the 
fact that the productivity and the GDP growth rate did not 
change much after 1973.^ A stronger slow-down in
4. The procedure employed here differs from other studies 
in the sense that the "exogenous" variables are decomposed 
into growing and shift variables. Other studies, for 
instance the studies in the special issue of Economica 
(1986), treat all "exogenous" variables as shift variables. 
Since income is treated cyclically in most of the studies, 
following the model suggested by Layard and Nickell (1986), 
the distinction becomes less important.
5. This finding is not at variance with the finding of 
chapter 5 where the GDP slow-down was found to have had 
severe consequences for the UK unemployment. The 
simulations in chapter 5 terminated in 1983 when the UK 
recession was at its deepest.
Table 4. Break-down of the contributions to the actual changes
in unemployment with hypothetical changes in "exogenous" 
variables, 1973 to 1989.
p v a
iTaxes gdp mm pop Total Actual
r ei
Canada 0.18 - 1.26 - 3.63 - 5.09 0.38 1.99
USA 0.84 - 3.56 - 3.13 - 1.10 2.18 - 4.77 0.39
Japan 0.01 0.00 - 0.08 - 0.61 - - 0.68 0.99
Australia 0.77 - 0.99 - 3.75 - 0.74 1.89 - 2.82 3.93
Austria - 0.06 0.42 0.59 - - 0.63 0.32 2.04
Belgium 0.18 - 3.64 - 9.27 - - 0.77 - 13.50 7.04
Denmark - 0.01 1.24 4.87 - 1.02 7.12 7.35
Finland 0.02 - 0.86 - 2.14 - 2.18 - 0.80 1.18
France - 3.37 - 2.05 - 10.53 - 1.20 - 14.75 6.83
Germany 0.04 - 0.10 - 1.14 - - 0.75 - 1.95 5.94
Greece 0.10 - - 6.02 - - 4.64 - 10.56 5.49
Ireland - 0.28 - 0.02 - 0.37 - 3.74 - 0.77 - 5.18 10.08
Italy 0.00 - 0.22 - 1.39 - 0.03 - 1.14 5.67
Netherl. - 0.10 0.32 - 0.13 - 2.36 - - 2.27 6.14
Norway - 0.07 - 0.01 - - - 0.06 3.44
Portugal - 0.59 0.17 0.35 - - - 0.07 2.38
Spain 5.23 - 1.34 - 22.55 - - 1.33 - 19.97 16.03
Sweden 0.29 - 0.28 0.23 - 0.43 - - 0.19 - 1.12
Switzerl. - 0.03 - 0.29 - - 0.26 0.45
UK 0.29 1.06 2.61 — - 1.70 - 2.26 3.97
1. Composite of terms-of-trade, direct and indirect taxes and 
payroll taxes.
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productivity growth than GDP growth in Denmark after 1973 
has prevented a employment growth slow-down. Spain, in 
contrast, did not experience a productivity slow-down after 
1973 but a slow-down in factor usage.
In this experiment the "Wage push" factors have not been 
responsible for much of the rise in unemployment, which to 
a small extent reflects the inability of the wage equation 
to account for the real wage explosion from the mid 1960s 
to the mid 1970s. Terms-of-trade and taxes, composing of 
indirect and direct taxes and pay-roll taxes, have pushed 
the unemployment rate up by 0.54 per cent for all countries 
on average. Whereas the inflation slow-down in France has 
added 3.4 percentage to the rate of unemployment, the 
increased inflation in Spain after 1973 has generated a 5.2 
percentage lower unemployment rate due to lower real wages.
Concerning labour supply factors, the slow-down in the 
population growth has reduced the rise in the rate of 
unemployment in countries which traditionally have had a 
high inflow of labour such as Canada, the US and Australia. 
The opposite has been experienced in Greece, Spain and the 
UK. Finally, mismatch, has contributed significantly to the 
rise in unemployment in Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands.
Experiment 2. This experiment simulates the unemployment 
paths' after 1973 assuming the "exogenous" variables follow 
the average paths' of all countries. For the countries
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where the coefficient on employment in the labour supply 
equation is close to, or even above, unity the average 
coefficient on employment in the labour supply function for 
all countries is employed, that is for Japan, Austria, 
Italy, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland.
The results of simulating the model are presented in table 
5. The countries that in particular would have gained from 
the hypothetical path in the "exogenous" variables, in 
terms of lower rates of unemployment are Spain, Ireland and 
Canada. Spain has been trapped by its composition of the 
GDP growth as discussed above. Ireland has been trapped by 
a decline in manufacturing employment while the rate of 
unemployment in Canada has been boosted by high population 
growth. The countries that would have lost from the 
hypothetical path of the "exogenous" variables are Japan, 
Denmark, Finland and the UK. Japan would experience higher 
unemployment due to lower factor using GDP growth and 
Denmark due to higher taxes. Finland and the UK would 
experience higher unemployment due to higher population 
growth.
The results indicate that the paths in the "exogenous" 
variables can explain some of the different rates of 
unemployment among countries. The countries that have 
experienced the strongest rise in the rate of unemployment
have seen a relative slow GDP growth relative to the
productivity growth and the strongest decline in
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Table 5 . Break-down of the contributions to the unemployment
changes from 1973 to 1989 
"exogenous" variables.
with the OECD average changes in the
p v a Taxes gdp mm pop Total Actual
Canada -0.27 0.75 3.72 - -7.57 -3.37 1.99
USA -1.43 4.45 5.79 -1.76 -3.62 3.43 0.39
Japan 2.96 1.87 2.46 0.34 - 7.63 0.99
Australia 0.29 6.67 2.58 -1.73 -5.71 2.10 3.93
Austria -2.00 -2.66 1.27 - 0.78 -2.61 2.04
Belgium -0.50 -2.46 -3.80 - 6.19 -0.58 7.04
Denmark 0.33 3.86 0.72 - - 4.91 7.35
Finland 0.00 1.73 0.78 - 3.92 6.43 1.18
France 3.86 -0.50 0.25 - 0.90 4.46 6.83
Germany 0.27 2.15 -2.65 - 2.05 1.82 5.94
Greece 0.02 - 0.01 - -1.72 -1.69 5.49
Ireland -0.25 0.63 0.26 -4.00 -0.96 -4.32 10.08
Italy -0.01 - 0.24 -2.07 0.61 -1.23 5.67
Netherl. -1.98 4.53 0.82 -4.66 - -1.29 6.14
Norway -0.07 - 0.60 - - 0.53 3.44
Portugal 1.34 -1.12 1.92 - - 2.14 2.38
Spain 3.85 1.52 -12.51 - -2.21 -12.39 16.03
Sweden -1.40 1.86 0.43 -1.00 - -0.14 -1.12
Switzerl. 1.05 - -2.15 - - 1.10 0.45
UK 0.08 3.19 -0.99 — 9.81 12.09 3.97
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manufacturing employment. Price movements, taxes and 
population growth, in contrast, are not much correlated 
with the different unemployment experiences. Comparing the 
last two columns of table 5 indicates only a weak 
correlation between the change in the rate of unemployment 
and the simulated changes. If the high unemployment 
performers, encompassing Spain and Ireland, are ignored the 
correlation becomes almost nonexistent. This suggest 
changes in the "exogenous" variables considered here have 
not been responsible for the differences in the rate of 
unemployment across countries, although they contribute to 
the explanation of the cross country differences.
4.1 Comparison With Results of Other Studies
The results obtained in the previous section are 
encouraging since they concur with some of the finding of 
other authors and, more importantly, are able to explain 
some of the conflicting results obtained in the single 
country and the cross-country studies. The finding that 
excess real wages do not account for much of the rise in 
the rate of unemployment concur with the estimates of 
Gordon (1987), the chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis and 
Artus (1987) suggesting that the real wage gap has declined 
since the mid 1970s and has become small in the 1980s. This 
result is additionally in line with the findings of Glyn 
and Rowthorn (1988) that changes in real wages over the 
period 1973 to 1985 are not correlated with changes in the
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rate of unemployment over the same period across countries. 
The importance of the manufacturing employment decline as a 
factor explaining some of the changes in the rate of 
unemployment over time and across countries concur with the 
results of Glyn and Rowthorn (1988) .
The finding that the changes in GDP growth have been a 
major factor contributing to the changes in unemployment 
over time is not easily compared with the results of other 
time series studies since the data period terminates in 
1983 in these studies (most of the studies in the special 
issue of Economica in 1986) . That this factor additionally 
explains some of the different changes in the rates of 
unemployment across countries concur, to some extent, with 
the findings of Glyn and Rowthorn (1988) (their data period 
terminates in 1985) . Glyn and Rowthorn find GDP changes 
barely significant at explaining unemployment changes 
across countries. Since the effect of GDP on labour demand 
is the composite of factor usage and the direct and 
secondary influences of productivity in the present study 
some discrepancy of the results are not surprising. Extreme 
observations presented by Spain and the US, for instance, 
can explain the point. Spain, on the one hand, has had a 
high growth in both GDP and labour productivity and hence a 
slow growth in employment. The US, on the other hand, has 
experienced a modest increase in the rate of unemployment, 
even though GDP growth has been low. This has occurred
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because the low growth in GDP has outpaced productivity 
growth and as a result employment has increased.
Finally, the finding that changes in population of working 
age has not contributed to cross country differences in the 
rate of unemployment is at variance with Glyn and Rowthorn 
(1988). Extreme observations again may help to explain the
disagreement Ireland has seen a strong growth in the
population of working age and unemployment since 1973.
Switzerland and Japan, on the other hand, have seen a
modest rise in the rate of unemployment and a decline in 
the population of working age. Since labour supply is 
insensitive to population of working age in all the three 
countries, reflected in the estimates of labour supply, 
changes in population do not have much effect on 
unemployment in the simulations in the previous section.
5 Conclusions
The chapter has established a model to simulate 
unemployment changes under different assumptions of the 
paths of the "exogenous" variables. Although the 
simulations suggest the rise in the unemployment and 
especially the cross country differences in unemployment 
experiences to be complex, some patterns can be traced out. 
First, wage push factors can explain only a modest 
proportion of the rise in the rate of unemployment since 
1973 concurring with the fact that the disequilibrium wage
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has not changed much over the same period. Second, the 
slow-down in the growth of GDP relative to productivity 
since 1973 has contributed much to the increased rate of 
unemployment and explains some of the different changes in 
the unemployment rates across countries that has occurred 
since 1973. Third, the decline in the manufacturing 
employment has been an important contributing factor behind 
the rise in the rate of unemployment in Ireland, Italy and 
the Netherlands. Fourth, different changes in the 
population of working age growth have not contributed to 
the different unemployment changes across countries. Fifth, 
the strong rise in the value-added price-deflator for Spain 
after 1973 has alleviated its unemployment problem since 
wages have not changed proportionally.
The policy implications of the findings are as follows. 
First, since wages in general do not follow prices 
proportionally, an expansive monetary policy may not only 
boost labour demand via the traditional IS/LM multiplier 
but also via lower real wages. Second, although declining 
manufacturing employment over the medium or long term may 
be difficult to prevent and, even if a desirable outcome, a 
sudden and large decline may generate higher unemployment, 
even though employment is growing in other sectors, and may 
be avoided to some extent by an appropriate mix of fiscal 
and monetary policy. Third, an economic policy directed 
towards increased productivity may have negative employment
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consequences. If directed towards factor usage, it 
unambiguously increase employment.
will
REFERENCES
293
Artus, J., 1987, "Comments," in R. Z. Lawrence and C. L. 
Schultze (eds.), Barriers to European Growth: A 
Transatlantic View, 292-295.
Bean, C. R., P. R. G. Layard and S. J. Nickell, 1986, "The 
Rise in Unemployment: A Multicountry Study," Economica, 53 
S1-S22.
Chan-Lee, J. H., D. T. Coe and M. Prywes, 1987, 
"Microeconomic Changes and Macroeconomic Wage Disinflation 
in the 1980s," OECD Economic Studies, No. 8, Spring.
Dolado, J. J., J. L. Malo de Molina, 1986, "Spanish 
Industrial Unemployment: Some Explanatory Factors," 
Economica, 53, S313-S334.
Glyn, A. and B. Rowthorn, 1988, "West European 
Unemployment: Corporatism and Structural Change," American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 78, 194-199.
Gordon, R. J., 1987, "Productivity, Wages, and Prices 
Inside and Outside of Manufacturing in the U.S., Japan, and 
Europe," European Economic Review, 31, 685-739.
Layard, R. and S. Nickell, 1986, "Unemployment in Britain," 
Economica, 53, S121-S169.
Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman, 1991, Unemployment, 
Oxford University Press.
Minford, P., 1983, "Labour Market Equilibrium in an Open 
Economy," Oxford Economic Papers (Supplement), 35, 207-244.
Rowthorn, B. and A. Glyn, 1987, "The Diversity of 
Unemployment Experience Since 1973," Applied Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 40, University of Oxford, 1-89.
Sachs, J. D., 1980, "Comments," European Economic Review, 
13, 333-337.
